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A Heuristic Methodology for Locating Monitoring Stations to Detect
Contamination Events in Potable Water Distribution Systems
James R. Chastain, Jr.
ABSTRACT
The requirements to protect public water systems from intentional contamination have
expanded in the years following September 11, 2001. The areal extent and non-linear
nature of water demand and movement in the distribution system makes efficient
location of sampling points difficult. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that
contamination conceptually can occur at any point and at any time within the distribution
system. Small to mid-sized water systems are especially at a disadvantage in
addressing this issue due to limited resources available to them.

This paper proposes a heuristic methodology to identify strategic locations within the
system that can be established as critical detection points for such occurrences. The
process uses off-the-shelf software and is structured to be accessible to small and midsized water system managers. This methodology is different from others proposed in
the literature in that it uses computer simulations to create a database of water system
response to contamination at every node in the system. A process is developed to mine
this database systematically after considering concentration thresholds and “time since
injection” parameters. Finally, using pivot tables and graphs, a network of monitoring
locations is identified to provide efficient coverage of the system under the conditions
imposed.

x

Chapter 1 Problem Statement

Introduction
September 8, 1853 was a critical day for the water industry. On that day Dr. John Snow
removed the handle from the Broad Street well which helped to stem the spread of
cholera during the London epidemic (Aldrich, Griffith, & Cooke, 1993). In doing so he
ushered in a new era not only in the field of analytic epidemiology but also in the role
and responsibilities of public water supplies. A safe, reliable public water supply has
always been a requirement for a sustainable community but from that point forward there
was a new realization of the effect that water quality played in disease transmission and
public health. Water supplies at the turn of the last century faced widespread fear of the
effects of cholera, dysentery and other critical waterborne diseases. However, as the
understanding of disease and its etiology improved, water utilities developed strategies
to address those threats. The result was dramatic reductions in the morbidity and
mortality of the population they served.

September 11, 2001 also will serve as a date which initiated a major paradigm shift in
the water industry. Many of the design and operational practices incorporated throughout
a water system are built on a foundation of public trust and the common good. However,
now, in addition to accidental contamination, the possibility of intentional contamination
of water supplies to disrupt society to achieve certain political or ideological goals must
be considered. Water supplies have evolved into much more complex and
sophisticated systems since Dr. Snow sought to protect consumers against the threat of
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waterborne disease approximately 150 years ago. Now as a different dimension to an
old problem asserts itself, it will be necessary to break down preconceived patterns of
thinking and look carefully at each component of the infrastructure and examine its
vulnerability, while keeping the overall framework in view.

A recent study proposed a helpful framework for addressing the water supply
infrastructure as a whole (Haimes, Matalas, Lambert, Jackson, & Fellows, 1998). Their
analysis recommends using a multivision risk identification method called Hierarchical
Holographic Modeling (HHM) to “harden” individual water supplies against attack. This
approach seeks to look at these complex systems in a holistic manner, as series of
interconnected and overlapping sub-systems. Somewhat in the spirit of “a chain is no
stronger than its weakest link”, HHM seeks to identify and model all the components that
compose the water system and affect its operation so the interactions and weaknesses
may be exposed. Fifteen categories are proposed as comprising the basic
decomposition of a water supply infrastructure. They are:

Category A:

Physical Components

Category B:

Scope of Impact (individual, plant, local, state, regional, national, or
international)

Category C:

Temporal (ability to detect, respond, and recover from a time perspective)

Category D:

Maintenance (policies and capability)

Category E:

Organizational (decision-making structure)

Category F:

Management (security, short/long term emergency response)

Category G:

Resource Allocation (prioritization of funds including system hardening)

Category H:

SCADA (cyber-tampering, modeling accuracy, data management)
2

Category I:

Systems Configuration (interconnection of physical, institutional,
organizational and management configurations)

Category J:

Hydrology (water sources and characteristics)

Category K:

Geography/Physiography

Category L:

External Ffactors (natural hazards, situations generating threats)

Category M:

System Buffers (redundancy, over-design)

Category N:

Contaminants (what range of contaminants can compromise a system)

Category O:

Quality of Water (what safety and aesthetic characteristics must be met)

Whether or not one agrees with the system decomposition they propose, it is correct to
point out that a wide range of factors contribute to the reliable delivery of water to the
consumer with an acceptable quality level. And, while all can agree with the
multifaceted approach to reducing system vulnerability, models of the individual subcomponents must be defined with sufficient precision to adequately describe causeeffect responses for the system analyses.

When designing and operating a Public Water System many factors must be considered.
However, none is more important than producing and maintaining an acceptable water
quality. This is the unifying paradigm underlying the regulatory environment and the
engineering rules of practice.

Following this then, one important aspect of system protection involves the capability to
effectively monitor the water for constituents that could harm consumers. Obviously,
without the ability to detect and quantify a contamination event, the ability to avert or
effectively respond to it is severely constrained. As this study ranges over a myriad of
3

diverse topics, the issue of water quality and detection of deviances from acceptable
values forms the central theme tying it together.

Literature Search
Water systems are generally divided into three major components: the water source or
supply, the treatment plant and the distribution system. Engineering design of these
components proceeds under the rubric of the “multiple barrier approach” in which a
series of treatment processes or redundancies provide a safety net to assure
downstream water quality. Water quality is typically monitored carefully at the source
and during treatment stages of the system as required by operational and regulatory
guidance. However, once the treated water enters the distribution system the level of
monitoring effort is significantly reduced, reflecting an implicit assumption that the
probability of water quality degradation in the distribution system is limited. This
assumption can no longer be considered universally valid and in fact, because of the
geographical extent and relatively direct access, it may be asserted that the distribution
system presents itself as the most vulnerable component of the overall system.

Over the past decade studies have appeared which, apart from any terrorist activity,
highlight the impact of the distribution system itself on water quality (Clark, Grayman, &
Wymer, 1993; Craun & Calderon, 2001; Herwaldt, Craun, Stokes, & Juranek, 1992;
Lindley & Buchberger, 2002). Given this set of conditions, improved monitoring of the
distribution system is becoming an increasingly crucial task. However, there is
surprisingly little in the literature relative to distribution system monitoring,
characterization and protection from a water quality perspective. More specifically, the
literature is sparse relative to quantitative methods to locate sampling stations within a
4

distribution system which increase the probability of detecting a contamination event
(either accidental or intentional).

A few researchers have developed approaches which provide some guidance on the
topic. One of the first attempts to objectively locate monitoring stations employed a
method that used pathway analysis coupled with integer programming to identify which
nodes have the maximum coverage of the distribution system (Lee & Deininger, 1992;
Lee, Deininger, & Clark, 1991) . The methodology is helpful in situations with
continuous, steady contamination in that the water quality effects are discerned by the
hydraulic pathways. Intermittent or rapidly variable water quality swings, such as those
that might be encountered in a terrorist event, weaken this approach. A later study
(Kumar, Kansal, & Arora, 1997) refined the process of Lee et al. by proposing a
methodology of re-ranking the pathway matrix to simplify its form thus making it more
usable. However, the same base assumptions and weaknesses still apply. Kessler,
Ostfeld & Sinai (1998) proposed a different, more novel approach by using the
distribution system flows as a directed graph and incorporated an “all shortest paths”
algorithm to find the minimum propagation times from any source node to other points in
the system. Kessler et al.’s method is based on the hydraulics of the system and
contamination is inferred only on the basis of water movement. It also assumes that
contamination is continuous and any water passing through a contaminated node is
considered contaminated regardless of the concentration. Non-conservative
contaminants are not covered under this approach. Kessler et al. produces a pollution
matrix for a level of service by which it is possible to estimate the volume of contaminant
consumed prior to the first opportunity to detect under the stated assumptions. Ostfeld
and Salomons (2003) build upon Kessler et al.’s methodology by randomizing the
5

pollution matrix and then using a genetic algorithm to seek the “most fit” set of
monitoring points. Their approach expands Kessler et al. by allowing a limited number
of events and defining a concentration hazard level. Berry, Fleisher, Hart & Phillips
(2003) propose a mixed integer programming solution that follows from probability
distributions of coupled population-weighted flows and contamination points. These risk
points are developed through a Delphi type process. Bahadur, Samuels, Grayman,
Amstutz & Pickus (2003) propose a GIS approach to the task in a computer program
called PipelineNet. This program develops a detailed source prioritization ranking based
upon a number of variables which are then coupled with a distribution system
component scoring matrix and a population density and critical infrastructure matrix.
Using a hierarchical approach the nodes are scored, ranked and related to the GIS map
to identify the sites best suited to minimize system vulnerability.

Each of the approaches mentioned above has its own set of assumptions and
applicability. From a conceptual standpoint a weakness asserted for these
methodologies is that they do not capitalize on the power and flexibility of the extended
period water quality models currently available. Consequently, significant assumptions
regarding contamination modes and characteristics must be made rather than computing
the effects directly. Most methodologies base their process on a limited number of
contamination actualizations with an emphasis on the hydraulic portion of the model.
This may not be reflective of likely contamination events, especially those that may occur
as a pulse or discrete incident. Also from a pragmatic standpoint, these approaches
have seen limited application because they tend to be mathematically complex and the
programs and concepts are out of reach of most operators or consultants.

6

The purpose of this paper is to present a methodology for the selection of optimal
monitoring locations within the distribution system. This methodology will be based upon
a more stochastic approach than previously published studies. Furthermore, an
approach is sought which can be tailored for use by small or mid-sized community water
systems. It is asserted that these water systems are more vulnerable relatively speaking
than larger distribution systems. Smaller systems typically have thinner management
resources, smaller dilution effects and shorter critical response times. Certainly, subsets
of larger systems can have similar characteristics, but again they can bring more
sophisticated resources to bear on the problem.

Statement of Research Questions
It is posited, then, that the distribution system is a “weak link” in the monitoring chain and
as such provides to those so motivated a potentially effective means of causing harm to
the consumer. For reasons to be discussed later in this study, it is also believed that this
is especially true in small to mid-sized water systems. The goal of this dissertation then
is to outline a methodology which will guide more effective placement of water quality
monitoring stations within distribution systems of small to mid-sized water systems. The
questions to be addressed in this study are:

1. What methods have traditionally been referenced as a means to select
monitoring station placement?
2. Are these methods adequate and easily accessible to small and mid-sized
systems?
3. Can a methodology be developed, using commercially available “off the shelf”
software, that would allow small and mid-sized operators and their consultants to
7

reliably analyze their systems to predict effective locations for water quality
monitoring stations?
4. What are the key parameters to be considered when trying to establish a
monitoring station network?

Document Organization
This dissertation is organized to proceed through the background information and
findings of this study in the following fashion.

Chapter 2 provides an overview of the layout and design of a conventional public water
supply and discusses the primary guidelines that govern the major components of a
typical system.

Chapter 3 discusses the approaches that have been used in the past to establish water
quality monitoring station locations within a distribution system. A discussion of the
assumptions, strengths and weaknesses of these approaches will be discussed within
the context of the focus of this study.

Chapter 4 discusses the contaminants that have been historically associated with
waterborne diseases and contamination and provides a sketch of some of the agents
that have been identified in the literature as candidates for concern.

Chapter 5 addresses the use of computer simulation as a tool to estimate the response
of a water system to changes in operating conditions both from a hydraulic and water
quality standpoint.
8

Chapter 6 combines these factors to present an approach that can be used to generate
a database that will simulate an intentional attack upon a public water supply. Then an
analysis and ranking algorithm will be proposed that may be used to predict an efficient
set of monitoring station locations for the proposed contamination scenario.

Chapter 7 presents a sample application of the techniques and algorithms proposed and
discuss the results.

Chapter 8 summarizes the findings of this study and lists the primary conclusions
stemming from this research. Topics for additional research will also be proposed.

9

Chapter 2 Overview of the Design of a Conventional Water System
The fundamental purpose of a public water system is to deliver water to its custom ers in
adequate quantities (volume and pressure) with acceptable quality and at a reasonable
price. This implies two primary tasks. The first addresses the fact that physically a
water system operates within a supply and demand framework. Water is essentially an
incompressible fluid and because the demand can vary on an instantaneous basis, a
modern water system must include a means of supplying, storing and pressuring the
water to meet the range of demand reasonably anticipated. The second task
recognizes that unless the quality of the water delivered is acceptable, the water cannot
be used without incurring some level of harm or damage. All of this being accomplished
within an economic framework that allows reasonable access to the resource.

From a conceptual point of view there are several “complicating” factors that create
much of the difficulty associated with designing and operating a water system. They are:

1. Variability of the consumer demand
2. Incompressibility of water
3. Friction (energy) loss in transport systems

There are, of course, many other factors that present difficult technical and operational
challenges, but these three in particular have widespread implications on the design of
the physical system.

10

Consumer demand can vary significantly in time and space. Facility planning requires
significant attention to the nature and location of users within the system as well as
changes in environmental, economic and regulatory impacts. Regardless of changes in
flow demand, the quality of the water produced must remain within regulatory guidelines
and the volume and pressure must stay within acceptable levels. That is, increased
demands in one part of the system should not adversely impact the level of service in
other locations. This is complicated by the second factor in that efficiency of storage
cannot be achieved in the same way that a compressible fluid can. Thus, storage is on
a 1:1 basis and can require significant capital investment to provide sufficient volume to
meet changing system demand. Storage and demand must be matched within
reasonable limits because it is possible to build too much storage, in which case water
can become stagnant, giving rise to water quality concerns.

Finally, the fact that water can have significant friction (energy) loss in its transmission to
the consumer makes analysis, design and operation challenging. Considering the
factors mentioned above, water will be demanded in varying quantities literally from
moment to moment within the system. Energy loss through this variable demand is
inherently non-linear and thus creates significant difficulties in developing analytical
solutions to distribution system design.

This chapter will provide a brief overview of the means by which conventional water
systems meet these requirements. A discussion of the historical context of public water
supplies in this country will be presented followed by a brief outline of the regulatory
framework within which water systems operate. Because of the nature of this study,
more attention will be focused on the water quality aspects of the regulations than the
11

design aspects. An outline of the components and general processes used to meet
water system demands and water quality is then presented.

Historical Context – the Rise of the Modern Water System
The design and operational standards of public water supplies has evolved dramatically
over the past 100 years. Shortly after the turn of the century, Congress authorized the
United States Public Health Service to develop regulations to minimize the spread of
communicable diseases through public water supplies. One of its first tasks was to
develop a means to distinguish a safe water from unsafe water. The relationship
between acute waterborne disease and microbial activity had been recognized and,
thus, attention was focused on improving the ability to reliably test for safe levels of
pathogens. The initial standards identified coliform bacteria as an effective surrogate
parameter for microbial contamination. The rationale being that, since coliform is an
intestinal bacteria, a positive test would indicate that some level of fecal contamination
must exist. Interestingly, almost 100 years from the time the test was proposed and
implemented, the coliform test remains the primary routine method for evaluating water
safety from a biological perspective (AWWA, 1990).

Concurrently, water treatment methods were being developed which could considerably
improve water quality. It was observed that a reduction in turbidity through simple
filtration provided significant beneficial effects, especially for those systems that
depended on surface waters for their basic supply. Studies examining methods for
disinfecting water demonstrated the efficacy of chlorine in reducing microbial levels.
With the development of a means to safely apply chlorine at the water plant (i.e. the gas
chlorinator), engineers began to include chlorine as a disinfectant in water supplies
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beginning in 1908. With the establishment of these two processes a remarkable
reduction in various waterborne diseases followed. Although other improvements in
sanitation and medical treatment also contributed to this reduction, a significant portion
of the seventy-five (75) per cent decline in the crude death rate for infectious disease
from 1900 to 1940 can be attributed to these changes in water treatment (Armstrong,
Conn, & Pinner, 1999). This is demonstrated graphically in Figure 1.

Figure 1 Crude Death Rate for Infectious Diseases

In the period between 1860 and 1960 the number of centralized municipal water
systems had grown from 400 to 19,000 (AWWA 1990). Once the basic parameters of
treatment were established, the rapid development of public supplies devoted much of
its attention to the efficient and reliable delivery of water to its users. Advances in
treatment process design, laboratory analyses, construction methods and materials, as
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well as use of information technologies for modeling and control of system components
have allowed greater sophistication and efficiency in the development of this country's
water systems.

Regulatory framework – “What is a safe water?”
The design and operation of potable water systems in the United States is heavily
regulated so as to provide a framework for the protection of public health and safety.
Therefore, to accurately provide an overview of public water systems, the regulatory
context within which they operate must be sketched. In fact the regulatory structure
defines to a great extent what constitutes a “safe” or acceptable water quality, at least
from a human consumption standpoint. These regulations codify much of the
professional practice which over the years has created a network of water supplies that
are unparalleled in history for their safety and reliability. Although taken for granted by
most Americans, it is truly remarkable that one can travel from coast to coast drinking
water from public supplies all along the way and not give any thought to the potential of
contracting waterborne disease.

In general, public water supplies are governed by the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)
of 1974 and its amendments along with the Lead Contamination Control Act (LCCA) of
1988. At this point there have been five (5) major amendments to the SDWA which
were promulgated in 1977, 1979, 1980, 1986, and 1996. These laws are codified in the
U.S. Code at 42 U.S.C. s/s 300f et seq. which is also listed as Title XIV of the U.S.
Public Health Services Act Section 1400 et seq. of the United States Code Annotated®.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has federal responsibility for implementing
the law. The regulations passed for this purpose are listed in the Code of Federal
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Regulations at 40 CFR Parts 141 – 143 and 149. Responsibility for the operational
management and enforcement for these regulations has for the most part been
delegated to the states through the primacy process. In order to achieve primacy, states
must stipulate to and demonstrate capacity to enforce the federal requirements as
outlined in the law and the subsequent EPA regulations. Any state unwilling or unable to
meet these requirements does not receive primacy and in that case the EPA assumes
responsibility for regulation and enforcement in that state (Kucera, 2003). Florida has
been granted primacy and enforces drinking water laws primarily through the Florida
Department of Environmental Protection (FDEP). The FDEP by interdepartmental
agreement has in turn delegated certain responsibilities to the Department of Health.

Consequently, every aspect of a water utility is governed by the overarching
requirements of the SDWA as implemented through state laws and regulations. These
regulations relate to water quality standards, testing methodologies, critical design
criteria, source water protection, enforcement authority and consumer
notification/awareness of violations. Among the more prominent rules issued by the
EPA in conjunction with the SDWA, along with their primary references, are:

1. Surface Water Treatment Rule (SWTR):

40 CFR Part 141 Subpart H

2. Disinfectants/Disinfection By-Products Rule

40 CFR Part 141 Subpart L

3. Total Coliform Rule (TCR)

40 CFR Part 141.21

4. Lead and Copper Rule:

40 CFR Part 141 Subpart I

5. Information Collection Rule (ICR):

40 CFR Part 141 Subpart M

6. Consumer Confidence Rule (CCR):

40 CFR Part 141 Subpart O

7. Groundwater (Disinfection) Rule (Proposed):

65 FR 30194
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These rules can have different applicability depending on the classification of the
system. Public Water Systems are generally classified as Community Water Systems
(CWSs) and Noncommunity Water Systems (NCWSs). This study addresses CWSs but
does not explicitly consider NCWSs. A Community W ater System is legally defined as a
public water system which serves at least 15 service connections used by year-round
residents or regularly serves at least 25 year-round residents (40 CFR 141.2). NCWSs
are systems smaller than this and as such consist of components so small as to make
monitoring system design trivial.

Water quality standards are among the most important sections of the regulations. They
stipulate the chemical and biological concentrations and characteristics that constitute a
“safe” or potable water. The most common standards are set forth in the National
Primary Drinking Water Regulations (NPDWR) and the National Secondary Drinking
Water Regulations (NSDWR).

The NPDWR, which currently consists of 87 chemical, microbiological and physical
parameters, forms the basis of the regulatory examination of a water system’s
performance. These parameters are assigned enforceable criteria levels called
Maximum Contaminant Levels (MCLs) that define a safe potable water. Facilities which
exceed established MCLs are deemed in violation of their permit to operate and subject
to enforcement action if not acceptably remedied. There are a few parameters in the
NPDWR that have not been assigned an MCL because they cannot be feasibly
measured or there is uncertainty about the appropriate limits. In those cases a
Treatment Technique is assigned. Thus, in systems where a particular parameter has
been demonstrated to exist or is likely to exist, the water utility must implement the
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treatment technique associated with that parameter in order to be deemed in compliance
with the regulations. In other words this is a presumptive criterion as explicit monitoring
is not performed. In summary, MCLs are health based criteria, they are enforceable and
they are developed with consideration to the cost-benefit associated with them.

NSDWRs differ from NPDWR in that they are non-enforceable guidelines that address
contaminants that may have adverse cosmetic or aesthetic effects in drinking water. In
other words these parameters may affect the palatability or cosmetic/staining
characteristics of the water, but have no meaningful impact on its safety. While
Secondary Maximum Contaminant Levels (SMCL) are not enforceable under federal
law, it is noted that an individual state may elect to make a secondary parameter
enforceable.

In addition the SDWA requires that every contaminant with an MCL have an associated
Maximum Contaminant Level Goal (MCLG). This is a non-enforceable health-based
criteria. These are based upon the National Research Council (NRC) risk assessment
process and are formulated to be set at a level at which there are no known adverse
effects and with an adequate safety factor (NRC, 1983). The MCLGs are set without
regard to cost to achieve the stipulated concentration.

Historically, MCLGs for carcinogens have always been set at zero following theoretical
and practical limits to determining the existence of a threshold of action. More recently
the EPA has adopted a “weight of evidence” process which assigns a contaminant to
one of three categories based on the knowledge base and potency of the carcinogen to
determine whether a non-zero value for the MCLG may be assigned. While not
17

enforceable, the MCLGs provide valuable information as to treatment targets to be
achieved and potential regulatory direction in future years (Kucera, 2003).

Of course, non-carcinogens also have MCLGs and are established based No
Observable Adverse Effect Levels (NOAEL) or Lowest Observable Adverse Effect
Levels (LOAEL) to determine a Reference Dose (RfD). This is then related to a Drinking
Water Effect Level (DWEL) which is used to compute the MCLG.

The list of regulated contaminants continues to grow as the SDWA requires the EPA to
monitor unregulated contaminants and add them to the NPDWR as appropriate.
Potential contaminants are examined and monitored to determine whether they occur at
a frequency and in concentrations that may warrant further study. If so they are placed
on the Contaminant Candidate List (CCL). The CCL was initially published in 1998 and
is reissued every five years. These listed contaminants are first assigned a proposed
MCLG and then they proceed through scientific study and public notification and
comment before a final decision is made on their regulatory status.

From this brief sketch it may be observed that Congress has established a broad and
continually evolving framework to govern the design and operation of public water
systems. Water quality relative to human consumption is paramount in the legislative
and regulatory history. This responsibility is transferred to the design and operating
professionals to develop the physical systems that will comply with these high standards.
The following sections will provide an overview of the components of a water system and
how a typical system sets about meeting the customers’ demands while operating within
the regulatory requirements.
18

Basic Water System Design Tenants
As briefly mentioned earlier widespread centralized urban water systems are a relatively
new phenomenon. With the advent of basic treatment and disinfection techniques, the
value of reliable and safe water supply began to manifest itself as a primary economic
component in a community’s development. While engineers continued to make
improvements in various aspects of its treatment and delivery, a number of guiding
design principles emerged. These have been formalized in professional technical
guidelines and agency regulatory requirements.

Reliability
Among the most fundamental of guidelines for infrastructure design are the requirements
for reliability and redundancy. Reliability or robustness refers to the dependability of the
overall system and its component parts (AWWA & ASCE, 1998). It recognizes, for
example, that variability of water demand is an inherent part of a water system
operation. Estimation of water demand is an important task and influences the selection
and sizing of all the downstream components. Because human consumption comprises
only a very small part of the overall water demand it is necessary to carefully consider
the composition of the community served. It was recognized early on that care must be
taken to not only define average conditions, but also to gage the impact of extreme
events. While there may be autocorrelation between day-to-day demands, seasonal and
external events (ex. irrigation, fire flow, industrial user demands) can impose significant
changes in demand patterns both on a short-term and long-term basis. Therefore,
system requirements (Ysusi, 2000) are typically estimated for:

Average Daily Demand (ADD) = (total water consumed in one year) / 365
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Maximum Daily Demand (MDD) = maximum 24-hour demand in one year
Maximum Hourly Demand (MHD) = maximum 1-hour demand in one year

In addition, fire flow demand and duration are estimated and generally superimposed
upon the MDD or MHD, along with any other external demand requirements. In more
complex systems, the analysis of demand requirements and patterns can become quite
sophisticated, but the principle remains the same: water must be available for the user
when required (for statistically reasonable demands), and the water must be delivered
with acceptable quality while maintaining at least some given minimum residual line
pressure.

Reliability concerns take into account all those resources necessary to properly operate
the subject facility. In the event of disruption of normal service this would include
adequate provision for auxiliary power, disinfectants, chemicals and other raw materials
that are crucial to operating the plant as designed to meet the regulatory requirements.

Reliability also relates to delivery of water of safe and consistent quality to the consumer.
Utilities that take their water from surface supplies (lakes and rivers) have more of a
challenge in this regard than utilities with groundwater supplies. This is due to the
influence of seasonal variations and the direct impact of surface features on the raw
water quality. These water quality variations must be recognized and treated in real time
before discharge to the system. Groundwater systems are usually more consistent with
regard to water quality. Because they are not directly under the influence of surface
conditions they are more stable, but many times will be more highly mineralized due to
their long-term contact with aquifer materials. In either case, however, reliable delivery
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of adequate volumes of water at sufficient pressure and quality is an essential feature of
an efficient water utility (Harberg, 1997).

Redundancy
Related to reliability is the concept of redundancy. In any system where mechanical
equipment and control systems exist, provision must be made for malfunctions; motors
will burn out, lightning will strike control panels, pipes will rupture and the like. The
system must be designed to continue to function, albeit at a lower level of service, even
when these malfunctions occur. Therefore, all critical components are to be designed
with duplicate units (as a minimum). Also, the system is to be capable of delivering the
maximum daily demand, even when the largest unit is out of service.

The concept of redundancy extends to the power and control systems too. Auxiliary
power units (with appropriate fuel resources) or redundant feed from separate electrical
grids is necessary to assure sufficient capacity to operate critical equipment or treatment
systems. As control systems become more integrated and sophisticated, care is
necessary to assure that critical equipment, programs and data are duplicated or backed
up in appropriate fashion (AWWA & ASCE, 1998).

Distribution systems have the additional requirement of maintaining a minimum residual
pressure of 20 psig throughout the distribution system during the stress event. This is
typically accomplished by on-line storage with auxiliary pumping systems or elevated
storage tanks with adequate reserve capacity.
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Resiliency
Unfortunately, no human system can be designed to account for all risks so one final
aspect of good design involves the concept of system resiliency. Given that catastrophic
events such as earthquakes, floods, and fires sometimes occur, thought should be given
to 'how long will it take for the system to recover?’. By judicious planning, certain
aspects of the system layout can minimize the amount of time that it takes to restore
water service to the community. Many times this is as much a function of organizational
and management structure as it is “pipes and pumps”. As discussed above (Haimes et
al., 1998) a system is composed of multiple aspects and the reliability and resilience are
especially influenced by many aspects of the utility operation.

Water System Components – “How do we deliver a safe water?”
A water system is generally broken down into three primary components, the water
supply, the treatment plant (including finished water storage), and the distribution
system. This is shown schematically in Figure 2. In order to have an effective system
each component must be matched to meet the requirements of the downstream
element. Each constituent has its own set of design issues and its design has actually
evolved into complete sub-disciplines.
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Figure 2 Generalized Layout of a Modern Potable Water System (Harburg, 1997)

It is the thesis of this study that the vast majority of attention, both in terms of regulations
and research, has been focused upon the first two components (the water supply and
the treatment systems) and that the distribution system has been largely neglected from
the standpoint of its impact on water quality. This, of course, is to be expected in that
the primary concern of a water utility is to find an adequate water supply with good raw
water characteristics and then to treat it to a uniform quality that meets all health and
regulatory requirements before release to the consumer. However, changes in water
quality can occur within the distribution system for a variety of reasons, and it is here
proposed that a more reliable means of detecting those changes is necessary to
safeguard the consumer.
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Water Supply
The first task of the water utility is to secure a reliable source of water with physical,
chemical and biological properties that are within acceptable ranges. The nature of the
source influences these properties considerably. Broadly classified, water supplies are
listed as being a groundwater supply or a surface supply. Different regulatory
requirements apply to a water system depending on the water source.

Typically groundwater supplies are preferable to surface supplies in that the water
quality tends to be more stable and the volumetric yield is more predictable. The water
may be more mineralized as a result of extended contact with the subsurface strata, but
the water generally is relatively pure and not as prone to biological contamination.
However, reliable ground water sources are not available in all parts of the country. This
is a function of the geology of the area and whether suitable aquifers exist at a
reasonable depth below ground. Florida is fortunate to have several high quality
productive aquifers. Thus, most of the water supplied to its citizens comes from ground
water sources.

Surface water sources are under the direct influence of stormwater runoff or snow melt
and are tapped by a utility through river, reservoir or lake intake structures. Utilities
using surface water sources must contend with daily variability in water quality (in that it
is directly influenced by surface runoff) and seasonal volume availability which can
dramatically affect public health issues (Craun, 1988). The SWTR, issued by the EPA is
quite involved and has many stringent provisions which require water utilities to carefully
consider and monitor the ways that source water is protected, the means by which it is
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treated and what criteria must be met (and documented) prior to being made available to
the public.

A special case of surface supply is brackish or ocean water. The ocean is the largest
reservoir of water in the world but the adverse chemical composition, until recently, has
precluded it as a viable source water. Interestingly, in many ways the ocean provides an
ideal water supply, especially for coastal areas, in that the water supply is virtually
inexhaustible and the water quality is consistently uniform. The primary problem has
been that the technology to treat the water was inadequate or prohibitively expensive
compared to other source options. Even in this case, consideration of reject water
disposal must not be ignored.

Water Treatment
Once the water supply has been selected, a complete characterization of that water and
its expected variability must be established. In many communities it is also not
uncommon to have multiple water sources for reliability and redundancy purposes. This
might also include mixed source combinations (ex. ground water and surface water
supply components).

Using applicable state and federal regulations as the minimum finished water standard,
the designer considers various treatment process trains to produce the required effluent
quality. Careful consideration of the variability of different combinations of raw water
characteristics, variation in consumer demand and cost of production is required. This
can be especially complex when blending waters from multiple sources, due to chemical
interactions that can occur when mixed that would not occur if they were separate.
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Process design and treatment equipment have evolved significantly over the years and
can effectively treat many waters that previously would have been deemed marginal, if
not unacceptable. The most simple treatment process involves nothing more that
chlorine disinfection before pumping it on to the consumer. This is normally only seen
when a high quality ground water is the source water.

Source waters that are highly mineralized (e.g. hard waters or dissolved H2S) or waters
from surface supplies need more careful treatment and control. Water quality objectives
are typically accomplished by using some form or combination of physical or chemical
processes. Common component processes might include aeration, pH adjustment,
sedimentation, coagulation/flocculation and clarification, lime softening, filtration,
adsorption processes and more recently membrane processes.

In addition some form of disinfection will be applied. Historically, gas chlorination has
been the primary means of providing microbial control of product water and has
performed remarkably in terms of overall deactivation levels and long-term effectiveness.
However, a change in design approach is underway as research has indicated that
chlorination of certain waters can produce process by-products that increase the risk of
bladder cancers and some level of adverse reproductive effects. Further research has
indicated that all commonly used disinfectants have some level of by-product generation
that must be controlled, with the exception of ultraviolet sterilization (AWWA, 1999;
White, 1999).

Any cursory review of the regulatory requirements demonstrates that in-plant monitoring
of incoming water quality and finished water quality can be quite thorough and
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demanding. The laws and regulations are written to assure as much as practicable that
the water produced by the CWS is safe to drink.

Distribution
Once the water has been treated it moves to the distribution network which is the final
component of the water system. The distribution system is composed of pumps, the
pipe grid, storage facilities and appurtenances (e.g. valves, hydrants, and service
connections). Typically, the design of the distribution system has been considered
primarily a hydraulic function. That is, the objective is to deliver the water from the
treatment plant to the customer in sufficient volumes and at an acceptable pressure
while minimizing the cost of delivery. This is accomplished by sophisticated computer
analyses of pressure loss through pipes under varying conditions to meet regulatory
criteria relative to residual pressure at all points in the system. In conjunction with this,
sizing and placement of distribution system storage is an important factor in efficient
design because it allows flow and pressure equalization which reduces energy loss and
can reduce pipe stress. As mentioned earlier, because water is an incompressible fluid,
clearwell storage at the water plant and distribution storage is absolutely necessary to
handle the variation in pressure and demand experienced within the distribution grid.
However, care must be taken not to oversize the pipes or storage because that can lead
to unacceptable water age in the system.

The water quality emphasis has tended to be associated with maintenance of the
integrity of system rather than the water quality itself. The implicit assumption being that
if the water met compliance criteria when it left the treatment plant it will arrive at the
customers tap in the same condition unless there is a breach in the structural integrity of
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the system. For example, backflow prevention and cross-connection control are
important programs in most water systems. The objective here is to protect the system
from inadvertent connection of a non-potable water source with the potable water
produced by the utility. There is also considerable effort to assure that when new water
lines are added to the system or whenever the existing system is tapped for new
connections that the pipe and water within the pipes are within standards. Again the
focus of these important programs is to insure that the pipe grid integrity is
uncompromised as opposed to detailed water quality monitoring within the network.

Water quality is monitored in distribution systems, but maybe not to the level that one
might think. It is upon this portion of the system that this dissertation focuses attention
asserting that the ability to detect contamination events, such as that imposed by a
terrorist attack, is poorly developed in both regulatory guidance and operational practice.
The focus of this study is to develop an approach to identify efficient monitoring locations
with an emphasis on making those tools accessible to small to mid-sized water systems
that in many ways represent the most vulnerable targets.

In order to understand the context from which this need arises, it will be necessary to
briefly explore current practice in water quality monitoring and to identify weaknesses
that characterize the process. This is discussed in Chapter 3.

One other means used as an indicator of the integrity of the network is the persistence of
a chlorine residual in the system. Chapter 62-550.350 (6) FAC stipulates that the
distribution system will maintain a 0.2 mg/L free chlorine residual or 0.6 mg/L combined
chlorine residual at all times. Chlorine residual is useful in maintaining a germicidal
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effect within the distribution network and can also provide an indication of a potential
breach of the system. In other words if the residual becomes depressed in one section
of the distribution system and not others, that would indicate a need to check the area to
determine what is consuming the residual. While chlorine at that level is not a powerful
disinfectant it is still useful to address many small microbiological events (VonHuben,
1999; White, 1999).

A summary of many of the most fundamental design requirements is indicated in
Appendix 1 (Health Research, 1997).

Summary
The fundamental purpose of a public water system is to deliver water to its customers in
acceptable quantities (volume and pressure) with an acceptable quality and at a
reasonable price. In order to accomplish this, the system ’s characteristics must be
quantified to adapt to highly non-linear factors such as demand variation and energy loss
associated with bulk transport. The sine qua non of any potable water system, of
course, is that the water is safe, palatable and suitable for use.

In the United States these goals are met within a regulatory framework which codifies
much of the engineering, operational and public health experience developed over the
years. The Safe Drinking Water Act, along with a number of implementation rules
promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency provides the basis for defining
what a “safe” water is and how it should be treated and delivered to a system’s
customers.
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Of fundamental importance are the 87 contaminants identified in the National Primary
Drinking Water Regulations. These are the contaminants for which Maximum
Contaminant Limits are set. These are the core parameters constituting the enforceable
health based criteria which essentially circumscribe an acceptable water quality. The
National Secondary Drinking Water Regulations are also desirable targets to meet
aesthetic or functional goals but are not enforceable. An on-going process of scientific
review and public scrutiny works to add to the list as additional “weight of evidence” data
becomes available.

Because a community’s water supply is crucial to its physical, social and economic wellbeing, care is taken to design, construct and operate a system that will be available to
meet required demands under all reasonable conditions. To comply with that directive,
water systems are designed with serious consideration given to reliability, redundancy
and resiliency. Reliability relates to a system’s capability of responding to the range of
demands (from both a quantity and quality perspective) placed upon it. This typically
involves various statistical projections relative to a community’s current and future
source and demand characteristic s. Redundancy is somewhat related to reliability but
focuses more upon the ability of a system to function acceptably when critical
mechanical, electrical or control systems fail. A common example of this concept is the
placement of multiple pumps in a station to allow continued pumping even when one or
more pumps are taken out of service for one reason or another. Finally, water systems
are designed with the concept of resiliency in mind. Emergency situations will occur
occasionally which may require temporary redirections or other response actions to
return service to an impaired system. By judicious placement of pipes, valves, pumps
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and the like, a resilient system will allow at least nominal service to be returned in a
minimum period of time.

To accomplish all these objectives, water systems are generally classified into three
components: the water supply, water treatment systems and the distribution network.
The water supply function is to identify, develop and protect the source system’s water.
Water supplies generally are classified as surface sources or groundwater sources.
Different regulations apply to a system depending on that classification.

The water treatment system are those components that exist to alter the raw water
characteristics of the water supply to conform to applicable regulations (as a minimum)
to produce a safe, palatable and useful water. The water treatment plant(s) typically
comprise the most complex operational portion of the water system and have heavy
monitoring requirements relative to the other components.

Finally, the treated water is delivered to the customer via the water distribution network.
This is composed of a pipe grid, appurtenances, storage, pumps and occasionally insystem treatment (ex. re-chlorination). Monitoring requirements are more rudimentary in
many ways than those required in the supply and treatment segments of a water system.
However, given the new post-9/11 realities, it is not prudent to allow network monitoring
to remain tied to (blinded by) past practices. The focus of this study is to develop an
approach to identifying efficient monitoring locations with an emphasis on accessibility of
those tools to small to mid-sized water systems that in many ways represent the most
vulnerable targets.
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Chapter 3 Distribution System Monitoring
A key aspect of this study focuses on the capability of current monitoring practice to
detect intentional contamination within the distribution system. Unless the monitoring
system is able to efficiently detect the contamination event, its existence will be revealed
by significant clinical response through the medical system. This, of course, is the effect
that the monitoring effort endeavors to avoid. This dissertation, then, seeks to address
the question of whether current regulatory and industry monitoring practice that has
come to focus on minute chemical concentrations (e.g. parts per billion level) can
effectively address events that lie on the other end of the spectrum, i.e. mass
contamination in an acute event.

Before proposing modifications to distribution system sampling protocol, it is appropriate
to examine the framework and practices underlying current monitoring practice. From a
public health perspective, the US water industry has served its customers well. Major
outbreaks are rare and, if an outbreak does occur, notification is prompt and specific (40
CFR Part 141, Subpart Q). The primary safeguards (Geldreich, 1996; VonHuben, 1999)
for the distribution system are generally listed as being:

1. Continuous positive pressure in the water main
2. Maintenance of a minimum chlorine residual
3. Cross-connection and backflow prevention
4. Compliance monitoring
5. Corrosion control
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As mentioned in Chapter 2, when one reviews the design, regulatory and operational
literature it becomes apparent that until the passage of the SDWA in 1986, an
operational “blind spot” existed. It seems that the generally held belief was that once
water enters the distribution system, it would be delivered to the consumer with
approximately the same quality it possessed when it left the treatment facility unless
there was a structural break in the lines or some form of accidental intrusion occurred.
Therefore, the operational and institutional focus of the water utilities tended to address
construction monitoring, backflow and cross-connection programs, and customer
complaint tracking.

Then in 1988 the issuance of the proposed Lead and Copper Rule required water
system operators to test water “at the consumer tap” for compliance (40 CFR 141). As
operators began to deal analytically with water quality issues within the distribution
system itself an evolving view of water quality drivers began to occur. The subsequent
Total Coliform Rule and Surface Water Treatment Rule reinforced the need to begin to
address the fact that the distribution system itself may impact water quality.

This is not to say that the effects of the distribution system on water quality had gone
completely unnoticed. In fact some researchers have described the distribution system
more in terms of a living individual with its own dynamic characteristics than a network of
pipes (Larson, 1966; Rossie, 1975). They use analogies in which the systems respond
to stresses placed on them, just as a functioning entity would, resulting in changes in
water quality and delivery capabilities. Also, epidemiological studies have provided
ample documentation that finished water quality can deteriorate as a result of distribution
system activities resulting in water-borne disease outbreaks (Besner, Gauthier, Servais,
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& Camper, 2002; Clark et al., 1993; Craun & Calderon, 2001; Geldreich, 1996; Herwaldt
et al., 1992; Logsdon, Schneider, & Budd, 2004). Thus, it is not the case that the
literature had not documented the fact that the distribution system affects water quality.
The distribution system has even been described as “the final barrier for the
maintenance of water quality” (Clark et al., 1993).

However, over the past century the major battles in providing safe water have been
associated with developing safe water supplies and providing adequate water treatment.
If the distribution system was properly constructed and adequately maintained history
generally confirmed that water quality in the distribution system remains similar to that
which left the plant. Therefore, intensive monitoring for non-specific purposes tended to
consistently prove negative and therefore has not been viewed as a prudent use of
manpower and financial resources.

Even trying to determine what “current monitoring practice” entails is difficult. A recent
AWWA Research Foundation report, commissioned to study distribution system
monitoring practices noted, “Current guidelines on water quality monitoring are scattered
throughout many sources and references and often are not specific to distribution
systems. Written guidelines may be difficult to retrieve from utility archives and
guidelines handed down verbally from past utility staff may be outdated or incomplete”
(Kirmeyer et al., 2002). Thus coherent, structured distribution system monitoring plans
are the exception rather than the norm in the water industry, especially in small to midsized systems.
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This also highlights an interesting feature of water supplies. Unlike electric utilities,
water systems are not connected in a global grid. Therefore, each water system has its
own set of strengths and vulnerabilities. That is, not all systems are equally vulnerable.
In a related fashion not all water systems have the same impact as “targets” to a terrorist
group. For example, contamination of a water system serving a small mobile home park
may not have the same “value” as an act that affects a major municipal system.
However, one can’t rule out an attack on a smaller system, because there may be
localized motivations or possibly the intent to impose a psychological impact on other
small system. In any event the point to be observed is that a multitude of independent
water systems exist which serve the vast majority of the population. A coordinated
attack on even a small proportion of the community systems could have widespread
societal implications.

Although water distribution monitoring objectives have been classified in many different
ways, ultimately they fall into one of two types of sampling programs, Compliance
Monitoring and Special Purpose Sampling. These will be approaches will be outlined in
the sections below with the intent of addressing the question posed at the outset - can
monitoring systems that are established to deal with minute contaminant levels deal with
massive contamination on an acute time scale?

Compliance Monitoring
Because waterborne disease posed the primary health risk during the formative years of
large centralized water systems in this country, the most common monitoring activity,
compliance monitoring, focused on managing that risk. Historically, that approach has
been based upon the use of “indicator species” as a surrogate for overall water quality.
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Indicator species have been used for that purpose for over 100 years in order to
minimize the analyses required to confirm microbial contamination. The most common
microorganisms used for this purpose are heterotrophic bacteria, total coliform and fecal
coliform.

Over time there has been a subtle shift in emphasis from acute manifestations (ex.
pathogenic organisms/diseases) to longer term or chronic outcomes (ex. carcinogens,
Pb/Cu, etc). No doubt this has resulted from the marked success of improvements in
water treatment and disinfection technology which dramatically reduced or eliminated
waterborne disease outbreaks arising from CWSs. The implicit assumption underlying a
compliance monitoring program is that the water is clean unless proven otherwise by
sampling. Table 1 provides an overview of the primary regulations and requirements for
sampling within the distribution system.
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Table 1

Water Quality Parameters and Associated Regulations for Water Distribution Systems

Parameter
Disinfectant residual*

Sample Location
Entry point to
distribution system

Regulatory Limit
Minimum 0.2 mg/L on a
continuous basis

Reference
U.S. SWTR

Comments
Only applies to systems using
surface water supplies. In U.S.,
Legionella is also regulated by a
treatment technique.

Disinfectant residual

Distribution system

MRDL chlorine 4.0 mg/L
MRDL chloramine 4.0
mg/L, running annual
average

U.S. D/DBP
Rule Stage 1

Surface water systems serving
>10,000 people.

Disinfectant residual or
HPC bacteria count*

Throughout
distribution system

Detectable level of
U.S. SWTR
disinfectant residual or
HPC bacteria count of 500
or less cfu/mL in 95
percent of samples
collected each month for
any two consecutive
months

Only applies to systems using
surface water supplies.

Total trihalomethanes

Throughout
distribution system

80 µg/L, running annual
average based on
quarterly samples

U.S. D/DBP
Rule Stage 1

Surface water systems serving
>10,000 people.

Haloacetic acids (HAA5 ) Throughout
distribution system

60 µg/L, running annual
average based on
quarterly samples

U.S. D/DBP
Rule Stage 1

Surface water systems serving
>10,000 people.

Total coliform bacteria

Throughout
distribution system

5% positive

U.S. Total
Coliform Rule

Number of samples determined by
population served.

Lead and copper

At customer's taps

Action levels:
Lead 0.015 mg/L at 90%
Copper 1.3 mg/L at 90%

U.S. Lead and
Copper Rule

Number of samples determined by
population served.

pH

Representative points Minimum of 7.0
in distribution system

U.S. Lead and
Copper Rule

State primacy agency may waive
requirement if the agency
determines that it is not feasible or
necessary to achieve pH 7.0

*Disinfectant residual may be regulated for some systems using groundwater supplies under the forthcoming Groundwater Rule.
Source: Kirmeyer et al, 2002.

Table 2 indicates the regulatory testing requirements for Coliform monitoring which is the
test to be performed with the highest frequency (40 CFR 141.21; Chapter 62.550.518(2)
FAC). The minimum number of samples required in the distribution system is typically
established by state or federal regulatory standards. By and large it is left to the utility’s
discretion to locate the sampling points in areas which suitably characterize the system.
Generally, sample points are selected in areas of reported or historical problems,
different pressure zones, high risk areas or near interconnection points with adjacent
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utilities. Some of the monitoring points might be permanent and some might be
relocated from month to month (Geldreich, 1996; VonHuben, 1999).

Table 2

EPA Coliform Monitoring Frequency Requirements

POPULATION SERVED

Minimum
number of
samples per
month

Population / Sample
Lowest Population

Highest Population

25
1,001
2,501
3,301
4,101

to
to
to
to
to

1,000
2,500
3,300
4,100
4,900

1
2
3
4
5

25
501
834
825
820

1,000
1,250
1,100
1,025
980

4,901
5,801
6,701
7,601
8,501
12,901
17,201

to
to
to
to
to
to
to

5,800
6,700
7,600
8,500
12,900
17,200
21,500

6
7
8
9
10
15
20

817
829
838
845
850
860
860

967
957
950
944
1,290
1,147
1,075

21,501
25,001
33,001
41,001
50,001
59,001
70,001
83,001

to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to

25,000
33,000
41,000
50,000
59,000
70,000
83,000
96,000

25
30
40
50
60
70
80
90

860
833
825
820
833
843
875
922

1,000
1,100
1,025
1,000
983
1,000
1,038
1,067

96,001
130,001
220,001
320,001
450,001
600,001
780,001
970,001

to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to

130,000
220,000
320,000
450,000
600,000
780,000
970,000
1,230,000

100
120
150
180
210
240
270
300

960
1,083
1,467
1,778
2,143
2,500
2,889
3,233

1,300
1,833
2,133
2,500
2,857
3,250
3,593
4,100

1,230,001
1,520,001
1,850,001
2,270,001
3,020,001
3,960,001

to
to
to
to
to
or

1,520,000
1,850,000
2,270,000
3,020,000
3,960,000
more

330
360
390
420
450
480

3,727
4,222
4,744
5,405
6,711
8,250

4,606
5,139
5,821
7,190
8,800

Source: 40CFR141.21 (Sampling table)
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By examining Table 2 and dividing the population served by the required samples, one
develops an insight into the coverage each test provides. For all intents and purposes
this ranges from 500 people covered per sample to 8800 people per sample. Recalling
that these are monthly sampling requirements, it is easy to see that coverage for acute
events is lacking in compliance monitoring. Most utilities will monitor in excess of the
minimum number of samples required, but the essential pattern remains unchanged.

A slightly different way of looking at the monitoring practice is to examine the number of
service connections covered by each biological test. This statistic is more reliable than
population because water meters or connections are more easily and accurately
determined by utility staff than population. Although some aspects of permit records are
not available publicly subsequent to Homeland Security rules, a dataset was secured
from the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (FDEP) during the early
research for this paper in August, 2000. This data set lists all 2030 CWSs permitted in
the state of Florida at that time. It addition it identified the population and service
connections associated with the system along with the number of bacteriological tests
required and the number actually performed. The number of bacteriological samples
was correlated with the number of connections served. The bacteriological samples
were chosen because they are the most frequently run tests. Examining water systems
that serve at least 100 connections, the median number of connections covered by a
bacteriological test is 99 connections per month. As the system size increases the unit
coverage also increases. This is characteristic is indicated in Table 3.
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Table 3

Average Number of Connections per Monthly Coliform Test Correlated to CWS Size

CWS with Connections Greater
Than
100
500
1,000
2,000
5,000
10,000
20,000

Connections Covered per
Monthly Bacteriological Test
99
194
212
228
253
261
303

Source: FDEP (Aug., 2000)

The point to notice is that both the spatial and temporal coverage of this testing is
nominal. As one examines this data, however, it should become clear that the ability to
detect an intentional, but unknown, contamination event within the distribution system
would be limited. Since the laboratory turnaround time for coliform will be at least three
days, even if the sample did detect the contamination the system managers wouldn't
know in time to respond (assuming that the appropriate tests were being performed in
the first place).

It should be noted that other more exhaustive distribution system compliance tests may
be take once every one to three years depending on the parameter. For example, lead
and copper are monitored at random consumer sites to verify compliance with
regulations. However, compared with the sampling which is required for water plant
operation (which varies from continuous to daily), the distribution system sampling scale
is normally monthly. Obviously, any sort of acute event would not be picked up within
the monitoring framework and would only serve as a confirmation test.
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Special Purpose Sampling
The other type of distribution sampling can be classified as special purpose sampling.
This type of monitoring is usually associated with a short-term intense sampling program
to address a specific issue. This might include investigations related to water quality
issues such as taste/odor complaints, compliance monitoring failure, or Pb/Cu studies.
Upon recognition of an initiating event, a special purpose sampling program will be
authorized to isolate the source, extent and magnitude of the contamination (Geldreich,
1996). Generally, the underlying assumption in this mode of sampling is that some level
of contamination may exist in a specific area or region of the system, but the overall
integrity of the system is intact.

Special purpose sampling is also used to meet operational needs which may not
explicitly deal with public health issues. Monitoring for this purpose would include
operational studies (ex. optimize pumping sequences or configuration), maintenance
functions (identify pipeline replacement or flushing programs), or support for capital
improvement programs (Kirmeyer et al., 2002).

For their purposes the foregoing methodologies have been adequate. However, when
faced with detecting acute, fast-moving incidents, they are unsatisfactory. The
feedback mechanism is much too slow (on the order of weeks or months) and in most
cases the coverage of the system is severely limited. This paper proposes a change in
sampling philosophy is now necessary. Using this paradigm the underlying assumption
presumes that contamination exists somewhere in the system and must be detected.
Accordingly, deployment of a set of continuous reading monitors within the network
would be required. This, of course, assumes that instrumentation exists which can
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detect contaminants of interest with sufficient speed and sensitivity to reliably assess the
water status. Although such instrumentation for most contaminants does not exist or is
prohibitively expensive, significant progress is being made in developing this capability.

This is not to imply that there is a wholesale decline in America’s water supply
capabilities, but rather it is a recognition of the need for a change in management culture
which recognizes the multifaceted nature and the new vulnerability of the distribution
system. On this basis, selection of the “best” set of monitoring points would be chosen
with a slightly different set of criteria in mind. Water systems are designed and operated
with an inherent level of trust that people will not intentionally contaminate a public water
system resulting in harm to innocent people. However, once it is acknowledged that
someone might be motivated to do such a thing, scenario development can quickly
identify the weaknesses in the infrastructure, especially the distribution system, because
there is no routine short term, much less continuous, means of measuring water quality
activity throughout the distribution system .

If adopted, it is acknowledged that this approach will be expensive both in terms of
capital and operating costs. Thus, the need to be able to strategically locate a limited
number of effective stations is critical. It is further noted that small to mid-sized systems
have even more pressure on them to allocate their limited resources in the best manner
practicable, due to their limited financial and technical capacity. This is, in fact, the
reason why the EPA has staggered implementation schedules for most rules, so that the
smaller systems have more time to make the adjustments.
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Summary
Utility designers and managers must concede that a new paradigm for network water
quality surveillance now exists. Systems that have served well for over 100 years are
now insufficient when one considers the possibility of direct and intentional
contamination. Currently, water distribution system monitoring is generally categorized
as “compliance monitoring” or “special purpose sampling”. Compliance monitoring is a
routine process of sampling at various sites through the distribution system to confirm
that water at those points meets specified regulatory standards. The time scale on this
sampling approach (including analytical turnaround time) is generally on the order of
weekly to monthly. Guidance on sampling location is limited. A summary of the major
regulations driving compliance monitoring was presented in Table 1.

Special Purpose Sampling is associated with a short-term intense sampling program to
address a specific issue. This is typically associated with a violation that occurs during
the compliance monitoring or in response to complaints from system customers. This
monitoring approach will be more thorough and have a shorter data turnaround time,
however, it generally occurs only for a limited duration.

To establish a monitoring scheme that efficiently protects the network from all the
potential levels of contamination is neither simple nor inexpensive…and probably, in an
absolute sense, impossible. The burden on small to mid-sized water systems is
especially burdensome due to their limited staff and budget constraints. A means of
identifying and prioritizing a set of monitoring points that addresses this need would be a
great help to utilities searching for a way to deal with the potential threat. That is the
purpose of the remainder of this study.
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Chapter 4 Potential Contamination Agents

Introduction
Because this study is focusing on the possibility of individuals or groups attempting to
intentionally contaminate a public water supply, one of the first questions that might be
asked is, ‘what contaminants might be used to cause mass contamination of a water
distribution system?’ In other words if the utility is trying to monitor to detect something,
what would that be? This is not a trivial matter in that, at first glance, it would seem that
thousands of potential contaminants exist. That being the case it is appropriate to
establish a framework for examining potential agents and then attempt to evaluate their
potential for effective contamination on a public health basis.

Parenthetically, it is noted that while assembling the data gathered for this paper, it
became evident that the documented effects of various treatment processes from this
perspective are not well developed. In fact, it is not uncommon to find diverging, if not
conflicting, data. This is probably not surprising in that (fortunately) these agents are
rarely found in water supplies, so few have ever had to be concerned with them.
However, given the new world realities, we can expect that future research will
accelerate in this area.

In organizing the research and presentation of results, some framework needed to be
set. A pattern of analysis has been established for analyzing environmental
contamination which has applicability to this problem, i.e. the Risk Assessment process.
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The challenge with intentional contamination events is that they do not follow traditional
probability distributions and tend to be extreme (low probability) events. However, the
assessment of risk can still follow the same general procedure.

The format of a Risk Assessment, generally used for chemical exposures, is broken into
four basic steps which are to be rooted in and focused on the scientific aspects of the
process. This has been defined (NRC, 1983) to include:

1. Hazard identification, i.e. what agent is present that will cause adverse effects?
2. Toxicity (dose-response) assessment, i.e. what is the relationship between an
exposure dose and an adverse health effect in humans?
3. Exposure assessment, i.e. what exposures are currently experienced or likely to
occur under different conditions?
4. Risk characterization, i.e. what is the estimated incidence of health impairment to
a given population?

Augmenting this process Haas, Rose and Gerba (1999) demonstrate that microbial
exposures can be examined in a quantitative or semi-quantitative manner by adapting
the NRC methodology. By the nature of infectious microbial agents, the process
invariably has data quality and management issues. However, research is proceeding to
attempt to enhance traditional epidemiological tools in managing this type of risk.

Routes of Exposure
Exposures occur primarily through three routes: inhalation, ingestion and dermal contact.
Dermal contact is sometimes further divided to distinguish between percutaneous
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absorption and percutaneous (puncture) wounds. The latter is not normally a significant
route in environmental assessments and is many times ignored. However, it is a major
concern in medical settings where “needle sticks” can transfer microbial agents. It is
important to note that chemical toxicity is greatly influenced by the route and method of
exposure, so the dose-response relationships used in an analysis must be related to the
appropriate route. To illustrate this intuitively, Figure 3 outlines schematically the
interrelationships between the major physiological systems.

Because the focus of this study is drinking water, the primary route of interest is
ingestion. It is possible that inhalation or dermal exposures can occur from activities
such as one showering, cooking, irrigating the lawn, but these are deemed to be
secondary routes. While these routes exist and should not be completely ignored, their
effect should be minor.

Clear definition of routes of exposure and exposure protocols is important because the
agent will impact the body in different ways and at different rates depending on the
method of absorption. Toxicity tests and development of uptake rates must, therefore,
differentiate between exposure mechanisms. This is even more difficult, because the
body has defense mechanisms that try to neutralize xenobiotic (foreign) substances
before they damage internal organs. Therefore, an applied dose is not the same as an
absorbed dose. Even the absorbed dose (which enters the blood stream) is not the
same as the “delivered” dose to a target organ. From the delivered dose, the
information truly desired is the “biologically effective” dose, which is the quantity of
chemical that the organ incorporates into the organ function (Chastain, 1998; Klaasen,
2001; USEPA, 1990).
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From the standpoint of planning for a bioterrorism emergency, event planners typically
assume that the primary method of agent dissemination for mass casualties will be
through the inhalation route. It has been shown that aerosol dispersion of appropriate
substances in highly populated areas is more effective than other means of application.
This, among other reasons, is why many of the substances deemed critical were
developed for aerosol dispersion or are focused on adapting the substance for exposure
via the inhalation route. Accordingly, most of the toxicological data is listed for inhalation
instead of ingestion. As mentioned earlier, the body’s reaction to an agent can be
greatly different depending on how the material is presented to the victim.

Absorption
Ingestion

Inhalation

Gastrointestinal
Tract

Lung

Dermal
Contact

Liver

Bile

Storage
Extracellular
Fluids

Blood and Lymph

Kidneys

Fat

Organs of
the Body

Lung
Secretion
Glands

Soft Tissues
or Bones

Bladder

Excretion
Feces

Urine

Expired Air

Secretions

after USEPA (1990)
Figure 3 Key Routes of Chemical Absorption, Distribution, and Excretion in Humans
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Because critical doses/exposures to biological agents and chemical agents occur on
different scales, a brief note about the measures of morbidity and mortality is
appropriate. When examining the toxicity or virulence of a given substance/organism,
there are a number of ways in which the effect can be measured or reported (Klaasen,
2001).

LD50: This is an abbreviation for Lethal Dose which results in the death of 50%
(median) of the subject population. This is a statistically derived measure of the
single dose of substance that can be expected to cause death in 50% of the test
animals. Although it is treated as a biological constant, it is not. It is subject to
many variables.
LCt50: Because the actual applied dose is a function of both the concentration (C) of the
agent and the length of time (t) exposed, many toxicologists are moving to a
weighted scale that shows the interaction of the effects. The result is the LCt50
which is the Lethal Concentration-time dose in which 50% of the population dies.
This measure is primarily seen in inhalation studies, but is also being recognized
in other route exposures.
NOAEL: No Observable Adverse Effect Level. This is the highest dosage of a given
test which does not result in a measurable or observed adverse effect on the test
animals (population).
RfD:

The Reference Dose is the dose that estimates the level of a substance that can
be safely consumed by the general population. It is calculated by dividing the
NOAEL by Uncertainty factors and Modifying factors. It is essentially equivalent
to the Average Daily Intake (ADI) factor which has become outmoded. In
general, the lower the RfD, the higher the toxicity.

Infectious dose: The dose at which an infectious agent (microorganism) enters the
body and begins to multiply. It may or may not result in a clinical manifestation of
the disease. The period between the exposure and the first shedding or
excretion of the agent, i.e., manifestation is called the Latent period. The period
of time which may exist between the time the infectious agent enters the body
and the time it begins to multiply is called the Lag period.
Other measures of toxicity exist; however, these are among the most common and can
provide at least a qualitative means of comparing risks between various agents. Also,
having some quantification of the toxicity values allows one to begin to estimate that
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amount of a specific agent that must be present to contaminate a water system to
produce a lethal effect.

Assumptions Regarding System Contamination
There are many contaminants that can pollute a water supply. Of specific interest to this
study are those contaminants that are not readily detectable by the consumer and which
can cause some degree of morbidity or mortality upon exposure. It is also assumed that
the agent is capable of mass contamination, otherwise known as “weapons of mass
destruction”. In other words, the intent would be to corrupt a large volume of water as
opposed to service to a few houses or a small isolated subdivision.

Focus is also limited to those agents that cause a major acute response contra a chronic
response. In other words, carcinogenic agents are not considered in the screening
process, because the time of action is too long. This is not to say that they might not
have serious consequences, but they don’t typically fit within a terrorist agenda and thus
present poor agent choices from that perspective.

For a contaminant to effectively harm a population by contaminating the water, it would
need, at a minimum, to have the following qualities:

1. Highly soluble or finely divided and suspended in water
2. Colorless
3. Odorless
4. Tasteless
5. Highly toxic
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In other words, to achieve the goals of the offending entity, the water would need to be
contaminated in such a way as to be undetectable when consumed, so that exposure to
the contaminant would be unrestrained. Given these criteria, one is able to then begin to
sort through a list of potential candidates to identify possible contaminants for use in
situations as posed here. Additional pragmatic concerns also come into play, such as
the ease of acquiring and the cost of the material as well as the ability to transport and
disperse the contaminant.

The contaminant can be drawn from several different categories: Chemical, Microbial or
Physical (Radiation). A number of studies have sought to screen various databases to
select likely candidates that fit the specified profile. As an example, Burrows and
Renner (1999) did a careful study of biological agents and their potential as threats to
potable water. That work examined 27 organisms or biotoxins that are likely to be used
as contamination agents. While the work was prepared by the U.S. Army with a focus
on field water treatment units, it has applicability to this study.

Assuming chemicals formed the primary threat, the University of Michigan’s Studies in
Urban Security Group (1997) prepared a report for the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency that examined 79,000 potential contaminants taken from the Registry of Toxic
Effects of Chemical Substances. They identified 35 chemicals that met the criteria of
being tasteless, odorless, colorless and had an LD 50 of 10 mg/kg. Another study
prepared at the University of Michigan (Deininger, 2000) conceptually widened the
scope to consider biological agents and “designer drugs” as a threat, although no
specific analysis was provided. The authors did note, however, that the use of “designer
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drugs” could be particularly difficult to identify because of the ability of a terrorist to
develop an agent that does not exist in any tracking database.

An interesting feature of each of these reports is that they all assume contamination
ahead of the treatment plant, thus allowing the treatment process to reduce the efficacy
of the agent. While this is valid if the contamination of the supply occurs, it leaves many
questions unanswered if the application occurred downstream. Although that
perspective will be changing as utilities begin to analyze their systems from a true
vulnerability perspective, it demonstrates the potential blind spot that has existed in the
past.

Another scenario that does not seem to be considered is the mixture of contaminants.
Should several different contaminants be combined into one injection incidence, it could
cause a more serious response in the population. The individual immune system could
be challenged on several fronts resulting in a weakening of the body’s ability to resist.
For example, if Cryptosporidium and Giardia were mixed, the resulting incident could
cause an epidemic of severe gastric distress that could result in additional secondary
infections.

Classes of Contamination Agents
Given the preceding discussion, a number of military, academic and public health
institutions have developed lists of agents to be considered as “weapons of mass
destruction”. There are a number of different ways to classify them but generally, they
can be organized as follows. (More expansive lists also include radioactive materials,
but those are not considered sufficiently viable to include in this analysis.)
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1. Biological Agents
•

Bacteria/Rickettsiae

•

Protozoa

•

Toxins

•

Viruses

2. Chemical Agents
•

Warfare Agents (Casualty agents)

•

Nerve Agents

•

Blood Agents

•

Choking Agents

•

Vesicants (Blister Agents)

•

Toxic Industrial Chemicals

Biological Agents
In many ways, the biological agents possess the most potential for system
contamination. Conceptually, any of the waterborne pathogens could be used as an
agent. The difference between the pathogens would be their virulence, ability to survive
in the distribution system environment and the ultimate effect. Many waterborne
diseases cause gastric illnesses, but have no long term effect, while others can result in
protracted illness or death. The key to selection lies in the intent of the perpetrator (i.e.
morbidity/mortality, disruption, psychological trauma, etc. ), ease of access to the
materials and ability to deliver the agent. While the issue is new to this generation of
water system designers and managers, it is certainly not the first time that it has been
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considered. Berger and Stevenson (1955), in fact, presented an analysis of biological
contamination following the initiation of the Cold War. Although the equipment and
technology have changed significantly, that article still contains pertinent information.

The Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has attempted to prioritize
different biological agents by classifying them as Class A, B, or C. The class codes
relate to their virulence and likelihood of use with Class A being the most damaging.
The listing for the bio-agents is as follows (CDC, 2000; Kahn, Morse, & Lillibridge, 2000;
Rotz, Kahn, Lillibridge, Ostroff, & Hughes, 2002). It should be noted that most of the
agents are established using the inhalational exposure route because that is deemed to
present the most vulnerable scenario.

Category A.

High-priority agents include organisms that pose a risk to national security because they:
•

can be easily disseminated or transmitted from person to person;

•

cause high mortality, and have the potential for major public health impact;

•

might cause public panic and social disruption; and

•

require special action for public health preparedness.

Agents currently classified as Category A Disease/Agents
•

Anthrax (Bacillus anthracis)

•

Botulism (Clostridium botulinum toxin)

•

Plague (Yersinia pestis)

•

Smallpox (Variola major)

•

Tularemia (Francisella tularensis)
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•

Viral hemorrhagic fevers (Arenaviruses, Filoviruses, Bunyaviruses, and
Flaviviruses)

Category B.

Second highest priority agents include those that:
•

are moderately easy to disseminate;

•

cause moderate morbidity and low mortality; and

•

require specific enhancements of CDC's diagnostic capacity and enhanced
disease surveillance.

Agents currently classified as Category B Disease/Agents
•

Brucellosis (Brucella species)

•

Epsilon toxin of Clostridium perfringens

•

Food safety threats (Salmonella, E. coli O157:H7, Shigella)

•

Glanders (Burkholderia mallei)

•

Melioidosis (Burkholderia pseudomallei)

•

Psittacosis (Chlamydia psittaci)

•

Q fever (Coxiella burnetti)

•

Ricin toxin from Ricinus communis (castor beans)

•

Staphylococcus enterotoxin B

•

Typhus fever (Rickettsia prowazekii)

•

Viral encephalitis

•

Water Safety Threats (Cryptosporidium parvum, Vibrio Cholerae)
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Category C.

Third highest priority agents include emerging pathogens that could be engineered for
mass dissemination in the future because of:

•

availability;

•

ease of production and dissemination; and

•

potential for high morbidity and mortality and major health impact.

Agents currently classified as Category C Disease/Agents
•

Hantaviruses

•

Multidrug-resistant tuberculosis

•

Nipah virus

•

Tickborne encephalitis viruses

•

Tickborne hemorrhagic fever viruses

•

Yellow fever

In this context Biological agents can be conveniently classified into four different
categories: Bacteria/Rickettsiae, Protozoa, Toxins and Viruses. For the purpose of this
analysis, an attempt to summarize the findings of numerous reports has been listed in
Table 4, Table 5 and Table 6. Because of the differences in the modes of operation of
the different organisms (as well as information available), each table is arranged a little
differently. The primary intent of the tables is to list in a compact fashion the nature of
the threat, the number of organisms necessary to cause an infection and whether or not
the organism is sensitive to inactivation by chlorine. Obviously, the fewer organisms
required to infect, i.e., the more virulent the agent, the more effective it could be in
meeting a terrorist objective.
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From a public health perspective, it is important to know if these agents are replicating
(able to reproduce themselves) and what their environmental (extra-host) survivability is
likely to be. The danger of certain pathogenic organisms can be magnified because,
given appropriate growing conditions, they can continue to increase in concentration
after the initial contamination event. Other substances such as toxins are derivative
substances, i.e. poisonous substances of plant or animal origin. A toxin is dependent on
a predecessor organism (plant or animal) producing it; therefore, it is not able to
replicate itself. This is important in that the concentration of the substance once in place
will not increase as is possible with replicating agents. Accordingly, an attempt has been
made to segregate the agents in terms of their ability to reproduce.

Table 4

Replicating Agents

Disease

Agent

Agent Type

Weaponized

Infective dosea

Water threat

Stable in water

Chlorine toleranceb

Anthrax

Bacillus anthracis

Bacteria

Yes

Yes

6,000 spores (inh)

2 years (spores)

Spores resistant

Brucellosis
Cholera

Brucella melitensis
Vibrio cholerae

Bacteria
Bacteria

Yes
Unknown

Probable
Yes

10,000 organisms (uns)
1,000 organisms (ing)

20-72 days
Survives well

Unknown
Easily killed

8

Gas Gangrene

Clostridium perfringens

Bacteria

Probable

Probable

10 organisms (ing)

Common in sewage

Resistant

Glanders
Melioidosis

Burkholderia mallei

Pseudomonas pseudomallei

Bacteria
Bacteria

Probable
Possible

Unlikely
Unlikely

3.2 x 10 organisms (uns)
Unknown

Up to 30 days
Unknown

Unknown
Unknown

Plague (Bubonic)

Yersinia pestis

Bacteria

Probable

Yes

500 organisms (inh)

16 days

Unknown

Psittacosis
Q fever

Clamydia psitacci
Coxiella burnetti

Parasite
Rickettsia

Possible
Yes

Possible
Possible

Unknown
25 organisms (uns)

18-24 hr, seawater
Unknown

Unknown
Unknown

Salmonellosis

Salmonella sp.

Bacteria

Unknown

Yes

Shigellosis
Tularemia

Shigella sp.
Francisella tularensis

Bacteria
Bacteria

Unknown
Yes

Yes
Yes

Typhus

Rickettsia prowazekii

Rickettsia

Probable

Encephalomyelitis
Enteric viruses

VEE

Virus

6

4

10 organisms (ing)
10 4 organisms (ing)

8 days, fresh water

Inactivated

10 8 organisms (ing)

2-3 days
Up to 90 days

Inactivated, 0.05 ppm, 10 min
Inactivated, 1 ppm, 5 min

Unlikely

10 organisms (uns)

Unknown

Unknown

Virus

Probable
Unknown

Unlikely
Yes

25 particles (aer)
6 particles (ing)

Unknown
8-32 days

Unknown
Readily inactivated (rotavirus)

Hemorrhagic fever

VHF, Rotavirus, Norwalk &
Ebola virus

Virus

Probable

Unlikely

10 5 particles (ing)

Unknown

Unknown

Smallpox
Cryptosporidiosis

Variola major
Cryptosporidum parvum

Virus
Protozoa

Possible
Unknown

Possible
Yes

10 particles (uns)
132 oocysts (ing)

Unknown
Stable days or more

Unknown
Resistant

Abbreviations: aer-aerosol; ing-ingestion; inh-inhalation; uns-unspecified.
a
b
Total infective dose used to calculate water values. Ambient temperature, < 1 ppm free available chlorine, 30 min or as indicated.

Source: Burrows and Renner, 1999

Toxins have been proven to be potent poisons in a number of settings. The range of
plant and animal based toxins is very large and the use of these substances to
contaminate water supplies is somewhat unconventional. To provide an indication of the
relative potency of the biotoxins, the following table is provided. (A few warfare agents
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are also listed below because they are, in essence, toxins. Note that the data is based
on the effects on laboratory mice.)

Table 5

Comparative Lethality of Selected Biotoxins and Chemical Agents in Laboratory Mice

Botulinum toxin
Shiga toxin
Tetanus toxin

LD50
(µ G/KG)
0.001
0.002
0.002

MOLECULAR
WEIGHT
150,000
55,000
150,000

Bacterium
Bacterium
Bacterium

Abrin
Diphtheria toxin
Mainotoxin
Palytoxin
Ciguatoxin
Textilotoxin
C. perfringens toxins
Batrachotoxin

0.04
0.10
0.10
0.15
0.40
0.60
0.1 – 5.0
2.0

65,000
62,000
3,400
2,700
1,000
80,000
35-40,000
539

Plant (Rosary Pea)
Bacterium
Marine Dinoflagellate
Maine Soft Coral
Marine Dinoflagellate
Elapid Snake
Bacterium
Arrow -Poison Frog

3.0
5.0
5.0
8.0
9.0
10.0 (Inhal 2.0)
15.0
27.0 (ED50~pg)

64,000
1,500
46,000
319
8,000
299
267
28,494

Plant (Castor Bean)
Cone Snail
Elapid Snake
Puffer Fish
Scorpion
Marine Dinoflagellate
Chemical Agent
Bacterium

50.0
50.0
64.0
100.0
100.0
1,210.0

500
994
182
140
647
466

Blue-Green Algae
Blue-Green Algae
Chemical Agent
Chemical Agent
Plant (Monkshood)
Fungal Mycotoxin

AGENT

Ricin
alpha-Conotoxin
Taipoxin
Tetrodotoxin
alpha-Tityustoxin
Saxitoxin
VX
SEB (Rhesus/Aerosol)
Anatoxin-A(s)
Microcystin
Soman (GD)
Sarin (GB)
Aconitine
T-2 Toxin

SOURCE

From: Medical Management of Biological Casualties, U.S. AMRIID, July 1998, Appendix C

Table 5 clearly shows that the Botulinum toxin is a thousand times more effective than
Ricin, and many of the other agents. However, Botulinum will be deactivated by chlorine
if a water system has reasonable CT, whereas many of the others are insensitive to
chlorine.
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Other routes of exposure are typically more efficient methods of delivery, but some can
be adapted to a water based delivery method. Table 6 was developed by Burrows and
Renner (1999) to show the biotoxins that are most likely to be used in a water
contamination event. (Notice that, in general, the toxins are relatively resistant to
chlorine at the levels commonly found in potable water systems.)

Table 6

Selected Biotoxins

Biotoxin

Weaponized

Water threat

Aflatoxin

Yes

Yes

NOA EL,
2 L/daya
75 µg/L

Unknown

Probable

Unknown

Yes

Yes

0.0004 µg/L

Stable

Possible
Yes

Yes
Yes

1.0 µg/Lc
15 µg/L

Probably stable
Stable

Inactivated, 6 ppm, 20
min
Resistant at 100 ppm
Resistant at 10 ppm

Yes

0.4 µg/L

Stable

Resistant at 10 ppm

Yes

0.1 µg/L

Probably stable

Unknown

Yes
Yes

65 µg/Ld
1 µg/L

Stable
Probably stable

Resistant
Inactivated, 50 ppm

Anatoxin A
Botulinum toxins
Microcystins
Ricin

Saxitoxin
Possible
Staphylococcal
Probable
enterotoxins
T-2 mycotoxin
Probable
Tetrodotoxin
Possible
NOAEL, no-observed-adverse-effect level.

Stable in water

Chlorine tolerance b

Probably stable
Inactivated in
days

Probably tolerant
Probably tolerant

a

Estimated as 7.5 times the NOAEL calculated for consumption of 15 L/day. bAmbient temperature, < 1 ppm free
available chlorine, 30 min or as indicated. c World Health Organization drinking water standard. dDerived from shortterm U.S. Department of Defense Tri-Service standard (77).
Source: Burrows and Renner, 1999

It should be noted that a number of these agents have not been thoroughly evaluated in
terms of removal or disinfection efficacy, because they are not of routine concern to
water utilities. Therefore, they have not had the level of research associated with them
that the more common indicator species have had. In light of that fact, it is not surprising
that there is disagreement in the literature about the characteristics of the organisms
(infective dose, survivability and efficacious chlorine dose). This is no doubt due to the
different conditions under which the studies in the literature were performed.
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Variables Affecting Disinfection
Disinfection processes are typically viewed as being the primary treatment barrier for
reducing or eliminating the threat of biological pathogens. Chlorine (HOCl and OClspecies) has been the primary agent of disinfection for roughly 100 years. However, in
recent years alternative disinfectants/oxidants are being used in specific situations.
Examples would include ozone, ultraviolet light, chlorine dioxide and gamma radiation.

The effectiveness of the disinfection or neutralization process is governed by more
variables than merely the mass of disinfectant/oxidant applied. One thing noted while
reviewing the literature was the fact that many of the key variables were not listed in the
articles. Therefore, it is possible that the dosages or effectiveness ratings of disinfectant
(chlorine specifically) may not be exactly as listed. Generally speaking, in order to fairly
estimate the efficacy of a disinfectant, the temperature, pH, contact time (assuming
adequate mixing), dosage, and presence of interfering chemicals/turbidity must be
known. Then, given the initial concentrations of the microorganisms, a reasonable
estimate of the disinfection process can be made.

Portions of the Surface Water Treatment Rule (SWTR) were promulgated by the USEPA
to account for variations in temperature, pH, dosage and contact time for various
disinfectants when designing disinfection systems. The SWTR established what are
known as the CT tables for a given organism and a given disinfectant at specific pH and
temperatures. CT is shorthand notation for (disinfectant) Concentration (C) times
Contact time (T). The concentration is measured in mg/L and the time is measured in
minutes.
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It is reasonable to assume that the higher the disinfectant concentration, the higher the
rate of destruction. Again, the actual CT values depend on the microorganism, the pH of
the water, the temperature, and the turbidity of the water. The turbidity is a
measurement of the amount of material suspended in the water that influences the
transmission of light. While turbidity itself is not a significant variable, studies have
shown that bacteria attach themselves to the surface of particles. If the material is
organic, bacteria may hide inside the particle and may be protected from the disinfectant
(White, 1999).

Generally speaking, chemical reactions proceed faster at higher temperatures. Chlorine
reacting with an organic compound will be faster at higher temperatures. Thus, the
inactivation (destruction) of viruses and protozoa is slower at lower temperatures than at
higher ones. For example, tables in the SWTR show that the required CT times for
inactivation at low temperatures (5° Celsius) are about 4 times higher than at 25°
Celsius. This phenomenon holds for all disinfectants, except for UV radiation. Thus, the
higher the CT value, the more disinfectant needed and/or the longer the detention time
required. This is clearly shown in Table 7 and Table 8 (AWWA, 1991).

The guidance manual does not list any CT values for bacteria since they are so much
lower than the CT values for viruses and protozoa. Since chlorine is the most prevalent
disinfectant used in the water industry (80%), a comparison is instructive. At a
temperature of 15° C and an inactivation by 3 logs (99.9%), the CT value for a
representative protozoa is 75 and for viruses 3 (see the Tables 7 and 8). By contrast,
the CT value for coliforms is about 0.5. Deininger (2000) notes that the CT values for
protozoa are an order of magnitude higher than the CT values for viruses, and the CT for
60

viruses are an order of magnitude higher than those for bacteria. One exception was
noted. Spores of Bacillus anthracis are very resistant to chlorine and will not be
inactivated by chlorine at the normal concentrations and contact times used in water
treatment plants. While most attention is focused on anthrax as an inhalational agent, its
use through the ingestion route can likewise be a potent agent (Berger & Stevenson,
1955; Inglesby et al., 1999). Other microorganisms are resistant to chlorine (ex. giardia
and cryptosporidium), but none has presented themselves to date that have the
virulence of B. anthracis.

Table 7

CT Tables for Inactivation of Giardia Cysts (at pH 7)

Disinfectant

Chlorine

Chlorine Dioxide

Inactivation*
1

5
.63

Temperature ºC
15
.32

25
.16

2
3

1.3
1.9

.63
.95

.32
.48

1
2
3

50
99
169

25
50
75

12
25
37

1

8.7

6.3

3.7

2
3

17
26

13
19

7.3
11

1
735
500
2
1,470
1,000
3
2,200
1,500
*Inactivation is in log units. A 2 means a 100 fold reduction, or a 99% inactivation.
The numbers are CT values (mg/L * minutes)
Chloramine

Source: AWWA, 1991
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250
500
750

Table 8

CT Tables for Inactivation of Viruses (pH 6-9)

Inactivation*

5

Temperature ºC
15

25

Ozone

2
3
4

.6
.9
1.2

.3
.5
.6

.15
.25
.3

Chlorine

2
3
4

4
6
8

2
3
4

1
1
2

Chlorine Dioxide

2
3
4

5.6
17.1
33

2.8
8.6
16.7

1.4
4.3
8.4

Chloramine

2
3
4

857
1,423
1,988

428
712
994

214
356
497

21
36

21
36

21
36

Disinfectant

2
3
The numbers are CT values – (mg/L * minutes)
UV Irradiation: Numbers are in mWsec/cm
Source: AWWA, 1991
UV Irradiation

Chemical Agents
Advances in chemistry have driven many of the technological, economic and social
changes in developed society. While much of this advancement has been for the good,
the large number of new chemicals with dangerous characteristics has caused much
environmental damage and now threatens to be used in more sinister ways. Although
chemical warfare has been used at various times throughout history, it was first utilized
on a large scale during World War I. Although banned by various conventions, research
and development within the military has continued and development of chemicals
specifically as warfare agents has occurred.

As mentioned, these agents are classified by their physiological effect. Chemicals which
were developed to have high mortality (death) levels are called Casualty Agents. They
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are sub-classified as Blood Agents, Choking Agents, Nerve Agents and Vesicants
(Munro et al., 1999; Reutter, 1999). Other agents have been developed whose purpose
is not necessarily to cause death, but rather to incapacitate the target in some manner.
These are called Harassing Agents. Among this classification are the Lachrymators
(Tear agents), Sternutators (Vomiting agents), Depressants, Psychedelic agents, and
Stimulants.

With regard to the specific warfare agents, they have been developed almost exclusively
as inhalational or dermal agents. The toxicity of ingesting the material is less well
documented but, in most cases, the agents are impractical because of solubility
limitations. If there were to be a threat, it would most likely be caused by volatilization of
the agent out of the water and inhaled.

Most of the critical agents from an ingestion standpoint are likely to be some form of
Organophosphate (Nerve agents), Arsenic (Vesicant) or Cyanide (Blood). The
organophosphates (OP) are related to the OP pesticides but have much higher
mammalian acute toxicity (particularly through the percutaneous route). Therefore,
some toxicity extrapolation may be inferred from that. These agents attack the central
nervous system in one way or another and generally are related to the interruption of
acetylcholinesterase activity. The OP agents are generally divided into the G-group and
V-group. The G agents are more volatile than the V agents, but all exist as colorless
and, for the most part, odorless liquids.

A brief description of the primary unclassified warfare agents listed in the public domain
follows in Table 9 (Marrs, Maynard, & Sidell, 1996). A more detailed discussion of the
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toxicology and fate is provided in Munro et al. (1999), which also includes some data on
environmental fate issues. It is also interesting to note that much of the development of
chemical warfare agents centered on causing maximum casualties for the least sensitive
male soldier. When considering the general population, lethal dosages may be need to
be adjusted given the fact that women, children, elderly and other sub-populations can
be affected. Apart from the acute event there is also the issue of the potential for longer
term low dose effects (Reutter, 1999).

Other agents that fall into the narcotic or drug classification probably should be
considered too, but it is difficult at this point to screen them. For example, certain
hormone, heart stimulants/depressants, or psychedelic drugs could effect different
populations in different ways. These agent classes would not be likely to show up on
most of the search routines reflected in these results. Accordingly, additional research
may be required to cover pharmaceutical class substances. Many of these chemicals
are sensitive to the disinfectants in common use, so if they were added to the water
upstream of treatment, their effectiveness is assumed to be significantly reduced.
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Table 9

Chemical Warfare Agents

Agent
Type

Agent

Blood
Agents

Arsine
Cyanogen Chloride (CK)
Hydrogen Cyanide (AC)

Choking
Agents

Chlorine
Diphosgene
PFIB
Phosgene
Sulfur mustard (HT)

Distilled mustard (HD)
Ethyldichoroarsine
Lewisite 1
Lewisite 2
Lewisite 3
Methyldichloroarsine
Mustard-Lewisite mixture (HL)
Vesciants
Mustard-T mixture
Nitrogen Mustard 1 (HN-1)
Nitrogen Mustard 2 (HN-2)
Nitrogen Mustard 3 (HN-3)
Phenyldichloroarsine
Phosgene oxime (CX)
Sesqui mustard

Nerve
Agents

a

GA (Tabun)
GB (Sarin)
GD (Soman)
GE
GF
VE
VG
VM
VX

Solubility

Water
threat

RfD
(µg/L)

Sparingly sol.
Soluble
Miscible

Unlikely
Possible
Yes

750
750

LD50
(µ G/KG)

Molecular
Weight

Stable in
water

Chlorine

CAS No.

b

tolerance

77.9
61.5
27.0

No

70.9

7784-42-1
506-77-4
74-90-8
yes

7782-50-5

Reactive
Insoluable

Unlikely
Unlikely

Sparingly sol.

Unlikely

Insoluable

Unlikely

186.4

Sparingly sol.
Sparingly sol.
Insoluable

Unlikely
Unlikely
No

170.1
156.1
204.5

538-07-8
51-75-2
555-77-1

Insoluable

No

113.9

1794-86-1

Miscible
Miscible
Slightly sol.

Unlikely

162.3
140.1
182.2

77-81-6
107-44-8
96-64-0

Unlikely
Unlikely

140

98.9
degrades

75-44-5
6392-89-8

7
80
80

degrades

505-60-2

70
13.8
6

100
64

180.1

Moderate

Total infective dose used to calculate water values.

b

Unlikely

7.5

15

267.0

50782-69-9

Ambient temperature, < 1 ppm free available chlorine, 30 min or as indicated.

Source: Marrs, Maynard, & Sidell (1997)

In addition to warfare agents, Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TICs) could represent a threat
for use in a contamination event. Again, if one assumes that an aesthetic change (taste,
odor, color) will deter individuals from consuming the product, the number of toxic
chemicals can be significantly reduced. Deininger (2000) reports that the EPA provided
a list of chemicals for analysis that was produced by a screening on some unknown
basis. The list included methyl mercaptan, arsine, dimethyl sulfate, acrolein, toluene 2,
4-diisocyanate, bromine, fluorine, methyl hydrazine, phosgene, stibine, chlorine, nickel
carbonyl, hydrogen sulfide, hydrogen chloride, hydrogen fluoride, triethylamine,
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gluteraldehyde, nitric acid vapors, furan, methylethyl ketone, methylvinylketone, osmium
tetroxide aerosol and chromic acid aerosol.

Although most of the chemicals are certainly toxic, a review of this list reveals that none
of these chemicals presents a credible threat in this context. For example, chlorine is
listed as one of the TICs. Chlorine is without a doubt toxic and must be monitored for an
aerosol release. In fact, chlorine is listed in the Clean Air Act Amendments as a
chemical to be modeled in Risk Management Plans (RMP). However, in order to be
toxic from an ingestion standpoint, the taste and odor would be so pungent that the
palatability of the water would render it undrinkable by most people. Therefore, it is not
considered a credible threat, because it could be too easily detected. Many of the other
chemicals on the list have a similar weakness from the standpoint of a lethal
contaminant via the ingestion route.

Additional research is necessary to more fully develop a viable list of candidate agents in
the TIC category. At this point, it would appear that the primary TICs would be related to
some of the warfare agents, such as cyanides, orthophosphate pesticides and
arsenicals. Again, this issue of viability of the toxic agents via the ingestion route (as
opposed to inhalational or dermal) while being undetectable by the senses is the major
problem.

Survival and Deactivation Rates of Agents
If a contamination event were to occur, a question of critical importance relates to the
persistence of the agent. With regard to bacteria, few have been studied in detail (in this
context), except the die-off of coliform organisms. The EPA Qual II model has a
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provision for the modeling of these organisms which occur in sewage effluents and
surface runoff. They are normally believed to follow the common exponential decay
form:

y ( t ) =y ( 0) * e (

-k*t )

(Equation 1)

The quoted rates for decay constant, k, vary between 0.5 and 4.0 (Deininger, 2000;
USEPA, 1985).

A textbook on water microbiology (McFeters, 1990) discusses a number of infectious
microorganisms. In the absence of more detailed studies, it may be prudent to assume
a worst case scenario, i.e. neglect the die-off and assume that there would be no
decrease in the agent concentration. As an indication of relative survivability, however,
McFeters quotes half-lives of 7 to 16 hours for Vibrio cholerae, Shigella spp.,
Enterotoxigenic E.coli, and Salmonella. Campylobacter jejuni has a half-life of 3 days,
and Yersinia enterocolitica has a half-life of more than a year. B. anthracis has a half-life
of several years. Viruses are reported to survive well in river settings; they die-off faster
at warm temperatures than at cold ones. Survival times for Echo 7 virus, Echo 12 virus,
Cocksackie A9 virus and Poliomyelitis virus at 4° C are: 99.9% are dead after 20 days,
99% are dead after 14 days, and 90% are dead after 7 days (Deininger, 2000).

Information on this aspect of toxins was difficult to find, but they are probably very stable
in water. Burrows and Renner (1999) speculate on the most likely biotoxins to be used
for water contamination and conclude that for the most part they seem to be stable in
water and more or less resistant to chlorine levels typically found in water systems.
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Therefore, the default assumption would be that they would remain potent in whatever
concentration they were applied.

Microbiological organisms require nominal food sources and nutrients to survive.
Therefore, many biological agents may not survive as well as the literature values
indicate, because it is noted that the data are taken from stream or wastewater effluent
sources. However, at specific stages of the life cycle (ex. Cysts), certain organisms are
well protected from environmental factors and remain dormant. This fact makes those
organisms attractive for use in surreptitious attacks.

The Toxic Industrial Chemicals will most likely be persistent and will leave the water
based on their partial pressures or fugacity. In turbulent situations (ex. pouring or
shaking), there will be a higher transfer to the atmosphere than in tranquil situations
(storage). Obviously, there would need to be exposure to the atmosphere for this to
occur.

General Discussion of the Effect of Treatment Processes on Contamination
The 1990 edition of Water Quality and Treatment (4th ed.) provides a table that shows
the effectiveness of treatment processes in terms of poor, fair, good, and excellent. This
table was developed by summarizing forty-five research reports in existence at that time
and is reproduced as Table 10 below (AWWA, 1990). Taking midpoints of the
sometimes wide ranges, leads to Table 11 below with numeric fractions. This table
should be used with extreme caution. The data need to be verified in a pilot treatment
plant. It is interesting to note that the 5th edition of Water Quality and Treatment (1999)
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has dropped this estimate of efficiency for each process, and has replaced it by only a
table with an “X” when the process is deemed to be effective (AWWA, 1999).

Table 10 Effectiveness of Processes for Contaminant Removal
Bacteria

Viruses

Protozoa

VOC

SOC

TOC

Taste/Odor

P

P

P

G-E

P-F

F

F-E

Coagulation
Sediment/Filtration

G-E

G-E

G-E

G-E

P

P-G

P-G

Lime Softening

G-E

G-E

G-E

P-F

P-F

G

P-F

Ion Exchange

P

P

P

P

P

G-E

-

Reverse Osmosis

E

E

E

F-E

F-E

G

-

Ultra Filtration

E

E

E

F-E

F-E

G

-

Disinfection

E

E

E

P-G

P-G

G-E

P- E

Granular Activ. Carbon

F

F

F

F-E

F-E

F

G-E

Powdered Activ. Carb.

P

P

P

P-G

P- E

F-G

G-E

UV Irradiation

E

E

E

G

G

G

G

Aeration, Air Stripping

P–Poor (0-20% removal); F–Fair (20-60%); G–Good (60-90%); E–Excellent (90-100%); NA –Insufficient Data
Source: Water Quality & Treatment, 4th edition, 1990

If one takes the midpoints of the categories of the above table, it is possible to generate
the following table. Obviously, each source water is different, so actual removals will
show a significant variance, but this table provides a relative indication of the results.

Table 11 Percentage Removal of Contaminants
Bacteria

Viruses

Protozoa

VOC

SOC

TOC

Taste/Odor

Aeration, Air Stripping

10

10

10

85

25

40

70

Coagulation Sedimentation

85

85

85

10

40

25

25

Lime Softening

85

85

85

25

25

75

25

Ion Exchange

10

10

10

10

10

85

-

Reverse Osmosis

95

95

95

70

70

75

-

Ultra Filtration

95

95

95

40

40

85

-

Disinfection

95

95

95

40

40

85

22

Granular Activ. Carbon

40

40

40

70

70

40

85

Powdered Activ. Carb.

10

10

10

40

50

55

75

UV Irradiation

95

95

95

75

75

75

75

th

Adapted from: Water Quality & Treatment, 4 edition, 1990

69

Summary
In the post-September 11 world, all utilities are examining their vulnerability to attack.
This especially includes bio-chemical contamination, although other facets of operation
are being considered too (cyber/control, disabling critical structures, critical personnel
backup, etc). An enormous number of microbiological and chemical substances exist
which could cause harm if consumed. However, the list of probable candidates can be
screened by looking at the virulence or toxicity of a substance and its ability to be
undetected (ex. no taste, odor, color). This reduces the number of viable candidates to
a more manageable number.

With regard to bacterial agents, Shigella, Salmonella, Vibrio cholerae are viable threats;
however, a reasonable chlorine residual will destroy them. The greatest threat seems to
be the spores of B. anthracis. They are not affected by the normal disinfectant
concentrations used in water treatment. For the same reason, Cryptosporidium or
Giardia are also worrisome due to its low LD 50 and its resistance to disinfectants.

Further examination of toxins is probably in order. Tables 2 and 3 are helpful as guides.
It appears that Botulinum, Aflatoxin and Ricin are the most likely to have been
weaponized.

Chemical agents need additional examination for viable candidates. The current
thinking in many venues is that some form of cyanide, arsenic or orthophosphates holds
the most potential as a contamination agent. The issue of detectability for some of these
agents could reduce their utility, however, these certainly can have a significant effect
and should be placed on a priority list. It seems highly likely that other chemicals
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(including pharmaceuticals or TIC) will expand the list, so periodic review of potential
candidates is warranted.

It should be noted that no judgment has been made as to the logistics of feeding an
adequate dose of toxicant into the water. Further screening could be accomplished by
looking at the quantity of the agent required to result in a toxic dosage in the water. As
additional LD 50 or other dose-response data becomes available on an ingestion basis,
this computation may be helpful.
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Chapter 5 Computer Simulation of Distribution System Water Quality
Because it is impracticable to physically test a wide range of contamination events, it
becomes immediately apparent that any reasonable approach seeking to address the
problem must rely upon a workable extended period simulation of the distribution
network in question. Although there are certainly many factors, assumptions and
sources of errors in developing an extended period water quality model (see Appendix
2), with time and effort the network simulations can be refined and calibrated to yield a
reasonably accurate representation of reality. With this in place it is possible to
investigate various system events and observe the results.

Because the computer simulations generate the data to be analyzed in this study, it may
be useful to survey the basic features of the mathematical models that replicate the
physical system. The modeling of a water distribution system is difficult because it is
governed by complex, nonlinear, non-convex and discontinuous hydraulic and water
quality equations. To realistically simulate the operation of a water system one must
consider the effects of pipes, valves, pumps (and their controls), storage tanks, spatial
and temporal variations in water demand, and variations in water quality. Fortunately, a
number of computer packages have been developed to handle the technical
mathematical aspects of network modeling. A few of the network solvers available
include the EPA’s freeware EPANET, Haestad Methods WaterCAD ®/WaterGEMS ®,
University of Kentucky’s KYPIPE, MWH’s H2ONET®, and Advantica’s Stoner SynerGEE®
Water to name a few. These packages are more affordable and accessible now than in

72

the past and for many reasons every community water system should have a working
simulation of their distribution network.

Hydraulic Analysis
The first set of physical relationships that must be understood and converted to
mathematical constructs relate to basic fluid flow. Pipe flow and especially networked
pipe flow, is complex because of its nonlinearity which arises primarily because of pipe
friction. In addition, the effects of water storage facilities and pump systems create a
discontinuous set of boundary conditions that must be managed. The primary
components of a distribution system network are links which represent pipes, pumps,
valves and nodes which correspond to junctions, tanks and reservoirs. The pipes and
junction nodes are connected in loops which provide a means of distributing water
efficiently with reduced energy requirements and improved operational redundancy.
This section will discuss the fundamental fluid relationships that form the foundation of
network simulation.

Characteristics of Water
Water from a hydraulic standpoint has a number of features that must be considered in
any simulation effort. For example, it is essentially, although not absolutely,
incompressible. It has a specific weight (γ) of 62.4 pounds per cubic foot. The specific
gravity is usually defined as 1.000 at 60oF, however, some references list it as 1.000 at
39.2oF, which is the point of maximum water density. The kinematic viscosity (ν) is
0.00001216 f2/sec at 60oF. Like all materials its viscosity varies with temperature and so
may be a factor in computing flow characteristics. It is considered the “universal acid”
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and as such can be reactive to piping and other material in the system which over time
can change the flow characteristics of the conduits (Camp & Meserve, 1974; Westaway
& Loomis, 1977).

Basic Fluid Equations
The hydraulic analysis of pipe systems rest primarily upon two basic laws of physics: the
law of conservation of mass and the law of conservation of energy. Thus, when
examining any control volume of water or any change of state, equations must be written
which conserve mass and energy. This is the starting point for network models.

The law of conservation of mass is understood to mean that storage is equal to inflow
minus outflow. In pressure pipe networks there is no storage within the pipe system
although tank storage may change over time. Thus, in a pipe or junction node, the
inflow must equal the outflow. Mathematically, then:

(Equation 2)

Q i= Q e

∑Q =∑Q

or

i

(Equation 3)

e

where: Qi = inflow (cfs)
Qe = outflow (cfs)

When considering pressure flow (no free water surface) in a conduit, the flow is also
related to the velocity of the water in accordance with the wetted cross-sectional area of
the conduit. Thus,
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(Equation 4)

Q=V*A

where: V = velocity (f/s)
A = cross-sectional area (f2)
and

(Equation 5)

V1* A1 = V2* A 2

When a storage tank is considered, it is possible to accumulate or expel water during a
time increment and thus the equation becomes:

∑Q - ∑Q
i

e

(Equation 6)

= qs

where: qs = external demand or supply (cfs)

If the elevation and configuration of the storage tank is known (ex. tank diameter and
minimum and maximum pool elevations), an equation for head and storage can be
written. This, in conjunction with the conservation equation above, can provide an
estimate of the effect of the tank on the water system. As mentioned, distribution
storage is essential to provide flow and head equalization during demand stress periods.
Therefore, it is critical to have the ability to estimate analytically the response of the tank
on the system.

Likewise, the law of conservation of energy asserts that the energy state (potential and
kinetic energy) between two points is constant. Of course, useful energy is converted or
“lost” due to a number of factors including friction and momentum. Thus, the term
“friction loss”, which will be estimated in following sections, refers to the energy that is
associated with water movement and converted to energy that is no longer available for
system use.
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Water system energy is commonly referred to as pressure or head. In an ideal state
head is the sum of three components:

1. Elevation head (potential energy)
2. Pressure head (potential energy)
3. Velocity head (kinetic energy)

The Bernoulli equation relates the total head at a point as:
p V2
H=z+ +
? 2g

(Equation 7)

where: H = total head (f)
z = elevation above datum (f)
p = pressure (lb/f2)
V = pipe velocity (f2/s)
g = gravitational constant (32.2 f/s 2)
γ = water specific weight (62.4 lb/f3)
Also, from the conservation of energy for two points in a frictionless environment:
H1 = H2
thus,

z1 +

(Equation 8)

p1 V12
p
V2
+
= z2 + 2 + 2
? 2g
? 2g

(Equation 9)

When friction loss is considered:

H1 = H2 + hf

(Equation 10)

where: hf = friction loss (f)
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so

z1 +

p1 V12
p
V2
+
= z 2 + 2 + 2 +hf
? 2g
? 2g

(Equation 11)

Now given the fundamental framework for flow and energy related to pressure pipe flow,
the next task is to sketch the equations which are commonly used to estimate flow,
velocity and headloss. These equations will form the basis for describing the mass and
energy effects as water moves through the distribution system (Mays, 1999; Mays,
2000).

Friction (Energy) Loss Equations
The study of fluid movement has produced a number of categories for classifying flow.
At low flows (velocities) there is relatively little wall interaction relative to the bulk flow
and so the regime is deemed to be in laminar mode. This occurs when the Reynold’s
number (Re) is less than 2000; the Reynold’s number, of course, being:

Re =

V D?
µ

(Equation 12)

where: V = mean velocity
D = Diameter
ρ = fluid density
µ = dynamic viscosity

As the flow increases the regime moves through a transition phase before becoming
fully turbulent. Turbulent flow is generally defined as a flow that occurs with a Reynold’s
number greater than 4000 (Westaway & Loomis, 1977).
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In addition flow systems can be further classified as steady or unsteady. Most typical
computations assume steady flow. Steady flow is defined as the condition where the
flow rate at a specific point is constant with respect to time. Otherwise the flow is
classified as unsteady or transient. By this definition most engineered systems,
technically speaking, are unsteady. However, computation of flow properties under
unsteady conditions is extremely difficult, if not intractable, so steady flow is assumed in
most cases. This assumption appears to be acceptable so long as the temporal mean
velocity does not change over brief periods. Unsteady flow then, for engineering design,
is associated with rapidly varying velocity or pressure gradients over a short period of
time (Mays, 2000).

Because water systems are just designed to convey water that is fit for human
consumption, certain assumptions can be reasonably made. These assumptions
include modeling a single phase, Newtonian fluid (i.e. water) flowing in a full pipe. This
means that the computations will assume pressure flow as opposed to open channel
flow. The only place a free water surface should occur in a water distribution system is a
storage tank or reservoir.

Darcy-Weisbach Equation
In 1845 Julius Weisbach published his three volume set on engineering mechanics
which included his theory of pressure loss through pipe. Over the next 10 to 15 years he
refined his approach, which is still widely used today. In fact it is still viewed as superior
to most other systems in that it is applicable to any fluid, is dimensionally correct and
takes into account temperature of the fluid (Brater & King, 1976; Haestaed et al., 2003).
The common forms of his equation are:
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hL = f

L V2
8 f L Q2
f L Q2
=
=
0.02517
D2g
gD 5 p 2
D5

(Equation 13)

where: hL = Friction loss
f = D-W friction factor
L = Length of pipe (f)
D = Diameter of pipe (f)

The Darcy-Weisbach equation can also be expressed in common units of D (in) and Q
(gpm), in which case the head loss is:

hL = 0.031

f L Q2
D5

(Equation 14)

The friction factor, f, is approximated by the following relationship in turbulent flow (Re >
4000):

1
e
=1.14-2log  
f
D

(Equation 15)

where: e = pipe wall uniform roughness (f)

For flow regimes in the transition zone (2000 > Re > 4000) the friction factor is
approximated by the Colebrook-White equation:

 e/D 2.51 
=-2log 
+
 3.7 R f 
f

e


1
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(Equation 16)

A key aspect to notice with the Darcy-Weisbach friction factor in the transition zone is
that it is not constant for a given pipe. It will change in relationship to the Reynold’s
number over the range of flows encountered in the field (Brater & King, 1976).

Computer power has improved the convenience of using the Darcy-Weisbach equation
in large scale hydraulic computations, but most of the friction loss computations in water
systems rely on the following equation set.

Hazen-Williams Equation
Although the Darcy-Weisbach equation offers a rational approach to friction loss
analysis, over the years it has been avoided in complex computations because the
friction factor, f, cannot be directly computed. Rather, an iterative approach is necessary
and, until recent advances in computer power, the time and effort required to perform all
of the computations made it undesirable.

The Hazen-Williams equation has been widely used in the water industry especially in
America. It is valid only for water with a turbulent flow regime and a fluid temperature of
60°F. Because there is an implicit kinematic viscosity assumption of ν = 0.00001216
f2/sec, as the temperature approaches the freezing or boiling point, the equation can
yield results with variances of as much as 40% (Westaway & Loomis, 1977). However,
water distribution systems tend to stay within the valid range in all but the coldest
climates. The mathematical representation of pipe friction loss according to the HazenWilliams equation is as follows:
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1.852

4.73L  Q 
hL = 4.8655  
D
C

(Equation 17)

where: L = Length (f)
D = Diameter (f)
Q = Flow (f3/s)
C = HW Coefficient

The equation, expressed in common units of L (f), D (f) and Q (gpm), V (f/s) is:

hL =0.00208L

Q 1.852
D4.8655

1.852

 100 
 C 



= 3.0226

L
D1.167

1.852

V
C
 

(Equation 18)

Although the formula is incorrect from a theoretical point of view, it still yields acceptable
results in practice. This is probably due to the built-in uncertainty implicit in the C
coefficient. The HW coefficient is generally obtained by using published tables for pipes
and appurtenances, although it is occasionally checked in the field by measuring flow
and pressure drop between hydrants (known pipe length) and back-computing the Cvalue.

Minor Losses
In addition to energy consumed as the water traverses the pipe route, it is also
consumed when the flow line changes. This typically occurs in flow through valves,
reducers, tees, bends, and other appurtenances in the piping system. The losses,
generally called minor or local losses, are due to the turbulence in the bulk flow as it
moves through the fittings. Thus, the energy loss tends to be proportional to the velocity
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of the water flowing through the fittings. The headloss through these appurtenances is
generally estimated by the following equation:

hL =K

V2
2g

(Equation 19)

where: K = minor loss coefficient

The minor loss coefficient is usually determined experimentally by the manufacturer of
the equipment or material in question and is provided in tabular form.

Energy Inputs: Pumps
Much of the discussion thus far has dealt with energy loss during delivery of water from
source to use. The supply of water and energy imparted to the system is due primarily
to pumping systems. While there are many types of pumps, the vast majority of pumps
used in the water industry are centrifugal pumps. Centrifugal pumps impart energy to
the water volume by a rotating impeller located in an eccentric casing. The pump inlet
characteristics (impeller design and rotational speed, outlet features and power applied)
form the specifics of each pump and its efficiency. Because of the physics of the pump,
the pressure (head) and outlet volume are inversely related so that as the flow increases
the pressure decreases and vice versa. This can correspond nicely with varying water
system demands in that pump combinations can be selected that naturally adjust to the
demand changes by moving up and down the demand curves (Karassik, Krutzsch,
Fraser, & Messina, 1976).
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The output of each pump design is different so manufacturers publish the pumping
characteristics of each of their particular pumps in Head-Capacity or H-Q curves.
Horizontal split-case centrifugal pumps are used in most applications because the split
case allows removal of the impeller without disturbing the inlet or outlet piping plus the
operating efficiency of this type of pump is quite high. Figure 4 illustrates a typical split
case centrifugal pump curve showing operating curves for five different impeller options
that can be used in the 5x6x11 pump operating at 1750 rpm (Aurora Pump, 1989). The
operating head (Y-axis) and the pump discharge (X-axis) stipulates the pump response
to different demand requirements. The point at which the impeller curve intersects the
Y-axis is called the cutoff head. This represents the pressure at which the pump is
unable to pump water (Q = 0) into the system. Thus, if this condition is reached the
pump impeller can spin but is unable to overcome the pressure imposed upon it.
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Figure 4 Typical Centrifugal Pump Curve (Source: Aurora Pump, 1989)

Pump design is complex, but fortunately most single speed centrifugal pump curves (HQ curves) can be approximated by a quadratic equation of the form:

hp =AQ 2 +BQ+hc

(Equation 20)

where: hp = pump head (f)
A, B = pump coefficients
Q = pump discharge (gpm)
hc = pump cutoff head (f)
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Data points are picked off the manufacturer’s published curves and fit to the equation by
regression methods. This allows a mathematical expression for pump activity that can
be programmed when solving network problems.

Over the past 15 to 20 years improvement in equipment has led to increased use of
variable speed centrifugal pumps instead of constant (single) speed pumps. The pumps
provide more flexibility to an operating system, but are more difficult to incorporate in
design and modeling efforts. Variable speed operations can be predicted from single
speed data by using pump affinity laws. They are:

Q1 n1
=
Q 2 n2

(Equation 21)

H1  n1 
= 
H2  n2 
P1  n1 
= 
P2  n2 

2

(Equation 22)

3

(Equation 23)

where: Q = pump discharge (gpm)
H = pump head (f)
P = pump power (hp)
n = impeller rotational speed (rpm)

With these equations and the concept of a Fixed Grade Node (FGN), the energy inputs
to the water distribution system can be described mathematically. This will be necessary
for solving the simultaneous equations describing the system. An FGN is a reservoir of
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assumed infinite volume operating at a fixed head (Boulos, Lansey, & Karney, 2004;
Haestaed et al., 2003; Mays, 2000).

Network Simulation
The preceding sections have described the major relationships that must be considered
when developing an overall model of the hydraulic aspects of a distribution system. The
law of conservation of mass states that at every node within the system, the flow
entering that node must equal the flow leaving it. Storage does not exist within the
system except for storage tanks and reservoirs where there is a free water surface and
sufficient freeboard to accommodate the changes in water elevation.

The conservation of energy principle states that the energy between any two nodes must
balance regardless of the path taken. This brings into play the concept of friction loss
through pipes, valves and other appurtenances within the system. The headloss
equations listed above are used to estimate the energy loss as a function of flow and
system characteristics (pipe materials and configuration, elevation, control valves, etc).
In addition, energy inputs into the system are considered by modeling pumping systems
or FGN.

As a matter in passing, because distribution networks can become unwieldy if all small
diameter pipes are included in the model, many times the modeler will consolidate small
elements of the network into hydraulically equivalent pipe configurations. This process,
called skeletonization, is a means simplifying or removing elements with small or
inconsequential effects. The data associated with removed elements is not typically
discarded, but is included with adjacent larger features, using conservation of mass and
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energy principles. A frequently used technique of converting flow and headloss for small
pipes, valves, bends and other appurtenances into the larger components is the
equivalent pipe method.

Steady State Model
Once the distribution system has been configured it will have N nodes (junctions) and L
links (pipes). Thus, there will be N conservation of mass equations and L non-linear
conservation of energy equations that must be solved simultaneously. These are
configured according to the physical layout of the pipe network and its loops or topology.
Accordingly, the system cannot be addressed by analytical (closed form) methods.
Rather, the problem must be solved iteratively (numerically). A number of approaches
have been proposed as computer power and mathematical sophistication has increased.

The simplest model to develop is the static or steady state model. In this configuration
all the input values are set and the computer iteratively steps to the solution that would
exist if the system were allowed to exist in equilibrium. In other words the dynamic
features of the system (ex. tank levels, nodal demands, pump output (curve)) are
specified and the computer iteratively solves the descriptive equations (Boulos et al.,
2004; Haestaed et al., 2003; Mays, 2000).

Extended Period Model
Developmentally, once system programmers had developed the ability to simulate
steady state conditions, the opportunity to move forward to a more dynamic
representation of a system was possible. This was conceptualized as being a time
variation problem, in that engineers had the ability to create steady state configurations
87

of the network and, if a means of updating the model with new system status could be
developed, the model would begin to predict actual system changes. In essence an
extended period simulation may be envisioned as a string of steady state models
incrementing forward by an arbitrary time step, while updating tank levels, system
demands and operational changes.

In order to accomplish this effectively, additional criteria and relationships must be
defined to instruct the model how these factors will change from step to step. Of
fundamental importance is the ability to reliably define or predict:

•

Change in demand both spatially and temporally

•

Change in control mechanisms (pumps, control valves and system
constraints)

•

Change in tank storage volumes and levels

Although demands can theoretically change in almost an infinite number of ways in
space and time, for each particular water system certain patterns tend to emerge after
study of daily and seasonal water trends. From that information diurnal relationships can
be structured by using an assumed baseline flow. If it is assumed that these
relationships apply uniformly across the network (spatial variance), one is able to
establish a procedure for modifying system demands over time that are imposed on the
pumping system.

Given new demand levels, the supply system must respond by either increasing or
decreasing the pumping rate or utilizing storage capacity or both. This involves some
means of simulating the control system governing the network. Most current software
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incorporates some type of scripting or rule-based logic that allows an analyst to describe
the conditions under which a pump will switch on or off, PRV’s to operate, check valves
to open or close, etc. As the new demands are imposed, the control system along with
branching logic relating tank storage to the new demands defines how the system
adjusts to the new demands.

Since the storage tanks have predefined configurations the water levels can be updated
by the conservation of mass and energy relationships. Given the updated demand data
the adjustment in water level can be estimated by (Mays, 2000):

? Ht =

Vt Qt ? t
=
AT
AT

(Equation 24)

where: ∆Ht = Change in tank water level at time t
Vt = Volume of water in tank at time t
AT = Cross sectional area of tank
∆t = Time increment

AT generally assumes a constant section, but the same concept can be used to predict
changing tank levels and volumes on more complex tank shapes.

Dynamic Water Quality Models
The next step in computer simulation of distribution systems is the development of
mechanisms to compute concentrations and movement of water quality parameters
though the network. At the outset it important to understand the nature of the
contaminant of interest. Generally, contaminants may be classified in one of two ways.
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They are either conservative or non-conservative. Conservative constituents are those
that do not degrade. Constituents in this category tend to be inorganic ionic species like
chlorides, fluorides, nitrates, etc. Their concentration is attenuated only by dilution
effects. Non-conservative or reactive constituents are those whose concentration are a
function of concentration and time and would be represented by microbiological
contaminants, THMs, chlorine and the like. A water quality model, then, must factor
these concepts into an analysis that can be divided into the following considerations:

•

Hydraulics

•

Transport Mechanisms

•

Bulk Reactions

•

Wall Reactions

•

Tank Hydrodynamics

Hydraulics.

A dynamic water quality model is dependant upon an extended period hydraulic
simulation in order to provide the basic “input” of flow, velocities, direction of movement
and storage tank levels as well as fundamental network descriptive data (ex. pipe
diameter and length). In essence then, the overall water quality model is actually
composed of two component models: the extended period hydraulic simulation and the
associated water quality solution algorithm. The extended period hydraulic simulation
has been discussed above and will not be repeated here other than to emphasize the
importance of developing and maintaining a calibrated simulation of the distribution
system in question. Because the water quality model depends on the hydraulic
simulation to make its projections, poorly developed hydraulic models will result in
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propagation of errors through to the water quality output. This can result in a faulty
analysis and improper conclusions.

Transport mechanisms.

Conceptually, water contaminants can be modeled by three mechanisms as they move
along a pipe route. These transport models are generally denominated as being
advective, dispersive or diffusive (actually, radiation is a fourth mechanism, but it doesn’t
have applicability in this context). Advective transport assumes that the constituent
moves down the pipe axis at a velocity equivalent to the mean velocity of the bulk water
column. Dispersive transport in this context is generally defined as radial movement, i.e.
from the axis to pipe wall. Diffusion is descriptive of interface transport which occurs at a
molecular level and in this context would occur at the leading or trailing edge of a
concentration gradient. Because of the increased complexity associated with a multidimensional analysis, most popular current analytical schemes uniformly assume that
only advective transport is significant. Most packages use a mathematical
representation similar to EPANET (Clark & Grayman, 1998; Rossman, 1994), which is:

∂Cij
∂t

= - v ij

∂Cij
∂x

( )

(Equation 25)

+k ij C ij

where: Cij = concentration at position x at time t in the link between nodes i and j
vij = velocity in link between nodes i and j
kij = substance reaction rate in link between nodes i and j

It is also important to note the means by which the concentration changes occur as
various pipes converge on a junction node. At any given node, multiple pipes can enter
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the node and multiple pipes can exit the node. In addition, it is possible for an external
demand or supply to exist at the node. Because nodes are a fundamental feature of the
pipe network, the computation of the situation should be rational and consistent.
Computational models uniformly assume that mixing of flows in a node is instantaneous
and complete and that no storage occurs within a node. It is further assumed that
conservation of mass principles apply. This leads to the following relationship to define
mixing at pipe junctions (Rossman, 1994):

∑Q C
C ix=0 =

j∈Ik

j

jx=L j


+ Q k,ext Ck,ext

∑Q +Q
j∈Ik

j

(Equation 26)
k,ext

where: Cix=0 = Concentration at start of node i
i = Link with flow leaving node k
Ik = Set of pipes with flow into node k
Qj = Flow in link j
Lj = Length of link j
Qk,ext = External source flow entering network at k
Ck,ext = Concentration of external flow entering at k

Bulk reactions.

As the water moves through the pipe network it is subject to reactive changes. Bulk
reactions refer to the changes that occur in the water column itself. The nature of the
changes is a function of the contaminant in question. In reality chemical components
may change oxidation state or react with other chemicals in the water to form new
species or compounds. This is especially prevalent when a community supplies water to
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the distribution system from several different sources. These waters mix in the
distribution system and can change the character of both waters as a new chemical
equilibrium is established. At this point network analysis software only handles
biological or chemical reactions as a single species decay (or growth) function. In other
words multi-species decay or interaction processes cannot be directly processed.
Accordingly, there is no direct way, for instance, for the software to estimate the effect of
a specified chlorine level in the water on a specified or computed concentration of a
contaminant. Work is being performed on developing toolkits for that purpose but as of
this point they do not exist in production form (Uber, Shang, & Rossman, 2004).

Biological contaminants on the other hand may grow or decay depending on the nature
of the biological species and the availability of sustaining nutrients in the water. As
mentioned in Chapter 4, from a monitoring standpoint it is important to know if a
monitored microorganism can replicate outside a host and what its environmental
survivability characteristics are. Water systems themselves can impact the
environmental survivability. For instance, it is not uncommon in systems that have
multiple water sources to create zones within the system that are conducive to growth of
microbiological colonies as the waters mix.

Under the assumptions of this paper, the focus is upon contaminants that are specifically
injected into the water column and the resultant fate of those contaminants. Certainly
there are dilution effects but, in addition, other changes may occur as the water moves
through the system. The simulation software must have a means of approximating
these changes.
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The means used to accomplish this draws from fundamental biological and chemical
relationships and the kinetic transformation models used in chemical engineering.
These models can become quite sophisticated but generally are unwarranted because
of the uncertainty associated with reaction factors in highly dilute and spatially variable
environments such as water systems.

Reaction rates are generally classified by reaction order. In simple reactions the order is
equal to the sum of the exponents in the rate equation. A rate equation states the
relationship between the reactants and the products and is determined experimentally.
The general form is patterned as follows:

Rate=k [ A ] n

(Equation 27)

where: k = equilibrium constant
A = reactant
n = reaction order

Simple reaction relationships used in water quality modeling include zero order, first
order and second order equations. Accordingly, then a zero order reaction would
indicate that the reaction is independent of constituent concentration, and a second
order equation would be proportional to the product or square of the concentration
(Williams & Williams, 1967).

The most commonly used model is the first order single species decay model which
states that the constituent decays at a rate proportional to initial concentration. Chlorine
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is commonly assumed to decay within a distribution system following this pattern unless
consumed by an unexpected demand within the system. Powell, West, Hallam,
Forester, and Simms (2000) explore this simplifying assumption and the variability
possible by using it. This can be represented mathematically by the following
expression:

Ct =C0 exp -kt

(Equation 28)

where Ct = Concentration at time t
Co = Original concentration
k = decay (growth) constant
t = time

Note that growth of a constituent can also be represented by this relationship if the
growth constant is expressed as a negative. The growth indicated would be
unconstrained and increase at a rate determined by k.

Biologicals on the other hand may exhibit growth potential up to some maximum or
limiting concentration due to limitation of critical nutrients in a potable water system.
This can be modeled by a first order growth to equilibrium. This has the same form as
that above except that it must consider the constraint posed by the limiting
concentration. This is represented by:

Ct =Cmax - ( Cmax - C0 e-kt )

where: Cmax = Maximum concentration
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(Equation 29)

Other reaction relationships can be modeled but this is only productive if information
regarding the fundamental reaction mechanisms is known along with the boundary
conditions in which they operate. Even the most straightforward modeling efforts require
a number of assumptions so, unless specific data is available upon which to base the
effort, a more complex analysis may be misguided (Weber & DiGiano, 1996; Williams &
Williams, 1967).

Wall reactions.

Wall reactions historically have been deemed to be secondary or tertiary effects with
respect to water quality except in cases where corrosion or physical damage occurs.
More recently however the implications of wall effects are being reconsidered especially
in pipes with high surface area to volume ratios. For example, it has been discovered
that the interior of water distribution systems can have thin but significant colonies of
microbiological species called biofilms. These colonies have existed inside the networks
for years but the impact on water quality (if any) is not well understood or documented.
Dissolved species flowing in the water column can contact and react with pipe wall
materials or these biofilms attached to the pipe wall and may contribute to changes in
the water quality (Camper et al., 2003; Camper, Warnecke, Jones, & McFeters, 1998;
Donlan, 2002; Geldreich, 1996).

The following relationship has been proposed as a means of quantifying wall effects on
water quality (Rossman, 1994). Assuming a first order reaction, the key unknown is the
decay or rate coefficient. This is computed as:
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r=

k w kf
RH (k w + k f )

(Equation 30)

where: r = pipe wall reaction rate
kw = pipe wall reaction rate constant
kf = mass transfer coefficient
RH = Hydraulic radius
and

d 
k f = Sh =  0.0149 (Re )
D 


0.88

ν 
 
d

1
3

d

D


(Equation 31)

where Sh = Sherwood number
d = molecular diffusivity of transported species
D = pipe diameter

This is then combined with the bulk reaction rate constant (kb) to yield an overall decay
or growth response as water moves through the pipes. The bulk flow coefficient, kb ,
representing the reaction in the water column is normally found experimentally for the
particular constituent under consideration.

Thus, the complete rate constant will be computed as:

K=k b +

k w kf
RH (k w + kf )

(Equation 32)

It then follows that the overall concentration impact can be computed as:

Ct =C0 exp -Kt

(Equation 33)
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Tank hydrodynamics.

As discussed in Chapter 2, storage tanks are important elements in a properly
functioning distribution system. They provide the buffering capacity within the system to
cope with variations in supply and demand, which reduces stress on the treatment,
pump and piping components. Accordingly, the volume of these tanks or reservoirs can
have an impact on the movement of a contaminant through the distribution system.

In its most simple form the tank behavior is approached assuming its contents are
homogeneous and completely mixed. Thus, incremental changes in incoming water
quality are blended with existing tank water in using a simple conservation of mass
approach. Also, since these tanks can have significant volume, it is recognized that
some level of constituent growth or decay can occur given the detention time afforded.
This is represented as follows (Clark & Grayman, 1998):

d ( Vs Cs )
= ∑ Q ksCksx=L
- ∑ Q sjCs + k ij (Cs )

dt
k
i

where: Cs = Concentration for tank s
Vs = Volume in tank at node s
dt = Change in time
Qks = Flow from node k to s
Qsj = Flow from node s to j
Cks = Concentration at end of links
kij = Decay coefficient between node i and j
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(Equation 34)

Under field conditions, however, it is not unusual to find that the water in a tank is not of
homogeneous quality. Short-circuiting and temperature stratification can create
significant concentration gradients that clearly impact water quality. These tanks can
manifest “dead” zones in which there is very little water movement or exchange. This
can result in microbial growth, chlorine destruction, chemical precipitation and other
adverse consequences. Current software updates are using research into these issues
to refine the simulation capabilities to more closely match field results. This is currently
being done by the two and three compartment models that are beginning to be
incorporated into the software. Use of these features though requires additional base
data to accurately define the functional description and boundary conditions under which
the tank operates (Grayman et al., 2000).

Dynamic Water Quality Solution Algorithms
Now that the descriptive components of the network are available, an algorithm can be
defined to solve the contaminant propagation equations. There are, in fact, four different
algorithms that have evolved over recent years and have come to provide the primary
“accounting” options for keeping track of the disparate components in water quality
simulation. These are classified by the numerical method used to segment the links and
then the manner by which these segments are tracked through the time steps.

Before proceeding with this discussion, it is important to point out the distinction between
the “hydraulic time step” used in computation of bulk flow movement and the “water
quality time step” that is associated with the segmentation of the links. Generally, the
hydraulic time step is measured in hours and is associated with the extended period
hydraulic simulation that computes the macro-scale parameters of the system operation.
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The “water quality time step” is established by the computational schemes below and
typically is measured in hundredths of an hour. This allows the algorithms to establish
small completely mixed segments that then move down the pipe and decay (or increase)
in accordance with the equations mentioned in the sections above. The means by which
this segmentation and tracking occurs is at the heart of the four solution methods below.

The first two methods may be classified as Eulerian after the Swiss mathematician,
Leonard Euler, who pioneered the basic numerical approach to solving differential
equations. The second two methods are Lagrangian following Joseph-Louis Lagrange’s
approach to solving large systems of simultaneous equations. These solution algorithms
are briefly described below (Boulos, Altman, Jarrige, & Collevati, 1995; Clark &
Grayman, 1998; Mays, 2000; Rossman & Boulos, 1996):

Eulerian Finite-Difference Method (FDM).

This approach seeks to solve the advective transport model (Eq.25) by using variations
of Eulerian numerical methods to approximate the derivatives with their finite difference
equivalents along a fixed grid of point in time and space (Islam, Chaudhry, & Clark,
1997).

The end result is a series of algebraic equations for the entire network that are

solved by marching forward in time and down the length of each pipe. At the start of
each new hydraulic time step a new grid spacing is chosen in each link so that the
number of intervals is as large as possible while staying less than a scaling ratio (L/V∆t).
The process is then repeated until the specified time steps have been completed.
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Eulerian Discrete Volume Method (DVM).

In this method each link is divided into a series of equally spaced, completely mixed
segment volumes. At the end of each successive water quality time step, concentration
within each volume is “reacted” (using the relative equations above) and then transferred
to the adjacent downstream segment. When the adjacent segment is a junction node,
the resultant (outgoing) concentration for this and all segments entering that node is
computed using Eq. 26. This sequence is repeated until a new hydraulic condition is
encountered. At that point the network is resegmented to reflect changes in link travel
time and the contaminant mass are reassigned to the new segments, at which time the
computations continue. The number of volume segments in a pipe is the same as the
FDM method, i.e. largest integer less than or equal to the travel time divided by the
water quality time step.

Lagrangian Time-Driven Method (TDM).

Instead of dividing each link into equally sized segments and react and transport the
water between segments at fixed time intervals as the Eulerian methods do, the
Lagrangian methods track the position of variably-sized segments in each link. The
difference between the two Lagrangian methods has to do with when the segment
conditions are updated. In the TDM method the conditions are at fixed time intervals.
The segment so determined is then reacted and the results reestablished as the
segment moves on through the link and/or node.

This method uses the water quality timestep (as opposed to the hydraulic timestep) to
organize each segment reaction, keeping a cumulative account of the total mass and
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flow entering each node. The water quality timestep is normally much shorter than the
hydraulic timestep to accommodate the short travel times that can occur within pipes.

Because this is the system algorithm incorporated by the software used in Chapter 7, a
more detailed description of the sequence is listed below. The description is taken from
the WaterCAD User’s Manual:

The following steps occur at the end of each water quality time step.

1. “The water quality in each segment is updated to reflect any reaction that may
have occurred over the time step.
2. The water from the leading segments of pipes with flow into each junction is
blended together to compute a new water quality value at the junction. The
volume contributed from each segment equals the product of its pipe’s flow rate
and the time step. If this volume exceeds that of the segment, then the segment
is destroyed and the next one in line behind it begins to contribute its volume.
3. Contributions from outside sources are added to the quality values at the
junctions. The quality in storage tanks is updated depending on the method used
to model mixing in the tank.
4. New segments are created in pipes with flow out of each junction, reservoir, and
tank. The segment volume equals the product of the pipe flow and the time step.
The segment’s water quality equals the new quality value computed for the node.
5. To cut down on the number of segments, this step is only carried out if the new
node quality differs by a user-specified tolerance from that of the last segment in
the outflow pipe. If the difference in quality is below the tolerance, then the size
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of the current last segment in the outflow pipe is increased by the volume flowing
into the pipe over the time step.” (Haestaed Methods, 2002)

The segment positions are also updated at each timestep. New nodal concentrations
are computed and new segments are created when the downstream segment is outside
the concentration tolerance. The process is repeated for each water quality timestep. At
the start of the next hydraulic timestep, the order of the segments is reversed for any link
experiencing a flow reversal. Otherwise no ordering adjustment is necessary.

Lagrangian Event-Driven Method (EDM).

As mentioned above this Lagrangian method establishes variably-sized segments based
on pipe volume that has the same concentration (within a stated tolerance). In the EDM
approach the update computations occur only at times when the leading segment in a
link completely disappears through its downstream node. This requires that the program
keep an ordered list of the projected “lifetime” of the leading edge of each link. The next
“event” occurs for the segment at the head of the list as it intersects and exists through
the next node. When the “event” occurs, the following actions occur: 1) the “event”
segment is destroyed and the simulation clock is updated, 2) a new concentration is
recorded at the node receiving the “event” in accordance with Eq 26 as it mixes with
other water entering the node, 3) if the concentration at the “event” node is above a
specified tolerance, a new segment is generated at the start of all links leaving the node
(with the concentration of each of those links being equal to the updated concentration),
and 4) the projected lifetimes of all the leading segments are adjusted and the event is
reordered accordingly.
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The process continues until the end of the current hydraulic time step. At that time all
the segments’ positions and concentrations are updated. As new hydraulic time steps
increment, directions of flow are recorded, a new ordered event list is generated, and the
event processing is continued through the system.

Rossman and Boulos (1996) provide a description and comparison of each of these
methods and conclude that all of them are capable of adequately representing observed
water quality behavior in actual water distribution systems. They did observe, however,
that the Lagrangian time-driven method (TDM) was the most versatile of the methods
tested, but did require more computer memory when water age was being computed. If
computer memory is at a premium given the size of the system in question the Eulerian
methods might be better suited when trying to model water age.

Summary
This chapter provides an overview of the fundamental factors associated with developing
a computer simulation of an operating water distribution system. Water distribution
systems can be described in terms of links (pipes), nodes (interconnection junctions),
and pipe loops. The movement within water systems is simulated by application of the
laws of conservation of mass and conservation of energy. The hydraulic movement of
water is inherently non-linear because friction (energy) loss within the pipes is highly
variable based on flow rate and other physical factors. Fluid formulas exist (DarcyWeisbach and Hazen-Williams) which can reasonably predict the flow and energy levels
(pressure or head) associated with the water at any particular point in a pipeline.
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Because of the interconnection of pipes in loops, the analysis of fluid movement
becomes quite complex as the water seeks to supply demand through the system with
minimum energy. The resulting flow and energy results are again highly non-linear and
in many cases non-intuitive. Equations balancing mass at each node and energy along
each link must all be solved simultaneously. A number of numerical processes have
been developed to solve these equations.

A steady state analysis is the most fundamental investigation of a system as it
addresses the response at a single point in time while all external forces are constant
and the system is in equilibrium. From that extended period simulation, processes have
been developed that define changes in external forces (included description of pump,
valve and tank control sequences) that allow a series of steady state models to step
through time (hydraulic time step) and simulate actual hydraulic response to the changes
imposed. By calibrating the hydraulic model to actual field data and making appropriate
adjustments in the model assumptions the computer simulation can provide a reliable
proxy for the physical reality.

After the calibrated extended period simulation for the distribution network has been
developed, it is possible to expand the computer model to form a representation of water
quality movement and fate in the system. This is accomplished by using the extended
period hydraulic simulation to compute the bulk movement components of the water,
define the advective transport features, bulk and wall decay reactions as well as tank
hydrodynamic characteristics. As these parameters and their associated relationships
are defined, the water quality simulation takes the hydraulic model output data and using
one of four solution algorithms, computes the changes in water quality resulting from the
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external forces applied. While the water quality simulations need to be subjected to
calibration exercises also, they have been found to provide a reasonable surrogate for
actual field studies. In fact they allow exploration of system response to atypical events
that otherwise would not be subject to analysis. That is the sense in which the computer
simulations will be used in later sections of this study.

For reference, a list of assumptions and potential error sources associated with
extended period dynamic water quality simulations is presented in Appendix 2. The
purpose of the list is to provide a sober assessment of the data needs necessary to
develop a reliable and workable model. Fortunately, computer simulations seem to be
fairly robust and can provide valuable insights into system operation if a conscientious
effort is made to calibrate the initial model. As George Box, the statistician, once stated
so well, “all models are wrong, but some models are useful.” That is precisely the view
that should be maintained with water network simulations. They are incredibly powerful
and useful tools that can provide system designers and operators a richness of system
understanding that could not be gained by any other means.
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Chapter 6 An Algorithm to Identify Efficient Monitoring Station Locations
As this study moves forward, it might be helpful to recap the ground that has been
covered. Up to this point the primary effort has been to develop the context and major
factors of the research effort. A statement of the research objective was presented and
an overview of current water system design and distribution system monitoring practice
was discussed to establish the framework within which the research will be conducted.
Then a discussion of potential contaminants followed to illustrate the range of
characteristics, effects and fate they present in water systems. Finally, a discussion of
the major features of water quality simulation was presented, to identify the source and
basis of the data to be used to analyze a specific system. At this point the study will
proceed with developing the approach and algorithm used to decompose the distribution
system and organize the data to reach the stated objectives.

Algorithm Setting
As mentioned earlier, because the nature of the contamination event and the operational
state of the subject distribution system has an infinite number of configurations, there is
in an absolute sense no one true optimum set of sampling locations, and variation in the
“optimum” set is to be expected given different base assumptions. However, it is posited
that there does exist a cluster of points that can serve as robust sentinels for detection of
a wide range of events.

For a methodology to be productive, the procedure must define a feasible contamination
event and make realistic assumptions regarding its occurrence and characteristics. This
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assumption set will be applied to a computer simulation of the physical system to
produce an assessment of the system's response to the critical event.

These assumptions may be considered to exist at two primary levels. The first involves
the physical reality of the event followed by a definition of the simplifying assumptions
related to the modeling endeavor. A reasonable set of physical assumptions would
include the following:

1. Contamination can occur at any point in the distribution system at any time and
for any duration.
2. The contaminant can be injected in either a continuous or discrete mode.
3. The contaminant can be chemical, biological or physical.
4. The contamination event can consist of a single agent or multiple agents injected
simultaneously at single or multiple points.
5. The contaminant is assumed to be sufficiently toxic to adversely affect
consumers at some arbitrary threshold concentration and is undetectable by the
consumer’s senses. The adverse endpoint can be defined in terms of morbidity,
mortality, psychological trauma or economic effects.
6. A distribution system monitoring point is assumed to continuously monitor for the
presence and concentration of the contaminant of interest with real-time
feedback.
7. Economic and/or technical factors constrain the number of sampling points to a
small number relative to the total nodes in the system.
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Beginning with these assumptions, the following sections develop a methodology to
identify, in a heuristic manner, a set of monitoring points that efficiently ranks and covers
the distribution system from contamination at any point within the system. At this point
the approach is presented in a “proof of concept” form which will be subject to
refinements and open areas of future research identified in the final chapter. As a final
note it is again mentioned that the methodology should be within the reach of its target
audience, small to med-sized water systems. Heuristic approaches have historically
been more effective in that practice segment.

Develop a Computer Simulation of the Distribution System
Because it is impracticable to physically test a wide range of contamination events, it
becomes immediately apparent that any reasonable approach seeking to address the
problem must rely upon a workable, extended period of computer simulation of the
distribution network in question. Thus, the first step in the process is to develop an
extended period water quality model that simulates the normally functioning water
system. This process was discussed in Chapter 5. In that chapter, there are certainly
many assumptions and sources of errors associated with an extended period water
quality model. However, a network simulation can be refined and calibrated to yield a
sufficiently accurate representation of reality. The simulation packages are more
affordable and accessible now than in the past and for many reasons every community
water system should have a working simulation of their distribution network.

Develop a Contamination Scenario
Once the basic extended period model describing the distribution system is in place, the
next step in the process is to define a contamination incident description or scenario.
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Vulnerability analysis training identifies this as the Design Basis Threat (DBT). The DBT
should be reflective of a realistic scenario that could be feasibly imposed upon the
system resulting in a defined adverse effect.

The first issue in developing the DBT is selecting the contaminating agent. Many
contaminants can pollute a water supply but, for this purpose, the agent is assumed
capable of mass contamination. In other words, the intent of contamination would be to
corrupt a large volume of water as opposed to a few connections. To achieve the goals
of the offending entity, the water would need to be contaminated in such a way as to be
undetectable when consumed, so that exposure to the contaminant would be
unconstrained. Given these criteria, Chapter 4 outlines a list of potential candidates
which can be considered for use in situations proposed here. Additional pragmatic
concerns also come into play, such as the ease of acquiring and the cost of the material
as well as the ability to transport and disperse the contaminant.

At a minimum the following information should be delineated to properly model the
event:

1. Identification of the contaminant: biological, chemical or physical, along with
toxicological properties, and detection methods or characteristics.
2. The mass of the contaminant to be injected into the system.
3. The duration or injection rate that the contaminant will be introduced into the
distribution system.
4. Time-of-day that the injection begins.

110

General Modeling Assumptions and Analysis Concepts
Once the basic distribution system simulation has been developed and the DBT has
been delineated, it is possible to predict the impact of the contamination event on the
distribution system. Given the fundamental set of physical assumptions presented
above, a corresponding set of primary modeling assumptions must be stated. Most
distribution system software provides a wide range of customizable attributes (with
associated assumptions) which allows simulation of complex and compounded events
that can approximate the physical assumptions. For purposes of this paper the following
represents the general modeling assumptions used in the development of the
contamination event data.

1. Contamination can occur at any point in the distribution system at any time and
for any duration.
2. The contamination event is assumed to occur at only one location in the
distribution system at a time;
3. Contamination is assumed to occur only at the junction nodes.
4. All nodes are equally important.
5. The contamination event will consist of a single agent.
6. The contamination event will be assumed to occur in a single discrete event as
opposed to continuous injection. (Continuous injection is permitted by the
algorithm, but is not as realistic for terrorist activity.)
7. Monitoring points are assumed to be located at the junction nodes.
8. The contaminant is carried with the bulk flow of water. The contaminant can be
treated as observing conservative or non-conservative particle assumptions
depending on the parameter and capability of the modeling software.
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9. Biological measurement assumes that count (i.e. cfu, oocysts, etc.) per million is
equivalent to parts per million (ppm). Strictly speaking this is incorrect because
ppm is a weight/weight relationship, but this assumption is sufficiently accurate
for simulation purposes.
10. A monitoring point that detects, above a given threshold, contamination
originated from multiple points is considered superior to a monitoring point that
detects contamination from fewer points.
11. Given a fixed number of monitoring points, M, the “best” location set shall be
those M points that detect contamination from the largest number of unique
origination nodes with the greatest redundancy.

The procedure proposed here differs from others cited in that, rather than utilizing a
representative hydraulic analysis and/or water quality simulation and then identifying a
monitoring set using various optimization techniques based on that one actualization, a
separate extended period water quality analysis is performed with each node in turn
being used as the contamination injection node all of which are then used to find the
optimum set. Thus if there are n nodes in the system there will be n extended period
simulations performed. In this way any combination of injection events conceptually can
be assumed for consideration. Using the DBT, the n extended period simulations will be
run for a duration necessary for the entire contamination mass to be consumed. Noting
that the concentration of contamination will be computed for each node along the
selected timestep, t, it is observed that all other nodes in the system can be considered
monitoring nodes. Recall that the principal of superposition is a useful tool in handling
problems of this type (Boccelli et al., 1998; Tryby, Boccelli, Uber, & Rossman, 2002). By
combining all n analyses for all t-timesteps it is possible by linear superposition to
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examine and rank each node for its efficiency in detecting contamination occurring at
any point in the system.

Until recently such an approach would be prohibitively burdensome computationally
except for systems that had been dramatically skeletonized. However the power,
efficiency and cost of computers and analysis software have improved to the point that
this procedure is in fact feasible for small to mid-sized water systems.

It is now possible to develop an analysis methodology which heuristically identifies a
ranked set of monitoring points to guide the establishment of a monitoring network. In a
generic sense the process proceeds as follows:

1. Develop a calibrated extended period hydraulic model of the system in question.
2. Develop a prototype contamination event.
3. Develop a contamination event database as follows.
4. Beginning with the first node in the distribution system, assume that the
contamination event occurs at that node, run the extended period water quality
model and record the computed concentrations for each node at each timestep
of the analysis.
5. Repeat step (4) for each node in the system in turn, applying the contamination
criteria to that node.
6. Analyze the resulting dataset for patterns which identify the nodes that have a
higher probability of detecting contamination events occurring in the system than
other nodes according to the criteria outlined in modeling assumption 10 above.
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The following sections of this paper will outline issues that arise when implementing this
strategy and provide a means of organizing the data to identify the desired monitoring
points.

Scenario Development and Analysis Issues
Water Distribution System Model and Development of Contamination Database
Time-of-day that injection begins.

The DBT should stipulate at what time of the day the injection begins and how long it
occurs. While a time-of-day can be arbitrarily selected, it may be prudent to run a
sensitivity analysis by starting the injection at several different times during the day.
Depending on the size of the system, this can create a significant amount of additional
work because it means that the entire modeling and analysis effort must be rerun for
each new starting time. It may be worth the additional effort, however, because the
selected monitoring locations may shift somewhat depending on the time that the
injection began. For example, the shift in water patterns between a contamination event
that begins at midnight and one that begins at noon may be sufficient to cause a reweighting of the monitoring nodes. Examination of several analysis sets using different
injection initiation times can help to create a more realistic portrayal of the range of
contamination events resulting in a more robust network of monitoring points.

Duration of analysis.

An extended period simulation requires selection of a hydraulic time step. This is the
time between each quasi-steady state analysis through the model duration which is the
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total time that the analysis runs. In other words the analysis will begin at t=0 and
proceed incrementally by the hydraulic time step (∆t) until the duration specified (td) has
been reached. Because a contaminant will move through (and exit) the system at
differing rates depending on when and where the injection occurs, one cannot
necessarily select an arbitrary duration of analysis, such as 24 hours. In order to avoid
comparing scenarios that may have different levels of total contaminant consumption, it
is necessary to estimate the time it takes for all of the contaminant to clear the system.
For example, injection of a contaminant near a highly active node may result in a short
duration uptake of the total mass whereas injection near a storage reservoir may cause
a lower concentration, longer duration feed. One convenient way to estimate the
appropriate duration of analysis is to select a number of diverse nodes and run
simulations at varying durations to see how long it takes for the contaminant to be
consumed at each. The intent is to set a duration that is long enough to provide a
comparable mass consumption for all permutations and yet as short as possible to
minimize the data to be processed.

Functionally, some level of judgment may be required. In situations with long
concentration tails, it may be necessary to set the duration at a level shorter than
required to completely clear the system. This entails a judgment call considering the
amount of extraneous data collected in the overall analysis along with the reduced
health implications at those low tail-levels.
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Development of contamination database.

Once the DBT scenario has been defined and the distribution system modeled and
calibrated, the contamination database is then created. As mentioned above an
injection “pattern” corresponding to the DBT is defined to include a contamination
initiation time and duration. The basic network model parameters have been set which
will include the selected hydraulic time step (∆t) and duration of the analysis (td). Apply
the DBT pattern to the first junction node and run the extended period water quality
simulation. The simulation data for all nodes is generated and stored, taking care to
note which node was the contamination node. The process is then repeated for all
nodes in turn. The resulting data set represents the response of the distribution system
to all nodes serving as the contamination source, for the assumptions associated with
the DBT pattern.

Manipulation and analysis of contamination database.

Once the full set of junction nodes have been simulated with each node serving as the
injection node, the resulting database provides a wealth of information about the system
and its response. In order to mine the data effectively, several factors need to be
addressed to improve the flexibility necessary to define the dominant patterns along with
their stability.

Threshold of concentration.

In one sense any node with a positive computed contaminant value should be
considered worthy of note and counted in the assessment process. However,
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pragmatically there is a difference between a computed simulation value and a
measured lab value, not to mention an actual infectious dose or NOAEL. It is not
unusual, for example, to observe a computed value that may have a magnitude of 0.001
mg/L. Depending upon on the agent, this may be neither significant nor detectable in a
field setting and thus is more of a computational artifact than a useful detection point.
Thus, when devising a ranking system, establishing a threshold of concentration
provides the analyst flexibility in exploring whether small computational values skew the
result. Also, allowing for a concentration threshold can demonstrate the sensitivity of the
monitoring points to changes in detection levels in the field.

Time since injection versus consumption volume.

There are two fundamental approaches to establishing the criteria for evaluating the
most desirable set of monitoring points. These approaches are related but can yield
results that may differ. One approach seeks to optimize the set of monitoring points by
minimizing the time to detection while the other approach focuses on establishing a
system that minimizes consumption of contaminated water. Both approaches have merit
depending on the emphasis of the program. It would seem intuitive that the basic
objective of a monitoring system would be to detect contamination as quickly as possible
after it occurs; however, the ultimate goal of monitoring is to minimize exposure of
customers to contamination. A brief discussion of these perspectives is given in Kumar,
Kansal and Arora (1999).

The method proposed here presents a methodology which seeks to utilize the time since
injection as a major variable, but is balanced against the stability of the monitoring set
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over time. By extension the proposed approach can also be used to estimate the
“volume consumed” and compare that with monitoring set stability. The basic thought
under consideration in this paper, is that for any given system, the “optimum” monitoring
set may vary for a given elapsed time or volume consumed and it is instructive to
develop a sense of the magnitude of the set variation prior to forming a conclusion.

Detection count versus average contaminant concentration.

Once the database is populated with concentration values for all contamination injection
possibilities over all time steps, it is necessary to provide a criterion for evaluation and
ranking. For a given concentration threshold, two straightforward means of
accomplishing this are (1) averaging the computed concentrations at each monitoring
node over time t or (2) summing the number of injection nodes that the response node
detects along with the frequency of detection. These statistics (means or totals) will be
cumulatively computed for each timestep at each response node.

This process (successive cumulative computations from t=0) tends to have more impact
on the evaluation of nodes by averages than by totals/frequency, so the counts tend to
be more stable, if not informative, than the averages. This follows from the fact that the
range of values encountered during a contamination event will be large and the use of
averages may overwhelm small but significant signals at some nodes. The counts will
not be as sensitive to extreme values, and, if a concentration threshold is considered,
counts will provide a reliable indication of the frequency at which each response node
can detect contamination from other nodes in the system.
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Ranking algorithm.

At this point it is possible to present a step by step summary of a proposed algorithm
that can be used to isolate nodes within the distribution system that are more efficient
than others in detecting external contamination.

1. Apply the injection pattern to each node in turn and record all computed
concentrations for all nodes for all timesteps through the modeled duration (td).
This generates a matrix populated with Cm,i,t s , the detected concentration at the
monitoring node m measured at time ts since injection at node i.
2. Proceed through the data matrix generated above and, for each injection node,
compare all computed timesteps with a preselected threshold concentration (C*).
In a parallel Evaluation matrix, if the computed concentration is greater than the
threshold concentration, place “1” in the cell; otherwise insert “0” in the cell. In
other words the matrix will be populated by values computed as follows:
fm,i,ts = 1 if Cm,i,ts > C*

or

0 if Cm,i,ts ≤ C* . This indicates whether the

monitoring node m detects injection at node i at timestep ts .
3. Using the Evaluation matrix, increment through the data and record in a
Summary matrix the number of times that Monitoring node, m, detects injection
by node i for all timesteps for 0 = t = ts . This sum will be recorded by timestep ts .

ts

sm,i,ts =

∑f

m,i,t

t=0

4. For simplification of presentation steps 4 through 9 assume a stipulated C* and
ts . Using the stated C* and ts , compute the efficacy (em,i) of each Monitoring node
119

m for injection at node i by noting if it detects any contamination for all timesteps
from t=0 to ts . In other words em,i = 1 if sm,i,ts > 0 or

0 if sm,i,ts = 0 .

5. Compute the efficiency with which each monitoring node detects contamination
(em ) by summing the number of injection nodes for which Monitoring node m has
an em,i value equal to 1. Hence,

n

em =

∑e

m,i

i=1

6. From the Summary matrix find the most efficient monitoring node (mb). This is
the monitoring node that detects the most injection nodes for 0 = t = ts and with
C > C*. Select node m b such that emb =max ( em ) . Thus, by ranking all
monitoring nodes by em in descending order, the monitoring nodes are ranked by
the number of injection nodes they detect. If there is a tie for m b (i.e. several
monitoring nodes have the same max(em )), rank the tied monitoring nodes by the
number of monitoring events that each node detects. This corresponds to a
secondary sort of values based on total detection events by the monitoring node
over ts . Symbolically then, chose from the set of tied nodes, the one node with
n

the largest ∑ sm,i,ts . This says that, in the event that several monitoring nodes
i=1

detect the same number of injection nodes, the most efficient node is the one
that has the most individual detection events through ts .
7. Selection of the most efficient node based on m b, however, does not assure
complete coverage of the system as injection at some nodes may not be
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detected by the selected node. Additional monitoring nodes, then, are required
by selecting all injection nodes i not detected by m b (i.e. m b with smb, i , t s = 0 ).
8. For each injection node, i, that is not detected by m b (i.e. smb, i , t s = 0 ), select other
monitoring nodes, m, for that injection node i for which smb ,i,t s > 0 . Record the
s m , i , ts counts for each of those nodes. Select the m with maximum counts, i.e.
max (sm,i,ts ) . If there is a tie, select the m that has the greatest redundancy for

that ts , i.e. the node with the largest em among the remaining nodes. This
identifies the monitoring node that provides the best opportunity to detect the
injection node under consideration along with the greatest redundancy for
detecting other injection nodes that are covered by other monitoring nodes.
9. To prioritize additional monitoring nodes not covered by m b, analyze and sort in
the same manner as above.
10. Perform sensitivity analysis by varying “time since injection” (ts ) and “threshold
concentration level” (C*). Typically, this task is accomplished by systematically
varying ts from some minimum value to td, observing the stability of the selected
monitoring set(s). Likewise C* should be varied through a reasonable range to
observe the effect that C* has on the selection of the monitoring set.
11. Using the information from step 10, develop contingency tables and charts to
assist in decision making. This can take a number of forms depending on the
technical ability of the analyst and degree of sophistication required. At a
minimum, one should plot and/or tabulate the selected monitoring sets with ts and
C* and note the magnitude of change in selected nodes. Decision rules for
acceptable stability will be system specific.
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The data set developed above has an explicit assumption regarding the time-of-day that
the DBT pattern was applied. To validate the selected monitoring points, consideration
should be given to repeating this process after setting the DBT pattern to initiate
contamination at a different time-of-day. This allows the examination of effects caused
by variable water demand experienced over the modeling duration. A separate set of
data will result reflecting the different initiation time of contamination. Additional sets
may be run reflecting other initiation times if there are discrepancies in the optimal
sampling points.

Summary
This chapter provides the context and assumptions used to develop an algorithm that
can be applied to locate a robust set of monitoring stations within a potable water
distribution system. First, a database is developed by computing concentration values
assuming all nodes are potential injection points for a stipulated Design Basis Threat.
This database is analyzed using the algorithm presented to select in ranked order the
nodes that are robust and effective in detecting the contamination event when
considering the time since injection and a threshold concentration level. The next
chapter will seek to illustrate the process on a small test water distribution system that is
frequently used in the literature.
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Chapter 7 An Illustrative Example Using the Ranking Algorithm
As a means of demonstrating the procedure described above, it will be applied to the
Anytown, USA model (Kessler et al., 1998; Walski et al., 1987). This test set is
frequently used in the literature and should provide a convenient means of setting up the
program and experimenting with results. The system consists of 34 pipes, 16 nodes and
17 loops. It also has two elevated storage tanks, a single well and pumping station. A
schematic drawing of the system is provided in Figure 5. The specific characteristics of
the system are delineated in Table 12 through Table 15. The assumed demand flow
pattern is listed on Table 16.

Figure 5 Schematic Drawing of the System
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Table 12 Pipe Characteristics

Table 13 Node Characteristics

Pipe
Number

Length
(ft)

Diameter
C-factor
(in.)

Node
Number

Elevation
(ft)

Average Demand
(gal./min.)

2

12,000

16

120

20

20

500

4

12,000

12

120

30

50

200

6

12,000

12

120

40

50

200

8

9,000

12

120

50

50

200

10

6,000

12

120

60

50

500

12

6,000

10

120

70

50

500

14

6,000

12

120

80

50

500

16

6,000

10

120

90

50

1,000

18

6,000

12

120

100

50

500

20

6,000

10

120

110

50

500

22

6,000

10

120

120

120

200

24

6,000

10

120

130

120

200

26

6,000

12

120

140

80

200

28

6,000

10

120

150

120

200

30

6,000

10

120

160

120

800

32

6,000

10

120

170

120

200

34

9,000

10

120

36

6,000

10

120

38

6,000

10

120

40

6,000

10

120

42

6,000

8

120

44

6,000

8

120

46

6,000

8

120

65

215

35

10

35

53.8

48

6,000

8

120

165

215

35

10

35

53.8

50

6,000

10

120

52

6,000

8

120

56

6,000

8

120

58

6,000

10

120

60

6,000

8

120

62

6,000

8

120

64

12,000

8

66

12,000

8

Table 14 Tank Characteristics
Tank Elevation
Number
(ft)

Initial
level
(ft)

Minimum Maximum
Diameter
level
level
(ft)
(ft)
(ft)

Table 15 Pump Characteristics
Discharge
(gal./min)

Head
(ft)

120

0

358

120

12,000

270
190
0

78

100

12

120

24,000

80

100

12

120

33,000
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Table 16 Demand Characteristics
Time of
Day

Multiplier of
average demand

06-09

1.2

09-12

1.3

12-15

1.2

15-18

1.1

18-21

1.0

21-24

0.9

24-03

0.7

03-06

0.6

Water Distribution System Simulation
An extended period water quality simulation for Anytown was prepared using Haestad
Methods WaterCAD ® v. 6.01. After configuring the model using the components as
listed above, the simulation was run several times under different initial hydraulic
conditions (ex. elevated tank water levels, pump control settings, etc) with a one week
duration. This helped to establish stable values for the pump controls to match the water
levels stipulated in the Anytown problem statement. These were then used to set the
initial conditions for the simulation used in this example. A one hour hydraulic time step
was used as the default increment between simulations.

Design Basis Threat Definition
For analysis purposes it will be assumed that the distribution system will be subject to a
biological contamination event. The agent chosen will be the parasite Cryptosporidium
parvum, which is the same organism involved in the accidental contamination of the
Milwaukee, Wisconsin water system in 1993. This agent, while typically having a low
mortality rate, has many characteristics of an ideal contaminant. It has a low infective
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dose, is highly resistant to normal disinfection procedures, can be significantly
concentrated and is easily handled (Burrows & Renner, 1999; Teunis, Chappell, &
Okhuysen, 2002). It can also give rise to subsequent secondary infections. Using this
agent the contamination scenario is assumed to unfold as follows.

It is noticed that large road or construction projects use water tankers as a means of
dust control. These tankers are frequently observed connecting to fire hydrants to
replenish the water in the tanker. The terrorists reason that it would be a fairly
straightforward task to fit the tanker with a pump such that rather than receiving water
the tanker could overcome the backpressure and pump water back into the distribution
system. Cryptosporidium oocysts can be cultivated and concentrated (Teunis et al.,
2002) to the point that a 3000 gallon tanker can be brought to a concentration of
300,000 oocysts/L. For planning purposes it is assumed that the tanker is fitted with a
50 gpm pump which would allow a full discharge of the tanker in 60 minutes. As a
simplifying assumption it is assumed that each node in the distribution system computer
model represents a fire hydrant (i.e. injection node). Thus, the DBT envisions an event
that discharges 3000 gallons of contaminant into the distribution system at a rate of 50
gpm for one hour with a concentration of 300,000 oocysts/L (assume this is equivalent to
300,000 mg/L for modeling purposes). Although pragmatically unlikely, for the initial
scenario it is assumed that the injection occurs at midnight.

Development of Contamination Database
The DBT scenario summary information is now developed into an injection pattern which
will be applied to each node of the distribution system. First, however, a few of the
nodes are sampled to establish the duration of the extended period water quality
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simulation of the contamination event. For this project, it is determined that a 24 hour
duration from the time of the injection should be sufficient for the majority of the
contamination to exit the system. The short duration is probably due to the fact that the
elevated storage tanks are small relative to the system demands which results in high
turnover rates. This in turn reduces the dampening effects of the storage tank. In any
event this step provides guidance on how to set the simulation parameters for the
extended period water quality model which will generate the fundamental data set.

Now, applying the injection pattern to each of the n nodes in turn, the simulation is run n
times. The time increment for the extended period model (∆t) in this example is 1 hour
and the total duration of the run (td) is 24 hours. Therefore, the analysis data set is
based upon 24 time steps (td / ∆t = 24 / 1 = 24) for each of the n simulations. Since
there are 16 nodes which can serve as monitoring points (including the contamination
node), this yields 384 data points for each contamination scenario. The simulation is
then repeated for each of the 16 contamination nodes, which yields a total of 6144 points
populating the database for consideration. A concentration matrix results with
Monitoring Nodes (m = 1, 2,…, 16) forming an X-axis, Injection Nodes (j = 1, 2,…,16)
defining the Y-axis and the Time-steps (t0 through td) as the Z-axis. By examining each
slice through the Y-axis (injection at that node), a record of contaminant movement
through the system over time is observed (in the X-Z plane) and the nodes which
detected that movement over the course of the event may be identified.

Analysis of Contamination Database
Now that the contamination matrix is defined it is possible to develop different queries to
test the efficiency of different nodes with respect to detecting contamination over a range
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of contamination injection points. For purposes of this analysis, the efficiency of the
monitoring nodes will be based upon the total counts (observations) recorded for each
monitoring node over the different scenarios. Because an objective of this study is to
use tools that are commonly available to operational personnel, Microsoft Excel® is used
for this illustration to process the data. As the distribution system increases in size it is
necessary to use a relational database, however by using Excel for this example the
process is more transparent.

Preprocess Raw Data
One of the limitations of Excel is that it can only accept 256 columns of data. Because
there are 256 node points (16 nodes * 16 nodes) to consider plus the need for some
labeling and computational columns, the first task is to import the database and
transpose the time and node axes. Once this is accomplished the analysis can proceed
for projects in which the timesteps under consideration are less than 256, which is
typically the case. However, as will been seen in the tasks to follow, this column
constraint will limit the use of Excel alone to systems with no more than 250 modeled
nodes.

Another comment on setting up the analysis database is to note that a simulation will
likely have many intermediate or fractional timesteps. This results from “change of state”
operations in the system (e.g. a pump turns on or off, a tank switches from filling to
discharging, etc.) These timesteps may or may not have concentration data associated
with the operations, but to keep from “oversampling” during fractional timesteps it is
normally best to eliminate these points from the analysis and just consider status at each
standard hydraulic timestep. This essentially forms a systematic sampling of the data
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and prevents the database from expanding unnecessarily. The initial state (t = 0) is also
included in the event that an initial or background concentration needed to be
considered (which in this case it did not).

Having imported and transposed the simulation results, a two dimensional spreadsheet
exists with evenly incremented timesteps across the top and monitoring-injection nodes
down the side. Table 17 provides a partial view of this information. Reading this chart
for example, 9 hours after the contamination event, monitoring node 80 detects a
contaminant level of 2313.849 mg/L (oocysts/L) for contamination that originated at node
60.

Table 17 Transposed Simulation Results (Partial)

Time (hr)
80 J20 Inj. Conc. (mg/l)
80 J30 Inj. Conc. (mg/l)
80 J40 Inj. Conc. (mg/l)
80 J50 Inj. Conc. (mg/l)
80 J60 Inj. Conc. (mg/l)
80 J70 Inj. Conc. (mg/l)

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
216.6066 1181.621 267.7076 170.9058 341.2332 565.2613 425.2074
43796.71 11069.39 154.569 297.9569 478.0985 783.9133 724.057
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
112787 10982.69 1200.131 2313.849 3713.53 6088.093 5623.952
469.0788 1539.53 191.9643 370.0469 593.7739 973.5806 899.2426

Develop a Count Evaluation Matrix
Next, construct a parallel spreadsheet with the same headings as above. Using a
Threshold Concentration (C*) established by the analyst, compare the value in each cell
of the raw data database with that threshold concentration. If the cell value is greater
than to the threshold concentration, a “1” is placed in the cell of the parallel spreadsheet.
Otherwise a “0” is placed in the cell. Upon completion this spreadsheet constitutes a
count evaluation matrix that is populated with a record of the number of times a
particular (monitoring) node detected contamination greater than C* from any injection
point in the system measured from the stated time.
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Prepare Count Summary Table
Using the parallel spreadsheet (Count Evaluation Matrix), develop a Count Summary
Table. This table has the Injection nodes listed across the top and the Monitoring nodes
listed down the side. Select a timestep value, then sum the number of "1"s in each
Monitoring node cell associated with each Injection node from the Counts worksheet.
Sum only through the time step indicated in the timestep cell.

Now it is possible to count across the table to determine the number of Injection nodes
that each monitoring node detects through the time period indicated in the timestep cell.
Note that this count is independent of the number of times that the monitoring point
detected contamination for an Injection node – only that it detected contamination at
least once during the period indicated. However, along with that count, another column
will be inserted that sums the total number of times that the monitoring node recorded a
detection over all nodes during the period indicated. With this summary information in
hand it is now possible to refine the search for the most robust set of monitoring points.
A partial view of the Count Summary Table is presented in Table 18.
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Table 18 Count Summary Table (Partial) – At 12 Hours With 100 Mg/L Threshold

Develop a Count Sorting Table
Using the same configuration as the Count Summary Table, a parallel table is
constructed. See Table 19. Using the data from the Count Summary Table, this new
table is sorted using the Count column as the primary key and the Count Total as the
secondary sort key. The top ranked node is the monitoring node that is the most
efficient in detecting contamination over the time and concentration criteria that have
been stipulated. In other words this node detects contamination from more Injection
nodes than any other Monitoring node in the system and, in the event that several
monitoring nodes detect the same number of Injection nodes, the top ranked node has
the largest number of total detection events. This will be called the Primary Monitoring
Node. In most cases though, this monitoring node will not detect contamination at all
nodes. In order to identify the additional monitoring points necessary to cover these
undetected nodes, an additional table is required.
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Table 19 Sorted Summary Table (Partial) – At 12 Hours With 100 Mg/L Threshold

Develop Supplemental Node Search Table
To identify and rank the additional monitoring nodes necessary to cover undetected
nodes in the distribution system, set up a table with headings as shown Table 20. This
table will list the nodes not covered by the Primary Monitoring Node identified in the
Count Sorting Table above. A computer search populates this table as follows.

Using the Count Sorting Table, proceed across the top row (the Primary Monitoring
Node) and identify any injection node that has no detections noted. Then drop down
that Injection node column to locate the maximum number of detections. From that
row, record the monitoring node along with the total number of injection nodes that the
monitoring node detected as well as the total number (i.e. sum) of detections. See Table
20. Record in the "Nodes Not Covered" Table along with the number of other Injection
nodes detected and also the total number of times that node detected.
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Table 20 Nodes Not Covered

In order to identify other undetected nodes, return to the Primary Monitoring Node and
continue across the top row and repeat the column lookup process described above for
any remaining injection nodes that had no detections. This is repeated across the top
row until no Injection node is left undetected. An Injection node will detect itself so there
will always be at least one monitoring node to detect every Injection node. At the
completion of this effort a table will be populated that has all Injection nodes not covered
by the Primary Monitoring Node identified along with the Monitoring nodes that do detect
them.

At this point the table searches for the monitoring node that most effectively detects
each Injection node. This is accomplished by sorting and ranking the nodes. It will be
recalled that one of the decision criteria for determining the most efficient set of
monitoring nodes will be those nodes that detect the most injection nodes over the
system and with the greatest redundancy. Since the Monitoring Nodes listed in the
“Nodes Not Covered” Table represent the largest (highest) number of detections for
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each Injection node not detected by the Primary Monitoring Node, the table can be used
to identify the nodes that have the greatest redundancy for detecting other Injection
nodes. Thus, as the nodes in this table are sorted, the resulting monitoring node ranking
will be the one that detects an Injection node not covered by the Primary Monitoring
Node, and the most other Injection nodes. If there is a tie at this level, the node is
selected which has the highest total number of total detects during the period.

At this point the process has identified and ranked all of the monitoring nodes necessary
to detect the DBT for the time and concentration threshold specified. It is quite possible
that a number of Injection nodes only detect themselves which of course means that the
contamination stays localized and does not spread to other parts of the system. At this
point the water system managers must make a value judgment as to how many
monitoring stations to deploy and what portions of the system are covered and which
sections are still vulnerable.

Sensitivity Analysis Based on Time Since Injection and Concentration Threshold
While the process above identifies the set of monitoring points which covers the system
for the event duration, it is intuitively obvious that at earlier points in the contamination
event the dispersion will not be as extensive as at later times and thus may have an
effect on the monitoring set. Also, if different threshold contamination levels are
selected, what impact would that have on the best set of monitoring nodes? It is
reasonable then to explore the effects of changes in time and threshold concentration on
the location of the best set of monitoring nodes.
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In order to accomplish this, a system must be devised to repeat the process above in a
systematic way while varying the “Time Since Injection” (ts ) and the threshold
concentration. This summarizing and sorting of data, based on the new threshold, can
be accomplished with Excel by using the Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) scripting
language which is a part of the Excel package.

After writing the appropriate script, the Anytown database was queried using Threshold
Concentrations of 0, 100, 200, 300 and 400 mg/L. Since some reports (Rose, 1988;
Teunis et al., 2002) show that the doses between 10 and 500 oocyst will provide
infection of the majority of subjects and if the population drinks 1 to 2 liters per day, this
range presents the approximate coverage of a minimum infective zone. Also, the “time
since injection” factor was considered by examining the data in 2 hour increments from 6
to 24 hours. It was observed that durations less than 6 hours after injection were not
useful because the movement of the contaminant through the system was too limited.
This procedure along with the VBA code is listed in Appendix 3.

Interpretation of Results
The analyst now has a means of organizing and ranking monitoring systems that provide
coverage of the entire network with varying levels of efficiency. At this point it is now
possible to develop additional procedures to assist in the selection of the set of
monitoring stations that provide the most robust coverage for the range of assumptions
that the analyst believes to be most appropriate.
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Number of Monitoring Stations Required
Probably the first question that an operations manager would want to know is ’how many
monitoring stations are required to cover the entire system?’ As the sensitivity analysis
under the varying ts and C* assumptions indicates, the answer to this question is
dependent on both variables. Therefore, the analyst must frame the response by
organizing the data into a form that incorporates the impacts of each function. This may
be accomplished by counting the number of stations determined in the ts and C*
sensitivity analysis. In other words as the ts is iterated from t=0 to t=td for each C* value,
a defined number of monitoring stations is counted to cover the system. By listing the
number of stations required for each combination of ts and C*, a table can be developed
to summarize data. This data can then be plotted for convenient comparison of the
impact of each variable.

For the Anytown example, Figure 6 is plotted which illustrates the outcome. It shows
that as time increases and threshold concentration decreases, the number of monitoring
stations decreases from 8 stations to 4 stations with a zero concentration threshold. On
the other hand with C* equal to 0, 100, 200 or 300 mg/L, the number of monitoring
stations decreases from 9 to 5 stations necessary to cover all nodes. With a 400 mg/L
threshold the number of stations required does not fall below 6 stations.
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Figure 6 Number of Monitoring Stations Required vs. Time to Detect: Injection at Midnight

With this information one can develop a sense of the resources required to develop a
system that will detect contamination introduced at any point in the system. In most real
water systems the number of stations required will greatly exceed the capital and human
resources available to cover the whole network. Factors such as dead-end lines,
pressure zones, lines with high water age and the like, will create areas that have low
efficacy from a system monitoring perspective and, thus, will require their own sampling
station to detect contamination for that small area. This issue will become more
apparent as the methodology seeks to identify and rank the effectiveness of various
monitoring nodes.

So, having developed an understanding of the number of nodes required to cover the
system, the core issues are now ready to be addressed, i.e.

1. Where are those nodes to be located?
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2. If all of the nodes necessary to cover the system cannot be implemented (ex.
resource constraints), what nodes should be selected for that smaller subset?
3. If a smaller subset is chosen, what portion of the system is covered; and
conversely, what portion will not be covered?

The next section develops the strategy for locating and ranking monitoring nodes in
terms of their suitability to detect contamination at other nodes within the pipe network.

Location of Monitoring Stations
Using the information from the sensitivity iterations, it is possible to construct
contingency tables to summarize the data and put it into a useful form to aid in
evaluation of the options. Excel has an internal “pivot table” function which
accomplishes this task and allows convenient plotting of the results. The contingency
table allows one to view the ranking of the Primary Monitoring Node and the associated
secondary monitoring nodes over time and at varying threshold concentration levels. In
this way the stability of the monitoring node set may be observed as the conditions vary.
This allows a realistic assessment of the functionality of a particular location sequence
which is invaluable when making risk tradeoffs or economic judgments. A few examples
illustrating the use of these tables and charts are shown below.

Suppose that the utility operating budget will allow no more than four monitoring stations
to cover Anytown. First, it is necessary to determine how many monitoring stations are
necessary to cover Anytown and then to locate those stations within the distribution
system. Using the sorting and supplemental node search tables it is also possible to
determine what sections of town are vulnerable if four monitoring stations are not
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sufficient. Recalling that the data is organized using cumulative time (i.e. time since the
contamination event), the best set of monitoring stations is determined for the time and
threshold concentration selected. For example, the chart above indicates that four
monitoring stations will be sufficient to cover the entire town if it is believed that no
threshold concentration is applicable. It also shows that five stations will be required if
100 mg/L must be observed before a detection is counted.

An interesting note here is that it is commonly assumed that using a zero threshold for
detection is the most conservative assumption in establishing the monitoring network.
Actually this is not the case because, from the network design perspective, the
contamination “signal” must be strong enough to be confirmed (threshold) and should
reject spurious events. Thus, this tends to require more monitoring stations, which
yields a more conservative design. Once the system is in place, of course, any
detection will be conservatively treated as an event, but that assumption should be used
on the operations side, not necessarily on the optimization side.

One way to develop a good overview of the optimum station locations is to look at all
times and all thresholds at once. For the midnight time of injection the monitoring
combinations are shown in Figure 7.
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Figure 7 Monitoring Station Configuration: Midnight Contamination Event (Permutation Order)

Node Ranking in Permutation Order
Again remembering that time is cumulative (t=0 to t=ts ) and therefore longer time periods
overlap shorter periods, this gives a first cut ordering of the ranked monitoring station
locations. The numbers along the X-axis, of course, being the Monitoring Nodes in
permutation order (Primary node first followed by ranked nodes). The Y-axis represents
the number of injection nodes that the indicated monitoring node combination detects for
the given ts and C*.

The purpose of this graph is to quickly scan the range of data to observe patterns that
may exist or to identify any dominant combinations that may exist. For the DBT with a
midnight injection at some point within the distribution system, the node sequence of
170/90/50/40 seems to provide the best coverage over all the range of data
assumptions.
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Node Ranking in Combination Order
It is noticed that the data presentation above has a “permutation” characteristic in that
each monitoring set is based on the Primary Monitoring Node holding the key position
and other nodes listed in ranked order. This is important when developing the node list,
however, when evaluating the efficacy of different monitoring node sets, the internal
order doesn’t matter. In other words once a node set is selected for consideration, it is
the efficacy of the group that matters since at that point there is no value to the order.
So in the example above if monitoring equipment was deployed at nodes 170/90/50/40,
it inconsequential whether the computed priority order is 170/90/50/40, 90/50/40/170,
50/40/170/90 or the like. Once those four nodes are selected it is the overall efficiency
of the group that matters. For that reason the node sets should be evaluated in
“combination” order, as opposed to “permutation” order, when selecting the most robust
set of monitoring nodes.

The same information viewed in combination order (equivalent node sets regardless of
ranking) is shown in Figure 8. It is noted that the number of columns is reduced from 14
to 11 as some of the nodes sets were combined when priority order was not considered.
This sorting operation is done through Excel using the VBA script indicated in Appendix
3.

From this chart it is seen that the node set 40/50/90/170 provides the most robust
coverage under all conditions. By incrementing through the time scale it is seen that this
sequence stabilizes as the dominant set 12 hours after the contamination event is
initiated. Also by observing the supplemental node tables at threshold concentrations
above 100 mg/L, it is observed that the area around node 120 will not be covered by this
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sequence (see Table 21). Table 21 is also useful in observing the time variance (or
stability) of the monitoring sets through the analysis period.
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Figure 8 Monitoring Station Configuration: Midnight Contamination Event (Combination Order)
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Table 21 Node Ranking for Midnight Injection Scenario

Rank
Threshold
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400

Hour
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24

1st
160
140
140
170
170
170
170
170
170
170
160
140
140
170
170
170
170
170
170
170
160
130
140
140
170
170
170
170
170
170
160
90
150
140
170
170
170
170
170
170
160
90
150
140
170
170
170
170
170
170

2nd
80
90
170
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
80
90
170
150
90
90
90
90
90
90
80
90
170
170
90
90
90
90
90
90
80
160
140
170
90
90
90
90
90
90
80
150
140
170
150
150
150
150
150
150

3rd
90
170
90
50
50
50
40
40
40
40
90
160
90
90
50
50
50
50
50
50
90
80
90
160
50
50
50
50
50
50
90
150
90
160
50
50
50
50
50
50
90
80
170
160
90
90
90
90
90
90

4th
50
40
40
40
40
40
120
120
120
120
50
150
160
50
40
40
40
40
40
40
50
150
160
90
40
40
40
40
40
40
50
80
170
90
40
40
40
40
40
40
50
140
90
90
50
50
50
50
50
50
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5th
140
12
120
120
120
120

6th
170

7th
40

8th
120

140
170
40
40
120
120
120
120
120
120
140
140
40
40
120
120
120
120
120
120
140
140
50
40
120
120
120
120
120
120
140
160
50
40
40
40
40
40
40
40

150
40
120
120

170
120

40

150
50
120
120

170
170

40
40

150
50
40
120

170
170
120

40
40

150
50
40
120
120
120
120
120
120
120

170
170
120

40
40

Sensitivity Analysis Based on Injection Time-of-Day
Because the water demand throughout the system drives the contamination, there is
reason to believe that monitoring node selection may be sensitive to fluctuations caused
by the diurnal pattern. Therefore, it would seem prudent to explore the implications of
this factor on the stability of the monitoring node set.

To illustrate the effect of “Time-of-Day” that the injection occurs, the entire methodology
is performed again by setting up a new database for applying the DBT to scenarios with
injection beginning at 6 a.m., Noon and 6 p.m. The three new databases allow the
development of three new monitoring networks which use the same assumptions as
stipulated in the example problem, except that the injection time-of-day has been
changed. By comparing the “optimum” monitoring networks for each of the three
additional injection “Time-of-Day” injection scenarios, one can explore the impact of the
“Time-of-Day” variable and the stability of the midnight injection monitoring node set.

Monitoring Locations Based Upon 6 a.m. Injection
Using the DBT contamination event pattern, each node was modeled with a 6 a.m.
injection. The resulting information was used to populate a database which was then
analyzed as described above. The results of the analysis are interesting in that they
affirm the fact that, as hypothesized, the time-of-day that the injection occurs does in fact
have an impact on the monitoring set.

Fortunately, contamination in this instance can ultimately be detected with two
monitoring points as shown in Figure 9. Figure 10 and Figure 11 show that Monitoring
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nodes 170 and 90 will cover the system effectively. Table 22 illustrates that this pattern
stabilizes at hour 16 for all concentration thresholds.

It should be remembered that the time scale remains the same on all “Time-of-Day”
scenarios. Because this scenario dataset was generated from a contamination event
that started at 6 a.m., the pattern actually stabilized 10 hours after the event initiation.
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Table 22 Node Ranking for 6 a.m. Injection Scenario

Rank
Threshold
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400

Hour
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
30
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
30
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
30
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
30
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
30

1st
160
170
170
170
170
170
170
170
170
170
160
170
170
170
170
170
170
170
170
170
160
170
170
170
170
170
170
170
170
170
160
170
170
170
170
170
170
170
170
170
160
170
170
170
170
170
170
170
170
170

2nd
140
160
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
140
160
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
140
160
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
140
160
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
140
160
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
90

3rd
90
90

4th
130

5th
170

90
90

130

170

90
90

130

170

90
90

130

170

90
90

130

170
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Figure 9 Number of Monitoring Stations Required vs. Time to Detect: Injection at 6 a.m.
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Figure 10 Monitoring Station Configuration: 6 a.m. Contamination Event (Permutation Order)

147

Count of Monitoring Station Set

42
40
38
36
34
32
30
28
26
24
22
20
18
16
14
12
10

C* (mg/L)

400
300
200
100
0

90 160 170

90 170

90 130 140 160

8
6
4
2
0

Monitoring Station Set

Figure 11 Monitoring Station Configuration: 6 a.m. Contamination Event (Combination Order)

Monitoring Locations Based Upon Noon Injection
Stepping the time of injection forward another six hours, a new database was created
with contamination beginning at noon. A set of exhibits similar to those above are
developed and presented in Figure 12, Figure 13 and Figure 14 along with Table 23.

Again, it is interesting to see the shift in the monitoring station patterns. In this case it is
observed that the distribution system can be covered with a single monitoring node after
10 hours from injection. As before this is a subset of the set selected for the midnight
event, but indicates rather dramatically the affect that the diurnal patterns can have on
the analysis.
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Table 23 Node Ranking for Noon Injection Scenario

Rank
Threshold
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400

Hour
18
20
22
24
26
28
30
32
34
36
18
20
22
24
26
28
30
32
34
36
18
20
22
24
26
28
30
32
34
36
18
20
22
24
26
28
30
32
34
36
18
20
22
24
26
28
30
32
34
36

1st
160
130
170
170
170
170
170
170
170
170
160
170
170
170
170
170
170
170
170
170
160
170
170
170
170
170
170
170
170
170
160
170
170
170
170
170
170
170
170
170
160
170
170
170
170
170
170
170
170
170

2nd
130
170

3rd
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160

170
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160
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130
160
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Figure 12 Number of Monitoring Stations Required vs. Time to Detect: Injection at Noon
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Figure 13 Monitoring Station Configuration: Noon Contamination Event (Permutation Order)
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Figure 14 Monitoring Station Configuration: Noon Contamination Event (Combination Order)

Monitoring Locations Based Upon 6 p.m. Injection
Finally, the initiation time is moved forward another six hours and the full set of injection
nodes replicated sequentially beginning at 6 p.m. The new database is generated and
the sorting analysis recompiled. As with the 6 a.m. and noon analyses the optimum
monitoring set differs from the midnight contamination scenario. However, as with the
other initiation times, the selected set for the 6 p.m. event remains subsumed within the
midnight set. The ranking results for the scenario are present in Table 24.
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Table 24 Node Ranking for 6 p.m. Injection Scenario

Rank
Threshold
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400

Hour
24
26
28
30
32
34
36
38
40
42
24
26
28
30
32
34
36
38
40
42
24
26
28
30
32
34
36
38
40
42
24
26
28
30
32
34
36
38
40
42
24
26
28
30
32
34
36
38
40
42

1st
160
160
170
170
170
170
170
170
170
170
160
160
170
170
170
170
170
170
170
170
160
160
170
170
170
170
170
170
170
170
160
160
170
170
170
170
170
170
170
170
160
160
170
170
170
170
170
170
170
170

2nd
130
130
160

3rd
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5th
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Figure 15 Number of Monitoring Stations Required vs. Time to Detect: Injection at 6 p.m.
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Figure 16 Monitoring Station Configuration: 6 p.m. Contamination Event (Permutation Order)
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Figure 17 Monitoring Station Configuration: 6 p.m. Contamination Event (Combination Order)

Discussion
Examination of Figure 8, Figure 11, Figure 14 and Figure 17 shows that the time-of-day
at which injection occurs can be a significant factor in the monitoring set analysis.
Diurnal hydraulic patterns cause changes in flow velocity and direction which can result
in differences in timing and extent of contaminant plumes. However, in this system the
vulnerability is not quite as severe as might have been indicated by just an analysis of
the midnight injection alone. Accordingly, the vulnerability of a system should be
measured not only in a space dimension, but also in a time dimension. The implication
here being that the level of monitoring resources required may not be the same through
time.

It is also observed that some nodes may predominate in detection efficiency during the
day. In this illustration Node 170 is clearly the most important node in the monitoring
network. Aside from being the primary node for the Midnight injection, Node 170
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stabilizes as the only node necessary to detect contamination for the whole system 10
hours after a noon injection with approximately the same results for injection occurring at
6 am and 6 pm.

An application of this result would be that particular care should be taken to protect this
node and keep it operating at peak performance. While it is highly unlikely that this level
of dominance will be evident in larger networks, certain nodes will be more efficient, and
therefore, more critical than others in managing risks.

While this small illustration will not necessarily characterize every system in that all
monitoring sets will be subsumed in the “worst case” or master cluster of monitoring
points, it is hypothesized that there will be a tendency for this to occur in systems that
have stable operation and regular diurnal patterns. Systems with more substantial
temporal discontinuities such as significant seasonal or tourist impacts, large industrial
demands with varying production schedules, etc. are more likely to result in varying
focus points.

The analysis also shows when the water system is the most vulnerable. Because more
nodes are required for detection during the midnight event and because it takes longer
for the selected monitoring set to detect the range of events, the utility manager is given
an indication of the time of day and areas that are most vulnerable. This information can
be used to inform police or other security services of necessary patrol patterns which will
provide additional protection for their system.
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Summary
An illustrative example has been developed which constructs an analysis of a small
water system. The example uses commercially available off-the-shelf software
(WaterCAD and Microsoft Excel) to perform the analysis. The process is not dependant
on any proprietary software and can be adapted to any small system.

The sample problem steps through a heuristic process that organizes the extended
period water quality model data into a form that can be manipulated to tease out sets of
monitoring stations that outperform others in terms of detecting potential contamination
occurring at any node in the system.

The process demonstrates and provides a means of dealing with the variables of
Concentration threshold (C*), Time Since Injection (ts ), and Time of Day of Injection.
Each of these variables should be explored in any analysis to determine the magnitude
of its influence on the monitoring set. While in some cases the selected monitoring set
may fluctuate given the weight assigned to each variable, this should not necessarily be
viewed as a negative consequence.

Recall that the overall objective is, given a fixed number of monitoring stations, to select
a set of monitoring nodes that most efficiently detects contamination which can occur
anywhere in the distribution system at any time. In most real situations it is not likely that
the selected set will provide complete coverage of the distributions system. This
analysis also provides direction to utility managers regarding susceptible zones and
times of day that the system has higher risk than others. This information can in turn be
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used to implement institutional or operational control which can further reduce overall
system vulnerability.
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Chapter 8 Conclusions and Recommendations for Future Research

Summary and Conclusions
Water is a fundamental resource, not only for life, but for a community’s social and
economic structure. Therefore, protection of a community’s water system is crucial to its
well-being. Over the years regulations, design procedures and operational practices
have evolved in this country to safeguard the water delivered to each customer. By and
large this effort has been successful given the reduction in waterborne diseases and
reliability of delivery and overall water quality. However, representative sampling of
water systems to ensure adequate water quality has always been complex and
technically challenging. With the paradigm shift that occurred subsequent to the events
of September 11, 2001, it is necessary to reevaluate the processes and procedures
used to detect contamination in our public water systems.

It is the thesis of this study that the distribution system itself is particularly vulnerable to
contamination, especially intentional contamination, which has not generally been
recognized in the water industry. The procedures that have been sufficient to monitor
systems in the past are not adequate to detect, respond and recover from significant
mass contamination events that can occur within the distribution system itself. This
results primarily from the following general beliefs prevalent in the water industry.

First, the long term experience in the water industry has generally proven that if the
structural integrity of the pipe grid is maintained, drastic changes in plant effluent water
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quality would not occur. Consequently, regulatory and operations management primarily
has been focused on cross-connection, backflow prevention and corrosion control, as
well as strict standards for disinfecting and testing new pipe connections. This belief
was founded on the facts that the pipe network (1) by and large is buried and difficult to
access, (2) it has a positive backpressure (20 psig minimum) which makes it difficult for
contaminants to enter the system and (3) with backflow and cross-contamination
regulations and programs in place have been effective in protecting network integrity.

In addition, a chlorine residual is maintained within the distribution system which
provides nominal disinfectant capability throughout the pipe network. The residual also
serves as a sentinel for detecting contaminant intrusion. Finally, monitoring in
accordance with regulatory and “professional practice” guidelines was felt to provide
adequate quantification of water quality within the system.

The documented epidemiological record of waterborne illnesses in the United States has
shown a high level of progress and success over the past century. While periodic
events will occur, the overall record speaks for itself. This applies to both chemical and
biological etiologies.

However, as this study has probed the regulatory requirements and general technical
literature which provides the guidance by which distribution system sampling is
structured, a void is identified relative to intentional contamination. This study has
illustrated that the programs that can function acceptably when considering normal
system failures or even significant naturally occurring disasters, are ill-equipped to deal
with intentional mass contamination events. This results from several factors:
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1. Most routine monitoring is accomplished primarily through indicator or surrogate
parameters and cannot detect specific contaminants in real time, and in most
cases the results will not be known for at least three to five days.
2. If the technology does exist to detect a set of contaminants within one hour or
less, the financial and operational ability to deploy that technology makes it
impracticable, especially in small to mid-sized systems.
3. Guidance on location of monitoring stations is not focused on searching for
optimum locations based on flow and water quality patterns.

Recognizing the deficiency of current monitoring practice to quickly detect an acute,
massive contamination event, water system managers need assistance in developing an
approach to identify a robust, if not optimized, set of monitoring stations. When one
examines the regulations and literature there is little, if any, explicit guidance instructing
water system managers on where to locate water quality monitoring stations to detect
mass contamination within a distribution system.

Locating a robust set of monitoring locations is important because monitoring stations
are expensive to purchase and operate. Plus, a large number of stations generating
streams of real-time information can produce a massive volume of data that could create
data management and interpretation problems. Thus, the objective of this study is to
maximize coverage of the network with the minimum number of stations, again
remembering that sampling for this purpose has a different focus than for the TCR.

The characteristics of an ideal contaminant were defined as those that are essentially
undetectable by the senses (e.g. colorless, tasteless, and odorless), highly soluble or
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finely divided and highly toxic. The contaminant can be either biological or chemical. A
review of pertinent literature has been performed to identify agents that have a
reasonable likelihood of being used to contaminate a public water supply. Logistical,
toxicity and/or infectivity considerations reduce the number of potential candidates to a
more or less manageable number, if the purpose of the contamination event is to impose
a health risk to a large number of people. However, it should be pointed out that the
literature does not explicitly address fate of most agents under conditions found in a
potable water distribution system. Considerable research is necessary to address the
paucity of data along those lines. Having said that, it would seem that Shigella,
Salmonella, and Vibrio cholerae are viable bacterial threats although they do have
susceptibility to reasonable chlorine levels.

It also appears that B. anthracis could be a very potent and difficult agent to eradicate
within a water system. While the vast majority of attention is focused on its inhalational
risk, the threat from ingestion may also present a worrisome risk. Additional research on
this agent and this route of exposure is encouraged.

Cryptosporidium or Giardia should also be considered because of their chlorine
resistance and low LD 50 levels. Additional research with toxins in water systems is
warranted, but it appears that Botulinum, Aflatoxin and Ricin are the most likely to be
weaponized at this point.

Likewise, chemical agents have considerable gaps with regard to the ingestion route.
The current thinking in many venues is that some form of cyanide, arsenic or
orthophosphates holds the most potential as viable contamination agents. The issue of
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detectability for some of these agents could reduce their utility. However, these certainly
have characteristics that can manifest adverse health effects and should be considered
for monitoring.

A few caveats are worthy of note. First, the literature sources used in this study are in
the public domain. Other classified agents that are not searchable are likely to exist.
Also, this study does not consider pharmaceuticals or explicit hallucinogenic drugs which
may result in an effect desired by terrorists. While this means that additional agents
could exist, the knowledge of and accessibility to such agents, as well as their logistical
constraints, hopefully, would significantly limit their utility.

Due to the complexity of water distribution systems there is no practicable way to
physically test a system to isolate the effective monitoring nodes. However, the speed
and power of computers and network analysis software have developed to the point that
it is now possible to develop mathematical models of those systems. They are also
capable of managing the large datasets that are produced in ways that were not
practicable in the past. This coupled with the fact that the cost of these tools has
dropped to the point that it is accessible to the target audience, i.e. small to mid-sized
water systems. Accordingly, the tools now exist to begin to address the problem in a
more scientific fashion.

This study has proposed a heuristic algorithm targeted for small to mid-sized water
systems which identifies a robust set of monitoring station locations capable of detecting
mass contamination occurring within the distribution system itself. The algorithm is
structured to treat every node in turn as a contaminant source and model the fate of the
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contaminant through the system over time. The results of these simulations are then
organized and analyzed to search for the number of nodes required to cover the system
and identify which node sets demonstrate stability over a range of detection times and
concentration thresholds. This process is then applied to a small test distribution system
using off-the-shelf commercially available software to illustrate its applicability to small or
mid-sized water systems.

Following the pattern used by other studies in the literature search, initial configurations
of the algorithm sought to optimize the monitoring node set by using a fixed analysis
time. Usually, this was tied to a diurnal sequence and, given the outcome of that one set
of conditions, the monitoring locations were established. When the early versions of this
algorithm were developed, it solved the problem in the same way. However, one of the
advantages of structuring the problem in the manner discussed in this paper is that one
is able to examine and manipulate the raw data directly. This allows full use of all of the
modeling software to describe an event, or combination of events, of interest to the
analyst without being constrained by the optimization process. While this can create
additional work in the modeling effort, current computer power and software routines can
manage those requirements for the size of system targeted in this study.

Using this approach and examining the results raised the question as to whether an
arbitrarily set time of analysis was warranted. Although some discussion occurs in the
literature regarding minimum time to detect contamination, none of the other papers
have suggested an approach that explicitly considers “Time Since Injection” (ts ) as a
variable for analysis. However, after looking at the raw data, and upon further
consideration of the context, it seemed that expanding the algorithm to include this factor
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would be prudent. The results did, in fact, confirm that ts is important in developing a
sense of the stability of the monitoring set. Accordingly, this study recommends that
future optimization processes consider ts when establishing the monitoring set.

Again, analysis of the raw data set and consideration of the context suggested that it
might be appropriate to consider a Threshold Concentration (C*) factor in the analysis.
This resulted from two observations. First, the mathematical computations would at
times produce very small values for some nodes. These values, though greater than
zero, seemed to be more computational artifacts than significant concentrations. Thus, if
a selection rule was established that noted any cell with a value greater than zero, these
cells would be selected and could bias the results with insignificant readings.
Accordingly, the algorithm was expanded to allow the analyst to set a C* value such that
any cell whose computed concentration was less than C* would be rejected from the
standpoint of influencing the monitoring station set. There could, of course, be situations
where an analyst wished to consider all data in which case one would set C* = 0.

Another reason for establishing a C* variable is to permit future use of a NOAEL or other
threshold concentration effect level (See Appendix 2). Thus, if the examination of a
system included some assumption of an acceptable concentration level the analysis
could accommodate such a consideration. A cautionary note in this regard is warranted.
While the computer simulation of water networks has developed considerably, there are
still many assumptions and sources of error which must be recognized. Therefore, as
with many epidemiological studies, the C* consideration should be viewed more as an
“indication” of effect rather than an absolute value. In other words depending on the
nature of the contaminant and the C* selected, a water system should not necessarily be
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considered “clean” if all concentration values are below C*. Rather, C* provides a
means of examining the sensitivity of an optimum monitoring station set to small
concentration values.

The implications of this note are interesting. The inability to compute and evaluate
concentrations at absolute levels is not necessary to effectively use the process
described in this paper to locate the monitoring stations. While experimenting with
different DBT scenarios during the initial phases of this study, it was realized that the
relationships influencing node selections are relative. The DBT selected influences the
magnitude of the concentration spikes, and thus has an impact from a NOAEL or action
level point of view, but the locations of the monitoring stations remain more or less
insensitive to that variable. Thus, the monitoring stations can be selected using any
hypothetical event while remaining more or less insensitive to the nature of the
contamination event itself. Of course, the more that contaminants exhibit significant
growth or decay characteristics relative to each other, an effect may be noticed.
However, modeling that type of behavior is imprecise in its own right and has its own set
of instability that must be evaluated.

Use of C* as an analysis variable also pointed out a fact that the current literature does
not seem to adequately consider. Most studies use the assumption that the most
conservative form of analysis must consider any positive concentration value at any
node to define the optimum monitoring set. Actually, this is not true. When defining a
more rigorous monitoring set, using a C* reduces the number of detection data points
and requires a “stronger” data signal to be considered. Consequently the analysis relies
on fewer data points. As one considers this implication, using a C* will tend to require
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more sampling stations. More sampling stations in this context are more conservative
than fewer sampling stations. The reason this point is overlooked is that this assum ption
(consideration of all positive concentration values) is the most conservative assumption
when actually monitoring the distribution system, i.e. as an operational rule. It is not,
however, the most conservative assumption when designing the monitoring set.

Finally, an outcome of this research emphasized the need to consider “Time of Day of
Injection” (TDI) as a variable for consideration. Because diurnal variations exist within all
community water systems, the direction and magnitude of flow within the pipes will vary
throughout the day. The literature to this point in time has tended to assume a time of
injection and compute a monitoring set using the approach proposed in that paper. This
study used the algorithm proposed in Chapter 6 and went a step farther by examining
the effect of TDI on the proposed monitoring set. It was determined that TDI can, in fact,
have a significant impact on the monitoring set and should be considered in any
methodology that seeks to truly define the rigor, if not the validity, of a specified
monitoring location set.

Areas of Future Research
This dissertation has provided an approach and solution to the research questions
identified in Chapter 1. However, while providing a direct response to the questions,
further research is warranted to enhance the approach to improve its utility and expand
the theoretical basis underlying portions of the algorithm. More specifically, these
recommendations are as follows.
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It is clear that additional research into the impact and fate of various contaminants within
water systems is necessary. As this study has indicated the discussion of fate must also
include the conditions existent within the distribution system itself. It is, again, the thesis
of this dissertation that the distribution network is actually the most vulnerable
component of the water system and must be considered as a potential point of
contaminant injection. The limited studies to date have focused on the contaminant
removals or inactivation by water treatment processes. With consideration of the nature
of the distribution system environment, guidance relative to fate, survivability, toxicity or
infectivity of the agent, especially via the ingestion route, is necessary.

Related to this, continued research is necessary to develop the sensing devices that can
detect concentration variances at acceptable cost, turnaround time, durability, and
operational stability for the parameters in question. Much work is proceeding in this area
and with advances in nanotechnology, miniaturization and biotechnology instruments to
meet the assumptions of this paper seem within reach. Obviously, the more parameters
that a single instrument can detect the more desirable it is. Interestingly, many of the
issues seem to be related as much to power (battery life) as to technical issues of
detecting a contaminant.

One assumption implicit in this methodology is that each node is assigned equal
important in the screening process. From a pragmatic standpoint this is not true. For
example, a node demand which is used primarily for non-potable uses (ex. irrigation)
may not be as critical as one that is sensitive for water quality (ex. hospital, key
government buildings, etc.) Therefore, an expansion of this model may be to develop

167

and apply a means of weighting node sensitivity and importance in terms of stipulated
outcomes.

This study used Microsoft Excel® as the primary tool to manipulate the data, because it
is more transparent than a relational database and, therefore, more suitable for
examination in a study such as this. However, because Excel® has inherent data size
limitations, the next phase in developing this algorithm will be to improve the data
handling characteristics by use of more sophisticated database structures and
automation features.

Associated with the improved database structure would be the extension of the algorithm
to consider monitoring station location on the basis of “Volume Consumed” as well as
“Time Since Injection”. This dissertation used ts as the initial basis of location because it
is more straightforward and is an important criterion in detection efficiency. However, if
the ultimate objective of monitoring is to minimize adverse health effects, then the
volume consumed is a more critical parameter than ts . While the two are related they
are not necessarily equivalent and thus consideration should be given to adapting the
algorithm to weighting the selection process to volume rather than time. With improved
data storage and management this task should be feasible.

With regard to possibilities for improving the underlying theoretical basis for the
algorithm, it seems possible to treat the outcome data as a Markov Chain process. The
data, especially using C* to create a binomial response, seems amenable to processing
using that mathematical approach. This could lead to analysis and decision processes
that would be more efficient and rigorous than those proposed here. Genetic algorithms
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are being proposed in some of the more recent papers (Ostfeld & Salomons, 2003) and
have shown some potential for searching for optimum solutions. However, the Markov
Chain approach has not been proposed in any of the papers viewed to date.

Finally, research should be initiated relative to incorporating this work into a public health
surveillance program. The purpose of water quality monitoring is to provide warning of
anomalous events as early as possible in order to protect public health and property.
While this study, hopefully, makes a contribution in terms of assisting system managers
in strategically placing the sensing devises, there is much work that needs to be done to
set this in an operational framework.

The SDWA has detailed requirements regarding consumer notification of MCL
exceedances. However, as the frequency and number of parameters monitored
increases, the likelihood of false positives can create nuisance, in not disruptive,
notifications. Decision rules and processes must be developed to give guidance to
water system operators to adequately balance these conditions.

In the past there has been little actual operational communications between the utilities
and the public health/medical community. With the passage of the Public Health
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, this deficiency is
beginning to lessen through the Vulnerability Assessment process, however, there is still
much work to be done. Just as water system monitoring is not sufficiently responsive for
acute massive events, the public health network is believed to suffer from the same
deficiencies.

169

Future research directed at developing a surveillance and communications model with
an emphasis on two-way communication would seem to be useful. In other words the
model would not just promote communication from the public health/medical community
to the utility by identifying waterborne health effects, but via improved short-term
monitoring the utility could report waterborne anomalies to the public health and medical
communities that could be used in patient notification and care.

This point is believed to be of importance because it is possible that the engineering
aspects of detection may be more effective than discovery via the clinical perspective,
especially for biological agents. This follows from the fact that many biological agents
have an incubation period measured in days if not weeks. If an efficient water system
monitoring program was established, detection could be noted in less than a day (at
least for covered nodes). If identified agents were communicated to the medical
community, this information could provide valuable insight into diagnosis and treatment
as well as provide critical response time for public notification, supplemental supplies
and support, if necessary. The primary issue being highlighted here is whether there
exists a functional partnership between these important social entities that is sufficient to
defeat or mitigate a massive contamination event.
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Appendix 1: Selected General Distribution System Design Guidelines
Key Water Demand Criteria:
1. Average Day: total year’s pumpage divided by 365 (expressed in MG/day)
2. Maximum Day: maximum 24-hour demand in one year
3. Maximum Hour: maximum 1-hour demand in one year
4. Fire Flow Demand: flow to provide for fire defense; generally computed by the
Insurance Services Office (ISO) criteria in the Fire Suppression Rating Schedule.
5. Present and Future
a. Type: Residential, Commercial, Industrial, Irrigation
b. Location: Direction/areas of growth

Redundancy:
1. At least two pumping units to be provided. With any pump out of service the
remaining pumps shall be capable of providing the maximum pumping demand
of the system.
2. Auxiliary Power provided from two separate feed sources or have auxiliary power
generator capable of operating critical components to service 50% of Maximum
Daily Flow

Pressure:
1. Minimum: 20 psig at ground level
2. Normal: 40-70 psig (35-60 psig RSWW recommended)
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Diameter:
1. Minimum: 6” for lines providing fire service; larger if required to maintain
minimum pressure during fire event.
2. Smaller mains (3” recommended min.) are allowed only in special circumstances
based on land use and hydraulic analysis. No fire service required.

Fire Protection:
3. Design system (supply, storage, pumps and mains) to meet fire demands of
State Insurance Services Office or other jurisdictional agencies.
4. Account shall be taken for hourly and season fluctuations in water demand when
designing for fire flow.

Distribution Mains:
1. Dead end mains minimized to reduce head loss and improve reliability of service.
2. Hydrants should be placed at street intersections and at intervals of 350-600’.
Hydrants not connected to mains that don’t support minimum fire flow (500 gpm)
3. Valves should be placed at minimum intervals of 500’ in industrial areas, 800’ in
residential areas and one mile in rural areas.

(adapted from: Recommended Standards for Water Works, 1997)
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Appendix 2: Major Variables in Modeling Water Distribution System Response to
Terrorist Attack
Contaminant Characterization
1. Nature of the Contaminant
a. Biological, chemical, or physical
b. Infective/toxic dose characteristics (dose-response information)
i.

NOAEL

ii. Regulatory default values
2. Dose Characterization
a. How much injected into system
i.

Volume injected

ii. Initial Concentration of injection
iii. Duration on injection
b. Location of injection
c. Date effects (ex. weekend/holiday/max. usage)
d. Time of Injection
e. Growth/Decay of contaminant in the system
3. Analytical Techniques Available
a. Accuracy (sensitivity, specificity)
b. Turnaround time
c. Sampling characteristics
i.

Volume of sample required

ii. Time to sample
iii. Skill/effort of sampling staff
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iv. Cost (equipment/expendables)

Distribution System Characterization
1. Hydraulic characterization
a. Distribution system geometry
i.

Actual vs. Skeletonized

ii. Pipe information
(a) Diameter
(b) Length
(c) Friction factor (function of Age, Material, water quality)
iii. Valve information (type, location, settings (open/closed/fractional))
iv. Storage tanks
(a) Elevated vs. Ground
(b) Geometric configuration (Diameter/Height/Volume; feed method)
(c) Operational Control (control equipment and setpoint/levels)
(d) Functional characteristics
(i) Short-circuiting
(ii) Diurnal Turnover and implications for water age/quality
b. Pump information
i.

Pump Curve characteristics
(a) Impeller Characteristics (Diameter, type)
(b) Pump Type
(i) Constant speed vs. Variable Speed
(ii) Turbine, Horizontal Split Case, End Suction, etc.
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c. System Demand Patterns - note: these are statistical characterizations (i.e.
all equivalent demand types (residential/commercial/etc) are assumed to
have equal withdrawals rates during equivalent time periods; the actual
demands are stochastic)
i.

Average Daily Demand

ii. Peak Hourly Demand
iii. Peak Instantaneous Demands
iv. Transient System Fluctuations
(a) Fire Flow
(b) Line Break
(c) Equipment/controls outage or malfunction
v. Change in system characteristics over time (new development/industry,
new booster station, close an old pumping station, etc.)
2. Water Quality
a. Water characterization from plant
i.

Normal operation

ii. Malfunction or atypical operation
b. Pipe effects
i.

Biofilms and its impact on contaminant
(a) Protective matrix
(b) Potential nutrient source
(c) Potential reproductive/breeding area

ii. Pipe materials (ex. CIP/DIP, PVC (internal/external leaching), copper,
etc.)
iii. In-pipe water quality changes (pipe as a reactor/contact basin)
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c. Chlorine residual maintained in water column
d. Transformations caused by chemical interactions between different water
sources
i.

Multiple water supply sources/plants feeding the distribution system

ii. Intersystem connections
e. Water age (related to hydraulic characteristics above)
f.

Operational influences
i.

Line Maintenance
(a) Flushing
(b) Pigging
(c) Repairs

ii. Transient conditions
(a) Hydraulic
(b) Treatment fluctuations
iii. Cross-connections
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Appendix 3: Description of Computational Procedure Associated with Analysis of
Anytown Water System
1. Develop and Calibrate a hydraulic model of the water system in question. This
would include decisions regarding skeletonizing non-critical distribution elements
(ex. pipe diameters below a given threshold, dead-end lines, etc.), verifying
pump/system control sequences, and backchecking against actual operating
records. The base computer model used should have a water quality feature
available (ex. EPANET, WaterCAD, KYPIPE, etc.); General calibration
procedures should be followed (see AWWA working papers).
2. Develop a Design Basis Threat (DBT) to describe the nature and extent of the
hypothesized contamination event. This would include such factors as time of
injection, duration of injection, volume/concentration of injection, identification
and nature of the contaminant.
3. Convert the DBT into an injection event in the computer model. This includes
modeling decisions such as time step selection, integration into diurnal
variations, decay/growth parameters, pipe wall effects, etc.
4. One of the issues to be dealt with is ‘what duration should be used when running
the computer simulation?’ The DBT should be test run at a number of locations
to see how long the contaminant persists in the system. A decision criteria
should be established such as calculated contaminant values equal to or less
than a given threshold. This will establish the duration to be used as the time
basis for the system definition runs.
5. Develop a notation convention to keep track of the computer runs and then move
the injection event to every node in turn, run the network model and record the
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results. The notation should delimit monitoring and injection nodes. WaterCAD
has a Scenario/Alternative feature that is useful in the regard.
6. Take the results of all the runs and export them to Excel. Note: the number of
runs will equal the number of nodes in your model if you moved the injection
point to every node in turn. Because you are measuring the response of the
injection at a specific node at every other node, this means that you will have N2
node responses in one dimension. In the other dimension, the model will list the
response by timestep. Several things must be kept in mind when performing this
step. Excel is limited to 256 columns. Because the analysis will include N2 node
responses the data will need to be transposed in order to be imported into Excel.
The number of timesteps required will generally be much less than 256 so the
transposition should not be a problem. (All formulas and VBA code in the steps
that follow are designed to work with time steps as column labels and nodes as
row labels so, even if N2 does not exceed 256, transpose the data.)
a. Insert, Worksheet
b. Return to original worksheet; select the full range of data, taking note of the
size of the range as shown beside the cursor (or in the Name Box), ie. 46R x
256C; Copy
c. Go to new, blank worksheet and select a range in reverse size, ie. 46C x
256R; Edit, Paste Special, Transpose, OK.
d. Rename the new worksheet Transposed CSV and delete the original
worksheet.
i.

Fractional timesteps will occur at transition points in the analysis (pump
on/off, tank fill/drain, etc.) so if the duration is long or the system is
unusually active, some data cleansing may be required.
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e. In a later step, you will need to filter for unique response and injection nodes.
i.

On the Tranposed CSV worksheet, type rnode in cell AA1; enter the
formula =LEFT(A2,FIND(" ",A2,1)-1) in cell AA2; copy the formula in cell
AA2 to the last row containing data; filter this new list for unique values by
clicking Data, Filter, Advanced Filter… (if you get a warning message
about the label, just click OK); in the Advanced Filter window, select Copy
to another location; the List range is your list of values in the rnode
column – in this example, cells $AA$1:$AA$257; in the Copy to box, type
$AC$1; check the Unique records only box; click OK; this provides you
with a list of response nodes that will be used as row labels.

ii. On the Tranposed CSV worksheet, type cnode in cell AB1; enter the
formula =MID(A2,LEN(AA2)+2,(FIND(" ",A2,LEN(AA2)+2))(LEN(AA2)+2)) in cell AB2; copy the formula in cell AB2 to the last row
containing data; filter this new list for unique values by clicking Data,
Filter, Advanced Filter… (if you get a warning message about the label,
just click OK); in the Advanced Filter window, select Copy to another
location; the List range is your list of values in the cnode column – in this
example, cells $AB$1:$AB$257; in the Copy to box, type $AD$1; check
the Unique records only box; click OK; this provides you with a list of
injection nodes that will be used as column labels; manually sort this list if
necessary.
f.

Also in a later step, you will need the time steps in rows as a list range for a
combo box.
i.

On the Transposed CSV worksheet, select the time steps in row 1; Copy
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ii. Go to cell AE2 on the same worksheet; Edit, Paste Special, Transpose,
OK.; type the label Time in cell AE1.
7. Using the transposed data set, set a threshold as a basis for counting the values
for each timestep from 0 to the end of the duration - always beginning with
timestep 0. For example, at timestep 5, the count would be computed by
counting the values from timestep 0 to timestep 5. Note: depending on how the
network program is set up, the actual contamination will occur at a small fraction
after point 0, say time 0.1, so the full initial timestep is used. This produces a
slight error but it’s certainly within reason given the overall uncertainty of the
process. Also, if there is a preexisting level of the contaminant at a node, this
step will be necessary to capture it’s initial effect. It is suggested that only the
even increment timesteps be used (typically this is the timestep used in the water
system modeling).

Two variable selections, five tables and a command button are required in order
to summarize the data set. These are created on a new, separate worksheet
and are comprised of both formulas and code.

a. Insert, Worksheet; name it Count Summary.
b. Name and create the first variable setting – a threshold variable by which
data set values are determined to be less than or equal to, or greater than,
the variable.
i.

In cell A1, paste this text:

ENTER Threshold VARIABLE (mg/L): and

row height at 21.75
ii. In cell F1, paste this number:

0
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format the

c. Name and create the second variable setting – a combo box with time step
selections.
i.

In cell L1, paste and right-align this text: Select Time Period:

ii. Insert a Combo Box and size it to span row 1 and columns M & N
iii. Right-click on the combo box and select properties; on the (Name) row,
name the button cmbCTime; on the ForeColor row, drop down to select
red from the Palette; on the Font row, click the ellipses and select Bold
(Arial, 10 should already be set); on the LinkedCell row, type $N$1; on
the ListFillRange row, paste this reference: 'Transposed CSV'!AE2:AE26;
close Properties window; click the Design Mode button on the Controls
toolbox to exit design mode
iv. Select a value from the combo box (to place a value into cell N1 that will
avoid formula errors in later steps).
d. Create the less than or equal to threshold variable table.
i.

In cell A2, paste this text:

Less than or equal to variable:

and format row height

at 30
ii. In cell A3, type Node
iii. Starting in cell A4, paste the unique Response nodes from the
Transposed CSV worksheet ('Transposed CSV'!AC2:AC17)
iv. Starting in cell B3, transpose/paste the unique Injection nodes from the
Transposed CSV worksheet ('Transposed CSV'!AD2:AD17)
v. In cell B4, enter (Ctrl+Shift+Enter) this array formula:

=COUNTIF(INDEX('Transposed CSV'!$B$1:OFFSET('Transposed
CSV'!$B$1,256,$N$1-'Transposed CSV'!$B$1),MATCH(TEXT($A4&"
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"&B$3&" Injection Concentration (mg/l)",0),'Transposed
CSV'!$A$1:$A$257,0),0),"<= "&$F$1)
Copy the formula to the rest of the cells in the table

vi. Format data as Number with 0 (zero) decimals; format table as desired
e. Create the greater than threshold variable table.
i.

In cell A21, paste this text:

Greater than variable:

and format the row height at

30
ii. Copy table 1 A3:Q19 (includes row and column labels) and paste to cell
A22
iii. In cell B23, enter (Ctrl+Shift+Enter) this array formula:

=IF(COUNTIF(INDEX('Transposed CSV'!$B$1:OFFSET('Transposed
CSV'!$B$1,256,$N$1-'Transposed CSV'!$B$1),MATCH(TEXT($A23&"
"&B$3&" Injection Concentration (mg/l)",0),'Transposed
CSV'!$A$1:$A$257,0),0),"> "&$F$1)=0,"",COUNTIF(INDEX('Transposed
CSV'!$B$1:OFFSET('Transposed CSV'!$B$1,256,$N$1-'Transposed
CSV'!$B$1),MATCH(TEXT($A23&" "&B$3&" Injection Concentration
(mg/l)",0),'Transposed CSV'!$A$1:$A$257,0),0),"> "&$F$1))
Copy the formula to the rest of the cells in table 2.

iv. Name table 2's data cells B23:Q38 (excludes row and column labels)
countgreat (type countgreat in the Name Box and press Enter)
v. In cell R22, paste COUNT ; in cell S22, paste Ave; in cell T22, Total
vi. In cell R23, enter this formula and copy it down the rows:
=COUNT(B23:Q23)
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vii. In cell S23, enter this formula and copy it down the rows:
=AVERAGE(B23:Q23)
viii. In cell T23, enter this formula and copy it down the rows: =R23*S23
ix. Format data as Number with 0 (zero) decimals; format columns as
desired
f.

Create a third table that will sort the values of table 2. In a later step, code
will be written in VBA to re-create table 3 but data must first be visually
placed on the worksheet in order to name ranges that VBA will be
programmed to refer to.
i.

In cell A40, paste this text:

Sorted values:

and format the row height at 30

ii. Select cells A22:T38 - the entire table 2 including row and column
headings, as well as the three additional count and average columns, but
not the cell containing the table heading Greater than variable:; Copy
iii. Paste the values of table 2 to cell A41 (Edit, Paste Special, Values, OK)
iv. With the pasted values still highlighted (A41:T57), type countsorttab in the
Name Box; press Enter
v. Select the data in the Count column of table 3 R42:R57 (excludes the
column heading, Count) and name the range countcv
vi. Select the data in the Total column of table 3 T42:T57 (excludes the
column heading, Total) and name the range countcav
vii. Select the Injection node column headings in the top row of table 3
B41:Q41 (excludes column A and the 3 Count and Average columns) and
name the range countcn
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viii. Select the Response node row headings in column A of table 3 A42:A57
(excludes the row containing the Injection node column headings) and
name the range countrn
ix. Select the first row of data in table 3 B42:Q42 (excludes row and column
node headings and the 3 count and average columns) and name the
range counter
x. Select all of the data in table 3 B42:Q57 (excludes row and column node
headings and the 3 count and average columns) and name the range
countar
g. Create a fourth table that will extract sorted data from table 3. In a later step,
code will be written in VBA to re-create table 4 but data must first be visually
placed on the worksheet in order to name ranges that VBA will be
programmed to refer to.
i.

In cell A59, paste this text: Summary of filtered values: and format row height at
30

ii. In cell A60, paste Col Node, in cell B60, paste Mon Node, in cell C60,
paste COUNT, in cell D60, paste Total
iii. Copy the row labels that identify the Response nodes from table 3
(A42:A57) to cells A61:B61
iv. Name the Injection nodes in column A of table 4, A61:A76 (excludes
headings), countcnn
v. Name the Response nodes in column B of table 4, B61:B76 (excludes
heading), countrnn (note that the values are not accurate now but will be
later)
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vi. Name the blank cells in column C of table 4, C61:C76 (excludes
heading), countcvn
vii. Name the blank cells in column D of table 4, D61:D76 (excludes
heading), countcavn
viii. Name the entire table 4, A60:D76 (excludes the table heading, Summary
of filtered values:), countfiltval
ix. Format table as desired
h. Create a fifth table that will sort the values of table 4. In a later step, code will
be written in VBA to re-create table 5 but data must first be visually placed on
the worksheet in order to name ranges that VBA will be programmed to refer
to.
i.

In cell G59, paste this text: Nodes not covered by first level node:

ii. Go to the named range countfiltval (drop down the name box and click on
the name); Copy
iii. Click on cell G60, Paste
iv. With the pasted cells still selected (G60:J76), name the new range
countfinval
i.

Add a command button control to the worksheet. VBA code will be assigned
to this button in a later step.
i.

Insert a command button and size it to span G1:I1 (open the Control
Toolbox, if necessary, to find the command button control)

ii. Right-click on the command button and select properties; on the (Name)
row, name the button cmdRank; on the Caption row, type the caption
View Ranked Data; on the Font row, click the ellipses, select Arial, Bold,
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8; close Properties window; exit design mode (first button on control
toolbar)
8. Write procedures to reproduce tables 3, 4 and 5.
a. In Visual Basic, insert a module and name it Count (View, Properties, Name).
Following the Option Explicit statement, paste each of the following six
procedures.
b. This first procedure automates pasting of the values in table 2 to table 3 and
renames table 3.

Sub CountPTV()
' This first procedure automates pasting of the values
' in table 2 (Greater than variable) to table 3 (Sorted values)
' and renames table 3
Worksheets("Count Summary").Range("countgreat").Select
Selection.CurrentRegion.Select
Selection.Copy
Range("countsorttab").Select
Selection.CurrentRegion.Select
Selection.PasteSpecial Paste:=xlPasteValues
Range("countsorttab").Cells(0, 1).Select
ActiveCell.Value = "Sorted values:"
End Sub

c. The second procedure sorts table 3 first by Count, then by Total, both
descending.
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Sub CountSNT()
' The second procedure sorts table 3 (Sorted values)
' first by Count, then by Total, both descending
Range("countsorttab").Sort Key1:=Range("countcv").Cells(0),
Order1:=xlDescending, Key2:= _
Range("countcav").Cells(0), Order2:=xlDescending, Header:=xlYes
End Sub

d. The third procedure searches for columns with no values in the first row of
sorted values in table 3.

Sub CountRCN()
' The third procedure searches for columns with no values
' in the first row of sorted values in table 3
Dim countcn, counter, countcnn As Range
Dim n As Integer

' Clear existing values in column A of table 4
Worksheets("Count Summary").Range("countcnn").ClearContents
Worksheets("Count Summary").Activate

Set countcn = Range("countcn") ' Refer to the first row in table 3 that
contains the column (injection) node labels
Set counter = Range("counter") ' Refer to the second row in table 3 to
determine if that row contains any empty cells
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Set countcnn = Range("countcnn") ' Refer to the first column in table 4
where the column labels that match empty cells will be returned

' Loop through cells in table 3
Do

' Count the number of columns in the countcn range and
' assign the number to the variable n
For n = 1 To countcn.Columns.Count

' Use the variable n as the row or column identifier
' where applicable, ie. in the counter row, we
' use 1 as the row and n to cycle through the columns
' If a non-numeric cell is found in counter, the code
' returns the label from countcn to the appropriate row
' in table 4. Otherwise, the row label in table 4 will
' have a value of "-"
If IsNumeric(counter.Cells(1, n)) = False Then
countcnn.Cells(n, 1) = countcn.Cells(1, n)
Else
countcnn.Cells(n, 1) = "-"
End If
Next n
Exit Do
Loop Until n = countcn.Columns.Count
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End Sub

e. The fourth procedure returns the corresponding response node, Count and
Total values from the first maximum value rows in table 3 to the rows
containing values in table 4.

Sub CountRRN()
' The fourth procedure looks at the columns in table 3
' that match the column (injection) node labels returned to table 4
' to determine the first maximum value within table 3's column
' and return the respective row (response) node label, Count value,
' and Total value to table 4.
Dim myrange, countcn, countrn, countar, countcv, countcav, countcnn,
countrnn, countcvn, countcavn As Range
Dim maxnum, m, n, r As Integer

' Clear columns 2-4 in table 4
Worksheets("Count
Summary").Range("countrnn,countcvn,countcavn").ClearContents
Worksheets("Count Summary").Activate

Set countcn = Range("countcn") ' Refer to column (injection) node labels
in table 3
Set countrn = Range("countrn") ' Refer to row (response) node labels in
table 3
Set countar = Range("countar") ' Refer to data in table 3
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Set countcv = Range("countcv") ' Refer to Count calculations in table 3
Set countcav = Range("countcav")

' Refer to Total calculations in table 3

Set countcnn = Range("countcnn")

' Refer to Col Node column in table

4
Set countrnn = Range("countrnn")

' Refer to Mon Node column in table

4
Set countcvn = Range("countcvn")

' Refer to Count column in table 4

Set countcavn = Range("countcavn") ' Refer to Total column in table 4

' Loop through cells in table 3
Do

' Count the number of columns in the countcn range and
' assign the number to the variable n
For n = 1 To countcn.Columns.Count

' Cycle through each row (using the variable n)
' in column A of table 4
' to determine if the row contains a value
' in order to proceed with code
If countcnn.Cells(n, 1) Like "J*" = True Then

' Count the number of rows in the countrn range and
' assign the number to the variable m
' Use the value assigned to m as the highest value for r
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m = countrn.Rows.Count
For r = 1 To m

' Once a value has been identified in column A of table 4
' the variables r, n & m serve to select data rows 1 to m in table 3
' in the column that matches the value identified
' and assigns that selected range to the variable myrange
Set myrange = countar.Range(Cells(r, n), Cells(m, n))

' Using the myrange variable, maximum value is located
' From the row containing the first value equal to the maximum,
' the row (response) node label from table 3 is returned to the Mon
Node column in table 4
' on the same row as the matching Col Node value
' the Count value from table 3 is returned to the Count column in table 4
' on the same row as the matching Col Node value
' the Total value from table 3 is returned to the Total column in table 4
' on the same row as the matching Col Node value
maxnum = Application.Max(myrange)
If countar.Cells(r, n) = maxnum Then
countrnn.Cells(n, 1) = countrn.Cells(r, 1)
countcvn.Cells(n, 1) = countcv.Cells(r, 1)
countcavn.Cells(n, 1) = countcav.Cells(r, 1)
Exit For
End If
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Next r
End If
Next n
Exit Do
Loop Until n = countcn.Columns.Count
End Sub

f.

The fifth procedure copies table 4 to table 5 and renames table 5.

Sub CountPFV()
' The fifth procedure copies table 4 to table 5 and renames table 5
Worksheets("Count Summary").Range("countfiltval").Select
Selection.CurrentRegion.Select
Selection.Copy
Range("countfinval").Select
Selection.CurrentRegion.Select
Selection.PasteSpecial Paste:=xlPasteValues
Range("countfinval").Cells(0, 1).Select
ActiveCell.Value = "Nodes not covered by first level node:"
End Sub

g. The last procedure sorts table 5

Sub CountSFT()
' The last procedure sorts table 5 by Count column (descending), then by
Total (descending).
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Range("countfinval").Sort Key1:=Range("countfinval").Offset(0, 2),
Order1:=xlDescending, Key2:= _
Range("countfinval").Offset(0, 3), Order2:=xlDescending,
Header:=xlYes
End Sub

9. Assign code to the command button control.
a. In Visual Basic's Project Explorer window, double-click Sheet1 (Count
Summary) and paste the following procedure into the blank Code sheet, after
Option Explicit. This code calls the six previously written procedures, in their
correct order, when the user clicks the View Ranked Data command button.

Private Sub cmdRank_Click()
Call CountPTV
Call CountSNT
Call CountRCN
Call CountRRN
Call CountPFV
Call CountSFT
Worksheets("Count Summary").Range("countfinval").Select
End Sub
Click File, Close and Return to Microsoft Excel. Save the spreadsheet.

200

About the Author

James R. Chastain, Jr. attended the University of Florida where he received his
Bachelor of Science in Civil Engineering with honors in 1971 and a Master of
Engineering in Environmental Engineering in 1972. He became a registered
Professional Engineer in the state of Florida in 1976 and has been a practicing engineer
since then. He became president of Chastain-Skillman, Inc., a consulting engineering
and environmental science firm, in 1982.

Mr. Chastain received a Master’s of Public Health from the University of South Florida’s
College of Public Health in 1993. After receiving his MPH, Mr. Chastain became
interested in projects that combined his engineering training with public health issues.
He subsequently entered the Ph.D. program at the University of South Florida where he
focused on research that sought to protect public water systems.

